Professional Ethics: Deception, Lying and Ellin's Critique (Phil 4401)

This essay provides a critical analysis of Ellin's perspective on deception and lying within the context of professional ethics, particularly focusing on the fiduciary relationship between professionals and clients. The paper examines Ellin's arguments supporting the ethical acceptability of deception in certain professional scenarios, contrasting his views with those of Kant, Bayles, and Gorovitz. It explores Ellin's distinction between ordinary and special morality, and his preference for the parallel view over the priority view. The essay argues that Ellin's justifications for deception are ethically and morally flawed, as they prioritize professional interests over client autonomy and the broader public interest. The analysis highlights inconsistencies in Ellin's arguments, especially his reliance on the fiduciary model and his dismissal of the importance of trust and universal moral principles. The essay concludes by critiquing Ellin's advocacy of the parallel view, suggesting that it could lead to professionals prioritizing their own or their profession's interests over those of their clients and the public. The paper emphasizes the importance of a consistent, public interest-focused approach to ethics and critiques Ellin's paternalistic approach to the fiduciary relationship, highlighting the potential for ethical breaches and the undermining of client autonomy.

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Phil 4401 Professional Ethics: Ellin Critique paper
Deception and lying have been more common in the professional world recently. By
looking at contemporary business practices, it is simple to see why today's society is more wary
than ever before of obtaining professional seervice, whether in medicine or law. As Ellin claims,
it is morally acceptable to lie in certain circumstances involving the professional-client
relationship. Some theorists, like Ellin, contend that lying and concealing facts are sometimes
acceptable and beneficial. On the other hand, it is challenging to provide ethical support for these
claims. Contrary to popular belief, more logical concepts proposed by scholars like Bayles,
Gorovitz, and Kant show that deceptive practices used in professional-client interactions are
rarely ethically justified since they violate clients' fundamental rights and autonomy. Although
Elllin believes that lying is ethically acceptable, Kant, Bayles, and Gorovitz persuasively
demonstrate that these strategies cause more harm than good by limiting customers' freedom and
fundamental rights or undermining their confidence.
In anticipation of a clash between special morality and ordinary morality, Ellin puts out
two conceptions of professional morality in his writings. Ordinary morality is defined as the
principles that ordinary individuals ought to possess or would possess if they had sufficient
reflection. (Ellin 75). On the other hand, special morality is restricted to individuals who occupy
particular roles or work in specific fields. (Ellin 75). He believes that the apparent differences
between these two ideas can be reconciled through rational reasoning, or what he refers to as

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ordinary reflective morality, which he defines as the minimum ethical benchmark for
knowledgeable professionals in any specialized field that distinguishes them from the ordinary
population. (Ellin 75). Ellin's concept of ordinary reflective morality states that people who
ignore ethical challenges fall short of the requirements of ordinary reflective morality. Therefore,
it is essential to consider the implications of the debate over general versus special morality.
Subsequently, Ellin contends that both the parallel view and the priority view do not raise
objections to the existence of ordinary moral rules that apply to educated practitioners and that,
in such cases, distinct codes of conduct should be in effect, however, when it comes to
identifying the relationship between the ordinary rules and the special rules, particularly when it
comes to the ethical codes of conduct that should apply to educated practitioners, the parallel
view and priority view diverge. According to Ellin (86), the priority view hypothesis proposes
that specific laws should govern the conduct of trained professionals in their fields. Such
regulations should impose requirements different from those set on each person daily. On the
contrary, the parallel view contends that moral obligations do exist, albeit they may not always
result from ordinary morality but rather from the distinctiveness of their professions (Ellin, 76).
The core of the priority view is that morality should be decided by "ordinary moral
considerations" (Ellin 76), regardless of the presence of outstanding obligations or sharp
distinctions.
He contends that ordinary morality does not provide a mechanism for resolving such
disputes; priority views may give rise to them. Of the two perspectives, Ellin appears to favor the
parallel view. He implicitly agrees with it. Ellin's central claim is that moral standards for regular
people differ from those for professionals entitled to special ethical advantages. The conflict
between their personal and professional lives has given rise to the idea of unique professional

