FLR2995 Case Study: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Survey Report

This case study analyzes a survey conducted on the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) UDOM-VIII, focusing on safety, conflict resolution, and compliance with the MODU Code. The survey addressed key areas including preparation for the offshore visit, conflict resolution among onboard staff, inspection of the free-fall lifeboat, and evaluation of various safety systems. The report details the inspection process, findings related to alarms, diesel generators, lifesaving equipment, and command authority, and provides recommendations for improvement. The case study emphasizes the importance of thorough inspections, addressing potential conflicts, and ensuring the operational readiness of safety equipment. The study also highlights the importance of clear communication and effective management in maintaining a safe working environment.

MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT SURVEY
By Name
Course
Instructor
Institution
Location
Date

Contents
Question 1...................................................................................................................................................3
Preparation for the offshore Visit................................................................................................................3
Required equipment and Precautions.....................................................................................................5
Question 2...................................................................................................................................................5
Conflict resolution...................................................................................................................................5
Question 3...................................................................................................................................................8
Free fall lifeboat inspection.....................................................................................................................8
Question 4.................................................................................................................................................11
Report........................................................................................................................................................11
Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................11
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................11
Findings.................................................................................................................................................12
(1) Alarms and indications.................................................................................................................12
(2) Diesel generator safety systems...................................................................................................13
(3) Lifesaving equipment...................................................................................................................13
(4) Standby generator........................................................................................................................13
(5) Command and Decision Authority................................................................................................14
Conclusions............................................................................................................................................14
Recommendations.................................................................................................................................14
REFERENCS................................................................................................................................................15

Question 1
Preparation for the offshore Visit
Competent Authority Inspection is one of the crucial ways that can be used to deliver oversight
of MODU. In most of the cases, the directives that are available do not specify with reasons what
kind of inspections should be carried out. Considering that this particular exercise is carried out
to assist in the management of the major hazard in the units, the importance of the unannounced
spot checks is very low(Langford et al 2014). The inspection exercise, therefore, should focus on
the preparedness, competence as opposed to the simple presence of hardware. One of the
approaches of the inspection will include a selection of several topics on the major hazards. The
selection process will be guided by the use of information that will be available at Research on
Maritime Handlers unit.
The activities of the inspection will be devised in such a manner so as to assist in the
identification of the effectiveness of assertions on the reflection of installation programs. The
preparation exercise will include a review of the written procedures of permit to work(PT W)as
it has been elaborated in the Research on Maritime Handling unit.
. Also, this will include obtaining more information from the owner of MODU.
There will be need to understand the format of the system and its intended use in the practical
field applications. The key roles of those managing the MODU system must be considered in

such analysis. A brief inspection protocol will be drafted as part of the preparation. In this draft,
the agenda for the inspection will be clearly stipulated. The other information that will be
necessary for the protocol inspection agenda document will include the following:
i. The position of those who will be subjected to the interview at the offshore unit
ii. A list of the documentary evidence that will be subjected to the assessment
iii. A list of the questions that will be in the form of the question sheets. This will be devised
to assist in the inspection of permit to work(PTW).
When it is considered necessary, there will be an onshore meeting with the operators to assist in
the exploration of the areas that are related to the permit to work(PTW )systems. During this
meeting, every operator will be expected to have permit to work(PTW) and their materials for
the training allocated to the onshore contractors. This stage will be very important as it will allow
the interrogation of the electronic system of the PTW at the shore. Appropriate and consistent
levels of proof that will be used to assess the compliance of each unit will, therefore, be
determined at the initial stages. This will then be followed by the development of the systems for
documenting the activities of the inspection (Vinnem 2014).
This is very crucial as it will enable the operator to know the kind of personnel who will be
required for a particular task (Kurtz 2013). It is expected that recording of the contemporaneous
notes will be done during the survey and therefore formal notebooks will be included in the list
of the required equipment. The written information is expected to form the basis of oversight
enforcement activities. The information will, therefore, be properly documented with the idea
that they may be subjected to scrutiny by others.

