ONDCP Director's Report: NSWBCN Efforts, WMD Threats, and Challenges

This report, a memo from the ONDCP Director to key stakeholders, provides an analysis of the NSWBCN's efforts in addressing threats from drug cartels, mafias, syndicates, and the potential use of drug trafficking channels by terrorists to smuggle WMDs. The report acknowledges the crucial work of NSWBCN in developing a comprehensive strategy to trace the routes and networks of criminals, focusing on interdicting drug flow and proceeds, weapons interdiction, and community sensitization. It highlights the challenges of addressing WMD threats, including the need for expertise and political and technical considerations. The report discusses the difficulties terrorists face in acquiring nuclear weapons, while also noting vulnerabilities such as corruption, poor cooperation, and technological gaps. It stresses the need for financial restrictions to curb the main motivation of drug business and the importance of addressing corruption. The report references several sources, including the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Update, FATF documents, and reports from the Washington Office on Latin America and UNODC.

Memo
From: ONDCP Director
To: Key stakeholders of ICP
Subject: Commentary on NSWBCN Efforts
Date: 1/13/20
It is apparent that the Southwest Border experience very many threats associated with the
existence and operation of drug cartels, mafias and syndicates as well as possible the use of drug
trafficking channels by terrorists to smuggle WMD. So far, NSWBCN has done a crucial job to
come up with comprehensive strategy that can help trace the routes and networks of such
criminals. So far, the primary threats addressed in the strategy include the interdiction of drug
flow and drug proceeds, the interdiction of flow of weapons and also the sensitization of
communities to avoid use of drugs (Border, 2012). The secondary threat which must be
addressed is the issue of WMD.
The difficulty lies in the need to address different areas of knowledge, analysis, and
political and technical factors. Islamic radicals have been trying to create their own nuclear
weapons since at least the early 1990s. The terrorist underground has even developed an
ideological concept that motivates the use of these weapons against the "infidels". However,
from plans to their implementation is a rather large and complex path. At the moment, there is no
evidence of real threats to terrorist access to nuclear weapons. Practically in all states at nuclear
facilities there are measures of physical protection, secrecy, multistage verification of personnel,
the rules of “two” or “three people” when working in strategically important zones (Isacson &
Meyer 2012). Despite the number and good armament, the attackers also failed to capture the

object. There is no reason to believe that the personnel of units with nuclear warheads are less
prepared. According to reports, the personnel of nuclear weapons storage sites in Russia and
Pakistan have at least. But the main difficulty in capturing strategic targets is not even the
counteraction of security, but the need to concentrate a sufficient number of people for an attack,
which is not easy, given the level of development of state institutions in all modern nuclear
countries. It is known that the number of Afghan Taliban (not less than 25 thousand people) and
their armament make it possible to seize the American White House, coping with its protection,
but it is unlikely they will be given the opportunity to gather in Washington for this purpose. Any
large-scale attack on a military facility will face the same, if not great, difficulties (UNODC 2015).
Of course, one cannot exclude the possibility of the sudden penetration of small groups of people
into the territory of military bases. This is evidenced by the experience of criminal incursions
into the territory of Russian military units in Faustovo (military unit 68128), Kronshtadt (45743)
and the Samara region, terrorist attacks on Pakistan's Mehran airbase, and finally, the penetration
of environmental activists at the Kleine Brogel base in Belgium, in the territory of which the
American nuclear munitions were stored.
Despite good efforts and strategies, NSWBCN still lacks adequate strategies for curbing
smuggling and use of WMD. Corruption, poor cooperation and technology represents areas that
still need to be considered (Ivanov 2018). Dealers recruit ordinary American citizens, threaten
them, offer huge amounts of money, etc. It remains to act against the main motivation of the drug
business - money, to carry out actions aimed at financial restrictions, not to allow the profit to be
spent, to freeze accounts, etc (FATF 2008). But here again, corruption plays a big role, which
can facilitate the transition of certain banks, which helps hide the transactions proceeds.

References
Border, S. (2012). National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation
Update. Retrieved from: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/swb_implementation10.pdf
FATF (2008). Best Practices Paper Best Practices on Trade Based Money Laundering. Retrieved
from: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/BPP%20Trade
%20Based%20Money%20Laundering%202012%20COVER.pdf
Isacson A. & Meyer M. (2012). Beyond the Border Buildup. Security and Migrants Along the
US-Mexico Border. - Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
Ivanov E. (2018). AML/CFT and anti-corruption compliance regulation: two parallel roads?
IACA Research Paper Series No. 2/2018:
http://iaca.int/images/Research/Research_paper_02_Eduard_Ivanov_final.pdf
UNODC (2015). Making the world safer from drugs, crime and terrorism. Retrieved from:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/EU-UNODC_10_Years_Brochure/EU-UNODC-
brochure_WEB.pdf