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morality, even though professionals are similar to ordinary people. According to special
morality, Ellin contends that lying may be justified in certain circumstances when trained
professionals are confronted with an ethical dilemma and attempt to act in their client's best
interests. Ellin considers the situation to be a fiduciary relationship. Any fiduciary relationship
(between a professional and a client ) results in a conflict between professional and personal
ethics (Ellin 76). Therefore, this claim supports the parallel view of special professional
Morality, which holds that professional and ordinary morality are different values that may
conflict. The foundation of Ellin's thesis is that lying is more ethically abhorrent than deceit. He
argues that lying in a fiduciary relationship is acceptable under certain circumstances.
In questioning the connection between professional morality and ordinary morality, Ellin
focuses on the distinction between deception and lying. His justifications are clearly biased
towards professional morality since it corresponds to a parallel view. Ellin thinks the parallel
view is preferable to the priority view when defending the client's interests when discussing the
role of sincerity in the relationship between professional and client. He believes professional
ethics permit deception within the fiduciary paradigm if it's required to safeguard the client's
interests. Ellin believes educated professionals have a different ethical code under certain
situations than ordinary people. He contends that although these professions have unique ethics,
they vary more in degree than in kind, putting more weight on personal integrity than social or
substantive ethics. Subsequently, Ellin (82) asserts that in fiduciary models, such as those
between clients and public relations practitioners, professional who are educated serves the needs
of the person who hired them.
However, Bayles asserts that Ellin leaves out a crucial aspect of the autonomy model. It
doesn't matter who the client is, according to Bayles (71), since professionals are constrained in

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their ability to act in the client's best interests by their commitments to other parties, such as the
public. Therefore, the client's autonomy should always be respected in any fiduciary relationship.
Although Bayles' point of view is understandable, given the high regard and authority accorded
to professionals, it is essential to emphasize that if this were not the case, educated professionals
would have little reason to respect the autonomy of their clients. As stated by Bayles (177), there
is a chance of conflict due to the many commitments given to different parties. Because of the
tension between job-related commitments to clients and general obligations to third parties, all
professionals sometimes encounter conflicts between their interests and those of their clients
(Bayles 129). Ellin's interpretation of the fiduciary model disregards the client's values, which
restricts the client's capacity for making free decisions. Instead, his fiduciary model adopts a
paternalistic one, where the expert controls the client's interests.
On first impression, Ellin appears to be debating whether a set of established norms
governs professional behavior. Ellin distinguishes between professional morality and ordinary
reflective morality. The former sets the parameters for regular and irregular encounters in
ordinary life; on the contrary, professional morality is a set of principles designed to serve a
certain profession's needs and safeguard clients' interests. Ellin argues that professional ethics
should govern fiduciary relationships, especially sincerity. According to Ellin (81), a Fiduciary
relationship, for whatever reason, puts a higher value on deceit than on lying since lying poses a
larger risk to the trust between a professional and a client. As a result, professional client
relationships function best when all parties consent to engage ethically; that is, when all parties
cooperate for the benefit of one another. Speech is essential to all human societies, but non-
deceiption is only required in societies that are permitted or moral. Truth is a necessary
prerequisite for civilization, while non-deception improves it. Lying breaks a promise, whereas

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deceit violates people's tacit knowledge that it is unacceptable to mislead, according to the social
contract. To express the speakers' true opinions, the clear comprehension of language should be
employed. The objective of the implicit agreement, which relates to social contract undertaking,
is not to mislead.
Generally, Ellin argues that specialized and educated practitioners have different moral
standards from the ordinary public, which gives them the right to mislead their customers into
maintaining their fiduciary relationship. He claims that while professionals and ordinary people
are equally moral, the complexity of the relationship between their personal and professional
lives has given birth to the idea of special professional morality. Ellin then makes three important
arguments: first, there are differences between common morality and particular professional
morality; second, lying differs from deception; and third, deceit is morally acceptable. He builds
his argument that even if lying is wrong, deception is allowed because of this unique professional
ethic.
However, Ellin's use of the ordinary morality defense to advance the parallel view that
supports deception by educated professionals to advance their client's interests can be criticized.
But his point of view is not morally or ethically acceptable. Ellin makes false claims since the
fact that professions exist to accomplish specific purposes does not address whether
professionals must achieve those goals, even if doing so goes against commonly held moral
standards. The morality of the scenario as a whole, rather than just the issue with a client, must
be evaluated when examining specific moral quandaries. Contributing to universal morality is
the basis for a particular morality's existence.
First of all, we would like to know what ethics are. To arrive at or defend a position on a
moral issue or quandary, one must engage in an extensive and critical investigation of basic