Required equipment and Precautions
In cases where requirements of the photographic pieces of evidence are needed, there will be
provision of cameras. This implies that cameras will be part of the required equipment in the list.
As part of the precautions, the use of cameras should be done with the permission of the operator
and they should not be close to the inflammable atmospheres. The precaution measures will
extend to the use of other equipment's that are considered vital .Some of them will include
switching off mobile phones while accessing control system. According to the information
provided, the number of people on board is sixty and the safety equipment equals this number.
Carrying of personal safety kits and lifesaving jackets will be very vital.
Question 2
Conflict resolution
In most cases, managers do issue contradicting messages. These messages are normally in
conflict with those of the employees. Although the employees are expected to be innovative and
use the established protocol in doing what is considered right, sometimes it may not be possible.
The employees in such cases are expected to focus on the initiatives of the company and all the
projects treated with the highest priority. People who find themselves in such a situation may
have predictable kind of responses(Shuen, Feiler and Teece 2014). The results include anger and
frustrations. The common reactions will include shutting down, withdrawal and waiting for
further direction to be given in regard to the matter at hand. Identification of such observations
during the survey will be clear evidence of furious reaction.
The manager has already issued a statement that contradicts the information from the engineers
as far as the operation of the fire detection system is concerned. First of all, there will be no
assumption that conflict exists. The acknowledgment of the existence of conflict will be the first

step in this particular process of the survey. According to the experience with similar cases, the
consequences of a cover-up may be very devastating. The analysis of the inconsistencies of the
delivered messages must be laid open. The problem may be worsening by acting as if the
delivered messages are consistent.
In the event that this is treated as an inconsistent message, it will be impossible to solve the issue.
Instead, the issues will be labeled irrelevant. It is important to note that leaders normally put
people including surveyors in situations that are impossible when they pretend that messages do
not conflict. The results of such activities will include preemption of any possible discussion on
the matter which is very dangerous. The statement of the OIM is very significant and it is a
pointer of several factors in the management or the organization itself. The situation has
therefore presented itself as a dilemma that is related to diverse consequences.
The second step will include identification of the possible causes of this kind of conflict. Some
of the possible causes of inconsistent message delivery include the following:
 Personality differences: It may be possible that engineers that are responsible for the
management of the fire detection system have personal differences with the managers and
as such, they give information that is inconsistent.
 Mismanagement of the transition and changes in the structure of the organization
 Poor communication including remarks that have been misunderstood by concerned
parties. This will include those comments that have been taken out of the context
 Perceived inadequacies of the resources
 A systemic scenario like a slowdown in the workforce
 The difference in the work objectives or the work goals

Noting that the identified factors are just suggestions, the process of the survey will dig in to
establish where the truth lies. This will be done while having in mind that failure to generate a
permanent solution may be very detrimental. A fundamental question will be used while seeking
a solution to the problem. Some of these questions will include:
 Who should be trusted between the manager and engineers?
 Could it be that there is a hidden agenda?
 What about communication effectiveness?
It is possible that the control or fire detection system had just failed a few minutes ago and the
error was yet to be communicated to the management for corrective measures. This will,
therefore, mean that the survey action must be carried out with precaution. Quick judgment will
be eliminated and the conclusion will be based on concrete facts. As part of the ethical
requirements, engineers are bound to work only in their areas of competence. Their statement in
regard to the problem with the fire detection equipment must be taken seriously.
The third stage will include moving to the exact location of the fire detection system in order to
establish its functionality. The process of the inspection should be guided with the manuals on
the site. The process should, however, be done in a professional manner that does not seek to
favor either side of the conflicting parties. The manager and the engineers must all be satisfied
that the inspection or the survey has been carried out as per the standard and therefore the
information received or the results obtained will be used as part of the solution to the problem.
Upon the establishment of the truth, the position of the parties will be reconciled based on their
references to the previous statements. The possible solutions to such conflicts will include the
following:

