R v DPP Case Study: European Court of Human Rights and End-of-Life

This case study analyzes the R v DPP case, focusing on the application of the Suicide Act 1961 and its implications under the European Convention on Human Rights. The case involves Ms. Pretty, who, suffering from motor neuron disease, challenged the DPP's refusal to guarantee non-intervention in assisted suicide, arguing violations of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9, and 14 of the European Treaty. The House of Lords supported the DPP's stance, stating that the Suicide Act did not permit suicide and that the Convention did not provide guidance to states on end-of-life issues. The analysis highlights the tension between the right to life and the right to private life, emphasizing the importance of individual self-reliance in end-of-life decisions, as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights. The study also references the Biomedicine Convention and the differing approaches to end-of-life issues among European countries, illustrating the complexities surrounding assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the role of medical professionals in such situations. The European Court of Human Rights typically balances the welfare to life (Article 2) and the benefit of private life (Article 8) in these cases, further extending the Biomedicine Convention.

Research on Westlaw or LexisNexis the case R on
the application of Pretty v DPP 2001 UKHL 61

A.
Ms. Pretty, who suffered from end-engine neuron disease, said she opposed the cancellation of
her request for a legal investigation into the DPP's refusal to attempt not to include it other
important elements under section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act 1961, if it supported suicide. Ms Pretty
promised that the refusal of the DPP was a violation of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the European
Treaty (right to life, independence from barbaric treatment and degradation, a choice respectively
attention to privacy, access to the heart and independence from separation)1.
Backing this apology, the House of Lords argued that the DPP was unable to choose not to
intervene where the crime did not appear to have been committed and that section 2 (1) of the
Suicide Act 1961 made possible by the Convention. The benefit to human pride published in
article 3 was the choice to live with dignity - not to move forward calmly - and to find a way to
lead a life to the end incomparably completely different from finding a way to delay life beyond
its normal limit. Although some convention rights were issued as a manifestation of opposing
rights and there was a specific choice to be made (e.g. benefit for the opportunity of a
relationship in a trade. Do not merge), Article 2 cannot be reduced in this way, to provide an
option to bite the dust.
Moreover, the certainty of human life was a definite social point defending the prohibition of the
right to respect for private life and the opportunity of thought and heart under Articles 8 and 9. In
addition, craftsmanship were communicated in a coordinated manner to determine individual
self-sufficiency as people progressed with their lives and there was nothing to recommend that
commented on the decision not to live longer. Ms Pretty's contention that she had been divided in
the enjoyment of her Convention rights could not be justified by its inadequacy as Article 14 was
not unique and was only relevant in circumstances where other Convention rights were involved
assembly2. However, the Suicide Act did not allow for suicide: it removed the status of the law
that it was an offense for an individual to stop everything.
The European Convention on Human Rights is just like the Biomedicine Convention does not
provide guidance to states on how best to control end-of-life issues, for example, a killer and a
1 Powell, Dave. "Assisting Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute: Hard Cases and Good Law? R (on the Application of Debbie
Purdy) v DPP [2001] EWHC 2565 (Admin)." The Journal of Criminal Law 73.1 (2001): 8-11.
2 Pedain, Antje. "The human rights dimension of the Diane Pretty case." The Cambridge Law Journal 62.1 (2000): 181-206.

doctor helped with a kick the bucket. Welfare to Life suggests states should take lives more
seriously and take action if this certificate is misused. In recent years, the European Court of
Human Rights has recognized that persons are equally bound to the option of self-sufficiency3.
People who are mentally able to decide on educational options based on European Court of
Justice, forgo treatment and, in specific situation, choose to reduce self life, based on the
legitimate structure of the home. States are left with a big thank you for simple end-of-life
problems. In addition to these specific self-selected issues, experts may conclude that further
false feeding, irrigation, or life support treatment is not recommended, as these options are taken
completely cautiously and carefully on the bases of rural legislation.
B.
The very presence of this Council of Europe highlights requires defining and, where essential,
extending the common freedoms promised by the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). The last exhibition, also designed within the framework of the Council of Europe, was
found in 1950, usually struck by the monstrosities suffered during World War II. The ECHR did
not specifically focus on existing biochemical issues, not to mention future biochemical issues,
such as organ donation, human research, hereditary testing and human cloning. These problems
and differences are explained, or at least explained, in the Biomedicine Convention or one of the
conventions.
Like the ECHR, the Biomedicine Convention does not address criminal and end-of-life issues.
This may surprise the heated discussions on these issues in several European and non-European
countries. Better budgetary considerations and better clinical improvement mean that the future
of Europe is far ahead. Today around 20% of Europeans are at least 65 years old. For a large
collection of these people - just like young people - life is usually not the value that should be
achieved sure4. This reflects the growing importance of individual self-reliance and self-
confidence in dead end choices. Several countries led law to these advances - as severally known
for - out of respect. Even many European states have taken control, or decriminalized, have
helped to pass a murder and a doctor (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and many
3 MACK, JONATHAN. "PURDY, R (ON THE APPLICATION OF) v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS & ORS [2009] EWCA
Civ 92 (19 February 2009) 16 Suicide Act 1961 s 2 (1) & (4)-assisting suicide by making travel arrangements-whether DPP obliged
to publish guidance on prosecution policy-no-personal."
4 Pretty v. the UK, no. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:0429JUD000234602.

more states allow people to refuse treatment, prescribe lethal drugs or at least deliberately
shortening of life (for example France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland).
Similarly to acceptance of local laws by public prosecutions, the management of such types of
treatments is entirely problematic at the European level, if possible, due to the existence of
legitimate associations and regulations. Further clinical links differ on whether, in specific
situations, physicians may be take participation in providing disastrous problems. This proofs the
reason behind absence of agreement between Council of Europe member states on specific
constraints, European court of human rights (ECHR) also find it difficult in application of
resolution for disastrous issue.
The particular prosecution failed to return single applicants to seek ECHR decisions on end-of-
life issues. In fact, there are a growing number of cases where the ECHR has been cited for
choosing to shorten or extend people's lives in different situations. In these cases, the ECHR
normally seeks the benefits established, from one perspective, in the welfare to life (article 2 of
the ECHR) and, on the other hand, in the for the benefit of private life (article 8 of the ECHR). In
fact, the ECHR extends the Biomedicine Convention.
1. List of Judges:
MrM. Pellonpää, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrsE. Palm,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O'Boyle, Section Registrar,
2. Name of the court: The European Court of Human Rights