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moral concepts. Normative statements are used in both problem-solving and ethical reasoning.
Through this process, the profession establishes criteria by which the work of its members can be
evaluated. It is improper to engage in a discussion on moral dilemmas without a grounding in the
fundamental ideas and values held by other members of the profession. While discussing the
same issue, different ethically correct conclusions may be reached.
Consequently, it is crucial to have a consistent, public interest-focused approach to ethics.
Different discourses may result in ideas on what constitutes the most morally appropriate
behavior that is diverse, contradictory, and at odds with one another. If the profession's moral
norms and standards are founded on inconsistent and incongruous research regarding what
constitutes morally good behavior, they cannot be upheld. Expecting moral discourse to be based
on professional-wide norms and objectives does not exclude taking into account the unique
characteristics of each situation, which may be essential to critical analysis and decision-making
on the morally correct course of action. Ellin's arguments are thus morally and ethically wrong.
Eventually, in advocating the parallel view, Ellin is evidently incorrect in his view of the
fiduciary relationship between a client and an educated practitioner. Ellin seems to have
forgotten that by advocating the parallel view, the trained practitioner may be persuaded to lie for
their direct advantage or the profession's interest instead of the client's and the public's interest.
Ellin's reasoning for favoring the parallel perspective over the priority view is incorrect. In
ordinary situations, when an educated practitioner would be required to assess a client to decide
whether to desceipt, this is obviously what Ellin appears to have overlooked in ordinary
situations. This does not mean the practitioner may consciously use his skills to further the
client's goals in a typical relationship based on trust. Instead, it emphasizes the client's desire to
use all available measures for the most desired outcomes. Ellin should be corrected for saying

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that an agency relationship does not need trust since the client may rationally judge if the
educated practitioner is operating in the intended way. This is inaccurate since not all customers
are logical. In addition, because they are only applicable to the duties of the profession they are
developed from, ethical standards are weak if they are not founded on universal morality. If
ethical standards were based on Ellin's parallel view, only independent professionals would have
to deal with them. It is more difficult to justify the existence of ethical guidelines when
professional standards are not consistent.
Ellin makes the erroneous assertion that the fiduciary model often includes dishonesty.
However, he seems to mix up the fiduciary model with the paternalist one. Regarding Ellin's
parallel view defense, it is unclear who should be in charge of the public interest. He seems to
think that professionals should hold authority with education. Therefore, Ellin's arguments are
based on a paternalistic rather than a fiduciary model. In a paternalistic model, the
knowledgeable practitioner decides what is best for a client without considering the client's
express consent or agreement. The paternalistic model, however, should be critiqued for being
misleading since it is erroneous to assert that one person should be given complete control over
determining what benefits the client and who should make judgments about those advantages.
Paternalism must be justified by generally recognized ethical principles, such as client autonomy,
whether in law, ethics, or regular public conduct.
Ellin falsely asserts that the fiduciary model often includes dishonesty. But he seems to
mix up the fiduciary model with the paternalist model. Regarding Ellin's parallel view defense, it
is unclear who should be in charge of the public interest. He seems to think that professionals
should hold authority with education. Therefore, Ellin's arguments are based on a paternalistic
rather than a fiduciary model. In a paternalistic model, the educated practitioner decides what is

