Picard vs. Maddox: A Philosophical Analysis of Data's Personhood

This essay explores the contrasting philosophical viewpoints of Picard and Maddox concerning the artificial intelligence Data and his rights as a sentient being. Picard argues for Data's personhood, emphasizing his capacity for thought and self-determination, reflecting a materialistic view of the mind-body problem. Conversely, Maddox adopts a dualistic perspective, asserting that Data lacks the essential components of a human being, namely a soul or spirit. The essay also reflects on the ethical considerations of treating machines with moral regard, ultimately arguing against the obligation to grant machines the same dignity afforded to humans due to their lack of a soul. Furthermore, the author concurs with the JAG officer's ruling that Data cannot be definitively proven non-human, thus supporting his right to self-determination.

Running head: PHILOSOPHY 1
Philosophy
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Author Note
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Running head: PHILOSOPHY 2
Views exhibited by Picard and Maddox
The position of Picard with regard to His robotic friend is that Data, is a being hence
should ought to be capable to make his choices like a genuine individual. His clear perspective of
the brain/body problem is that your mind does not get alienated from the body, eventually,
Picard has faith in a materialistic view of the paradox. Picard refers to Data as beings similar to a
based on how he thinks; to be a thinking human being with respect to the manner you think, you
should have the equivalent mental ability. Data, similar to people, just has a brain, a mind that
makes a mental idea (Van Oudenhove & Cuypers, 2010). Data’s brain, similar to each other
human has a self-working PC that operates it. Maddox alludes a different perspective from
Picard in his defense in the min/body situation, which perhaps has caused their disagreement on
how to approach the Data case. Maddox presents the view both the body and mind exists in a
dualistic nature. To him, this is the fundamental definition of human being and how we are
shaped. Maddox trusts that man exhibits a dualistic nature, Data cannot be distinguished as
Human being since it has only one part, the brain but no mind. Moreover, Human have spirits
while machines don't, more specifically defines Maddox's definitive position (Jaworski, 2016).
Reflection of Treating Machines “ethically”
Humans will not be obligated to treat machines morally. A.I. becomes conceivable, will
there be commitments to make machines behave “morally? “I disagree. In the long run, I don't
figure man to make any commitments to work with machines with a similar regard and utmost
nobility that can be merited by different people. Why? Because, machines we create does not
resemble God’s image since they lack a soul, a spirit that can be condemned to hellfire or
celebrated into paradise. For a similar reason that we as humans shouldn't treat creature's
superior to people, we ought to be compelled to treat creations like humans (Green, 2010).

Running head: PHILOSOPHY 3
Review of JAG officer Ruling
I completely concur with the ruling since the prosecution cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Data is not a human being. Data has some characteristics that are also seen in Human beings
in terms of Brain functionality and therefore would be unethical to detach it from making its own
decision as other humans (Slors, 2013).

Running head: PHILOSOPHY 4
References
Green, J. B. (2010). In Search of the Soul: Perspectives on the Mind-Body Problem. Wipf and
Stock Publishers.
Jaworski, W. (2016). Structure and the metaphysics of mind: How hylomorphism solves the
mind-body problem. Oxford University Press.
Slors, M. V. (2013). The diachronic mind: An essay on personal identity, psychological
continuity and the mind-body problem (Vol. 86). Springer Science & Business Media.
Van Oudenhove, L., & Cuypers, S. E. (2010). The philosophical" mind-body problem" and its
relevance for the relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences. Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine, 53(4), 545–557.