Civil Engineering Risk Management: West Gate Bridge Failure Report

This report delves into the realm of engineering risk management, using the catastrophic failure of the West Gate Bridge as a focal point. It initiates with an introduction to engineering failures and their associated risks, emphasizing the importance of Failure Mode and Event Analysis. The report then provides a detailed overview of the West Gate Bridge, its construction, and the circumstances surrounding its collapse, including images and procedural dynamics. It meticulously examines the initial design flaws, poor coordination, and inadequate scrutiny of contractors as primary causes. The report outlines how these failures could have been averted through improved information flow, delegated responsibilities, and thorough evaluation of contractors' past performance. The report further explores the changes in laws that followed the failure, such as the assurance of appropriate resources and clear division of responsibilities. Finally, the report underscores the lessons learned from the disaster, including design and construction method flaws and the need for comprehensive risk assessment and mitigation strategies, emphasizing the significance of tolerability of risk.

ENGINEERING RISK MANAGEMENT
Student’s Name
Class
Tutor’s Name

Risks 2
Introduction
There are failures in engineering that are to be discussed with some examination so as to
determine the association in risks with every project (Zhang, et al., 2016). The analyses will
begin with the understanding of the Failure Mode and Event Analysis using questions such as
(Vesilind & Gunn, 2015); what occurred? What made it occur? What consequences were there?
Was there a possibility of the event prediction? And was there any way to mitigate or prevent the
failure? This article takes note of the West Gate Bridge failure (Häring, 2016).
West Gate Bridge
The west gate bridge in Melbourne is made of girder steel box with cable-stayed construction
that spreads over Yarra River in the northern region next to the entrance paving to Port Philip
Bay. The bridge provides crucial importance in connecting the inner city, Geelong city and the
western suburbs of Melbourne. More to it is its length that spans a total 2585 m with a width of
37m and stands 58m from the water surface (Häring, 2016).
Initial design
(Hollnagel, et al., 2008)
(Hollnagel, et al., 2008)
Images from the failure

Risks 3
(Herrmann, 2015)
Procedural failure dynamics
(Herrmann, 2015)
(Herrmann, 2015)
How it would’ve been done differently.
Taking from the causal chain of the disastrous event, the following are the way forward that
would have prevented the occurrence of such an engineering failure. The poor coordination
system between the firms contracted the job seemed to be the major cause of the failure. There
needed to be a systematic flow of information that would have prevented delay of the project
construction (Meyer & Reniers, 2016). Also, the systematic flow would have produced an
evidential delegated duties of the firms involved. Hence the duties assigned to each firm in the
construction process would be known (Torres, et al., 2017). Another thing that would have
prevented the failure is the noting of the possibility of any contracted in failing to reach the