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best for a client without considering the client's direct consent or agreement. Nevertheless, the
paternalistic model should be critiqued for being deceptive since it is erroneous to assert that one
person should be given complete control over determining what benefits the client and who
should judge those benefits. Paternalism must be justified by generally recognized ethical
principles, such as client autonomy, whether in law, ethics, or regular public conduct.
Similarly to Bayles, Gorovitz (177) argues in favor of the public interest. According to
him, a professional's dedication to a particular patient or client has limitations when it comes to
prioritizing the public good. As a result, each professional's commitment to a specific patient or
client has a limit. However, it is unusual for this boundary to be established, at which point the
public interest should take priority over individual interests and for this norm to serve as a
professional code of conduct. Society gives professions and their members some liberty in
exchange, enabling them to work for the community's overall welfare.
Consequently, professionals would need to compromise between their almost unwavering
commitment to a specific client or patient and a larger sense of duty to the greater good. The
greatest way for professionals to fulfill their obligation to advance society's welfare is by openly
discussing the benefits and services provided by their professions (Gorovitz 192). According to
Ellin, professionals would deceive consumers to persuade them to choose the solution they
believe is best. However, doing so is unethical because it takes away the clients' autonomy to
decide what they believe is in their best interests. In Gorovitz's "Informed Consent and Patient
Autonomy," patients' rights to informed consent and autonomy are emphasized.
Kant's method seems to emphasize autonomy the most. We could contend that Gorovitz
approaches his reasoning in a Kantian manner. Respecting others demonstrates our concern for
them. To Kant, this is a manifestation of moral law. Instead of perceiving other people as a

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means to an end, we should perceive them as ends in and of themselves. Based on this
justification, Gorovitz contends that a client's freedom of choice is unaffected by the probability
of making a wrong decision. The categorical imperative, which holds that what is right for one
person is suitable for all, logically supports the golden rule for the public good. Therefore, the
only factor that should be used to judge a professional's behavior is whether or not we are
simultaneously working to establish a universal code of morality. Ellin's opposing viewpoint,
nevertheless, seems to go against universal morality. The litmus test is the capacity to
universalize authentic moral responsibility. Just as there must be unbreakable physical laws like
gravity, there must also be unbreakable moral standards. The greater truths Kant alludes to are
more important than a professional's limited incentive to lie to further the client's interests. Kant's
categorical imperative requires rejecting all natural and socially accepted rules. Kant's ethics are
thus seen as more motivating than Ellin's subjective methods, which can be described by nothing
more than transient sensations.
In summary, notwithstanding, Ellin claims that lying and deception are ethically
acceptable and even essential in professional-client relationships; it is clear that these tactics only
serve to hurt clients or limit their fundamental rights. He argues principally that specialized and
educated practitioners have different moral standards from the ordinary public, which gives them
the right to deceive their clients into maintaining their fiduciary relationship. Actually, in his
view, it is not morally or ethically acceptable. According to Bayles and Gorovitz, deception
prevents the customer from making crucial decisions. Professionalism should not be considered a
game where lying and deception are acceptable. The need to be honest with clients and
consumers extends to all professions, including business. Professionals and clients have used
deceit and lie in the past, but this does not indicate that they should do so in the future.

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In addition, it is evident that Ellin's argument is based on paternalism rather than the
expert's professional knowledge. Consequently, despite the physician's superior level of skill and
the fact that the patient and the doctor may have the same goals, the patient may still make an
informed decision. A professional, such as a doctor, is responsible for telling his patients about
their alternatives and giving them the freedom to choose without deceptive strategies. Ellin is
also mistaken since it seems he disagrees with the ethical tenet that clients have a right to
autonomy and information whether or not they are impaired. Depending on their level of
knowledge, the professional owes it to his patients to provide as much information as feasible.
Paternalism needs to be used sparingly and only in challenging circumstances. The client's
capacity for understanding, freedom of choice, and autonomy increase proportionally to how
little the paternalism model is required.

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Works Cited
Bayles, Michael D. "Professional Ethics. Wadsworth, "." Westminister Institute for Ethics and
Human Values (1981): 121-146.
Bayles, Michael D. Professional ethics. Wadsworth, 1989.
Ellin, Joseph S., and Milton F. Lunch. "Special Professional Morality and the Duty of Veracity
[with Commentary]." Business & Professional Ethics Journal 1.2 (1982): 75-94.
Gorovitz, Samuel. "Professions, professors, and competing obligations." Eds.), Ethics, trust, and
the professions: Philosophical and cultural aspects (1991): 177-192.