Creation of the interactive communication that will help clear and build trust between the
managers and the employees. The absence of trust can possibly compromise the communication
among the managers and the employees. The framework to manage conflict will include the use
of the written policies that touch on the employee handbook as well. The management review as
well will be carried out. In cases where open door approach may not assist in the conflict
resolution, attempts may be given to other options.
Question 3
Free fall lifeboat inspection
The free-fall lifeboat is becoming one of the common lifesaving equipment on the facilities of
the seagoing appliances. It is a representation of the latest improvement in safety over the
systems of the conventional lifeboats. As a result of the increased requirements of safety, the
authorities of the maritime have prepared the design and criteria of certification of the lifeboats.
Since during the survey it was discovered that one of the free-fall lifesaving boats was damaged,
the evaluation procedure will involve checking for the parameters like:
 Checking if the lifeboat is having adequate strength for the reserve. This will be
demonstrated during the test of the over height(Souchek and National Oilwell 2013)
 Determination of the adequate strength for the repeated use exercise. This too will be
demonstrating during the test of the free fall
 The lifeboat will be expected to have positive headway after entry into the water. This
goes along with the protection of the occupants from injury during the free fall. Its
evaluation will be done through forces of acceleration that will be measured during the
test
 Testing for reserve strength

The requirement of the good design is that the expected system must have a proper design whose
reserve strength is beyond the one stated. At the inspector's judgment, some minor damage may
be permitted during the test of the free fall. Regardless of the laminate cracking, permanent
deformation and delamination would usually not be considered
A visual inspection will be the immediate step towards the determination of the exact location of
the problem. In case there will be permanent deformation then that will be indicative of proper
damages(Konduc et al 2013). Depending upon the observed damages other methods of elevation
may be required. The methods that will be recommended will include ultrasonic testing
alongside the infra-red cameras. The lifeboat wills the cored at the location of the crack. The
pigmented gel coat can also be used. The expected result will be that canopy and hull will appear
cloudy in those areas where delamination has taken place. This will enable it to withstand the
expected loading during the operation(Shuen, Feiler and Teece 2014). The reserve strength is
demonstrated by launching the lifeboat from a height that is greater. The primary purpose of
conducting this kind of test is to illustrate the survival chances of the lifeboat during unexpected
events. During the period of the test, the watertight components of the boat will not be
considered ineffective. The test will only be considered successful if the watertight integrity and
structural fitness are maintained regardless of the delamination or the crack that may occur as a
result of the testing. Although it is not a must that the components should be ready for another
launch, it must still be able to serve as an appropriate appliance for the life-saving process(Kaiser
and Liu 2014).
The evaluation of the damaged free-fall lifesaving boat will not follow a universal standard or a
specific method. This is because there is much variation in the lifeboats that are produced by
different manufacturers. The evaluation will be strictly done to determine which component the

primary is in the structural setup. In most of the occasions, the inner liner can only serve as the
primary component of the structural set up if they were designed to work with the canopy and
hull in the load resistance. The components are meant to keep weather and water out of the;
lifeboat during the operation. It is important to note that the occurrence of the damage may not
necessarily the reason to reject the boat especially if the damage was from the reserved test.
There is usually the amount of the damage permitted which is always subjective (Esmaeili 2017).
The cracking of the gel coat during the test of reserve strength may not be considered serious.
This will be allowed if the crack has not penetrated the underlying material. At the corners and
other sharp edges, it will always be executed for the gel to show some cracking signs. The cracks
are to be considered cosmetic and as one caused by the natural flexibility of the boat. Such
cracks cannot be prevented practically from occurring. In the event that the evaluation
determines the delamination and the existence of the cracks to be beyond some extensive level,
some remedial action will be recommended.
Question 4
Report
Executive Summary
The purpose of the investigation was to perform a visual and auditory inspection on the mobile
offshore drilling units and give an opinion as to whether the components of the unit were
performing the functions for which they were intended to. The report that has been given is not
meant to be all-encompassing (Coli and Schelske 2016). The report is specific just on the areas
that have been reported by the inspector.