Risks 4
desired goal (Gupta, 2016). The firms involved needed to be scrutinized of their previous
projects to see if they were successful. If any firm showed poor standards in their projects then it
was to be dropped off the list (Ben-Daya, et al., 2016).
Changes in laws.
The failure in West Gate Bridge brought about changes that include; the assurance of clients to
provide engineers with appropriate and adequate resources, any engineering project should have
a clear responsibility division existing between the contractors and engineers. Also, the
contractor needs to provide a programme of the project to an engineer for its approval (Baldoni,
et al., 2016).
Detailed causal chain.
It was just before the midday of October 1970 when a 120m span of the built West gate Bridge
made a disastrous collapse. The bridge collapsed into the Yarra River (Rykov, 2016). There was
a loss of lives thus the engineering failure led to the strengthening of most of the steel spans. The
designers of this bridge were the same designers of West Gate Bridge (Modarres, 2016). A week
before the collapse, it was noted that buckling existed when the steel bridge was put in place.
The late time schedule forced the project to proceed and the problem to be sorted out later. Later
the problem was rooted to the poor calculation that was due to the resulting stresses on the
bridge. These are the systematic events that led to the collapse of the West Gate Bridge
(Glendon, et al., 2016).
Lessons learned.
Findings were later put forward that the span 10-11 was not to be attributed to whole or part in
defects regarding the material used hat mainly comprised of concrete and steel. The failure was
attributed to the unique design used in building the bridge together with the unusual procedure
used in the construction process (Modarres, 2016). Contracting firms lacked any stipulation
mentioning the design being used and the method of construction was not able to work.
However, there was insufficient forethought that was used in considering the potential issues at
hand. More to it is the manner that was used in the spans in the pier category 10-11 together with
the 14-15 that were erected (Munier, 2014). This spanning criterion was the beginning of the
disastrous event (Pollard, 2016).
Tolerability of Risk.
The considerations that follow were put forward to produce the Risk Priority Number. Even
though the risks that take place in Workplaces are not avoidable, they have to be reduced if any
chance is seen. The highest Probability of Occurrence was put to be 7 with the lesser value being
3. The society never accepts heavy injuries in it that lead to fatalities to be put as an acceptable
hazard. The highest acceptable value was put to be 7 with the minimum value set as 5. Most of
the employees are conscious of the possibility of hazards occurring and need to accept such risks
in their employment. However, they are not liable to considering employment to risks that cannot
be seen easily (Pinto & Garvey, 2016).

Risks 5
References
Baldoni, M., Müller, J., Nunes, I. & Zalila-Wenkstern, R., 2016. Engineering Multi-Agent Systems: 4th
International Workshop, EMAS 2016, Singapore, Singapore, May 9-10, 2016, Revised, Selected, and
Invited Papers. 1 ed. Sydney: Springer.
Ben-Daya, M., Kumar, U. & Murthy, D., 2016. Introduction to Maintenance Engineering: Modelling,
Optimization and Management. 1 ed. Sydney: John Wiley & Sons.
Glendon, A., Clarke, S. & McKenna, E., 2016. Human Safety and Risk Management, Second Edition. 2 ed.
Cairns: CRC Press.
Gupta, A., 2016. Risk Management and Simulation. illustrated ed. Sydney: CRC Press.
Häring, I., 2016. Risk Analysis and Management: Engineering Resilience. illustrated ed. Perth: Springer.
Herrmann, J., 2015. Engineering Decision Making and Risk Management. reprint ed. Sydney: John Wiley
& Sons.
Hollnagel, E., Nemeth, C. & Dekker, S., 2008. Resilience Engineering Perspectives: Remaining sensitive to
the possibility of failure. illustrated ed. Darwin: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Meyer, T. & Reniers, G., 2016. Engineering Risk Management. 2 ed. Sunshine Coast: De Gruyter.
Modarres, M., 2016. Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends. 1 ed. Newcastle–
Maitland: CRC Press.
Munier, N., 2014. Risk Management for Engineering Projects: Procedures, Methods and Tools. illustrated
ed. Sydney: Springer Science & Business.
Pinto, C. & Garvey, P., 2016. Advanced Risk Analysis in Engineering Enterprise Systems. illustrated ed.
Perth: CRC Press.
Pollard, S., 2016. Risk Management for Water and Wastewater Utilities. 2 ed. Brisbane: IWA Publishing.
Rykov, V., 2016. Reliability of Engineering Systems and Technological Risk. 1 ed. Melbourne: John Wiley
& Sons.
Torres, I., Bustamante, J. & Sierra, D., 2017. VII Latin American Congress on Biomedical Engineering
CLAIB 2016, Bucaramanga, Santander, Colombia, October 26th -28th, 2016. 1 ed. Brisbane: Springer.
Vesilind, P. & Gunn, A., 2015. Hold Paramount: The Engineer's Responsibility to Society. 3 ed. Darwin:
Cengage Learning.
Zhang, L., Peng, M., Chang, D. & Xu, Y., 2016. Dam Failure Mechanisms and Risk Assessment. illustrated
ed. Melbourne: John Wiley & Sons.