Introduction
It is important to note that every component of the MODU is in the used condition and therefore
they are in the state of tear and wear. The inspection did not involve the dismantling of the real
equipment to inspect the component parts. The term inspection has not been used to mean all the
components of the unit but rather those that were subjected to the inspection. It is further
certified that the report that had been presented here has not been subjected to any manipulation
to serve the interest of the inspector but rather address the fundamental issues on the unit I regard
to its performance.
Findings
The MODU unit was actually designed to propel itself to a site of exploration and also to keep
the station over the site without the use of a fixed system of mooring. It was to act as a base of
the operations of the drilling. The rig actually served as a floating base that was stable for the
outfitting and drilling. As for the case of the drilling rigs, the operation of the rig has been done
by a crew under the command leadership of licensed master. The crew was being directed by the
OIM at points where there was the attachment of the rig to the bottom. The crew members were
divided into functional areas including deck, drilling, engineering and other operations of the
subsea. Each of these functional units was headed by the head of the department who’s acted as a
subordinate to the master(Weaver 2014).
The crew members stood at designated points in a rotation that was prescribed. They were
regularly cycled on and off to ensure maximum support for the continuous operations. Six large
diesel generators were used to power the integrated electric plant of the rig. A system of
mechanical devices and electrical components were installed to assist in the detection of
combustible gases and prevent its ignition

(1) Alarms and indications
In total there were 27 CGDs present on the rig. Each of these components had a visual and
audible alarm system. Ten out of the 27 CGDs were installed with the automatic responses
including securing of the ventilation fans and all electrical components. According to the
manual, the design of the system was to accommodate just one CGD at every location point. The
remaining CGDs only had a visual display and audible systems(Ma et al 2013). The engine room
was not installed with the CGD and this meant that every crew had to validate an alarm in the
space prior to any manual operation. The procedures and training have not been sufficient sea s
to ensure timely actions that may be considered effective to prevent the occurrence of the
explosions.
(2) Diesel generator safety systems
The diesel engines were basically fixed with devices that were responsible for the overspend shut
down. These three components were responsible for shutting down the fuel supply but
unfortunately, none of the devices were designed to close off the direct intake to the engine.
Instead, one of the signals was sent to the systems IACS. The uncontrolled flow of the
hydrocarbons through the derrick led to the emergence of a huge cloud of gasses to the
surrounding of the rig(Brodie 2013). The design of the rig has no employed the use of an
automatic system to reacts to the indicators of the blowout methods.
(3) Lifesaving equipment
Life-Saving equipment
The number of the lifesaving equipment was actually enough although one of the free-fall boats
were found to have some defects. The study, however, revealed a lack of shielding of heat to
protect the escape paths and the equipment of life-saving(Bailey, Craig and Reddy 2014).

(4) Standby generator
The standby generator was found to be lacking an efficient mode of starting. This was discovered
during the testing of the machine components. This is a clear deficiency in the reliability of the
system of the back. The restoration of the main power generator can likely fail the entire system.
This poor performance of the standby diesel generator may indicate insufficient testing of
environmental matters.
(5) Command and Decision Authority
The conflicting information that was given by the engineers in regard to the fire detection system
was a clear indication of the confusion in the command. This was very dangerous as it was likely
to impair timely connections
Conclusions
The investigation process of MODU unit was carried out by the use of the equipment that was
considered relevant and effective. The free fall lifesaving boat was found to very crucial
component of the unit. The recommendations as per the results of the investigations are as shown
below.
Recommendations
The inhibition of the systems of the alarms should only be allowed once approved by the
senior officer who works within the vessel. The system should be monitored by the
master, chief engineer and OIM. The trio should work together to ensure periodic review
of the status of the alarm. This should be done with the view to resolving the situation.
The regulators should also increase the requirement for the qualification to give a
reflection of experience that is commensurate to the level of decision making (Abimbola
et al 2015).

The industry should ensure that the standby generator will always be robust and
automatic in its starting systems. The location of the standby generator, power lines and
controls should be capable of minimizing damages from the fire.
In regard to the safety equipment, the instrumentation and systems of the experts should
be used to provide timely warning to the drillers. The free fall lifesaving boats should be
kept in proper conditions and subjected to regular inspection.
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