Discussing R. v. Fearon: Privacy vs. Law Enforcement in Cell Searches

This essay provides an analysis of the R. v. Fearon case, focusing on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision regarding police authority to search cell phones incident to arrest. The author agrees with the majority decision, arguing that the evidence obtained by the police should not be excluded. The justification is based on three key points: the lack of a serious breach of privacy under Section 24(2) of the Charter, the necessity to modify the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest to comply with Section 8 of the Charter while acknowledging valid law enforcement objectives, and the potential for criminals to evade justice if such evidence is deemed inadmissible. The essay emphasizes the importance of balancing privacy rights with the need for effective law enforcement in the digital age, referencing specific paragraphs from the R. v. Fearon case to support the arguments presented.

I agree with the decision which has been provided in the case of R. v. Fearon by the
majority. I believe that the evidence provided by the police to the court should not be
excluded. The dissenting judges got it wrong to address the issue related to the search of
mobile phones incidental to the arrest amidst privacy being at stake. There are three reasons
because of which I have derived such conclusion. These three reasons have been discussed
below,
Firstly the majority stated that the evidence which had been provided by the police to
the court should not be excluded pursuant to the provisions of section 24(2) of the Charter
based on the factors relating to grant. Even where privacy had been infringed in relation to
the search of cell phone belonging to the appellant, there was no serious breach associated in
relation to the infringement. There was a pure and legitimate belief amongst the police that
they have been acting with bona fide intentions in a manner which they consider being as
reasonable or which may be considered as reasonable by any person in their position. The
exclusion of the evidence under the given situation would undermine the function of the
judiciary related to seeking the truth at para 22
Secondly, there was determination on the part of the majority judges that there must
be modification of the doctrine of search incident to arrest at common law so that it can
effectively comply with charter specifically the provisions of section 8. If there would have
been allowed a categorical prevention in relation to search of cell phones without warrants it
would not be incompliance with valid objectives of law enforcements which includes police
and public safety. The moderate approach would also not be suitable for the same reasons.
The correct approach is that the common law is to be modified. This would mean that extent
and nature of the search has to be actually incidental to the arrest and only information which
has a necessary link has to be addressed. The evidence would be valid in case the no search
would stymied or significantly hamper the investigation. The officer has to make notes in

relation to the purpose duration and extent of the search as well as accessed applications at
para 44
Finally, i agree with the decision of the court because if such evidence is not accepted
it would let many of the criminals’ getaways with the crime committed by them as cell phone
these days have advanced technologies which helps carrying out a criminal activity at para 60
To conclude I would re state that I agree with the decision which has been provided in
the case of R. v. Fearon by the majority. I believe that the evidence provided by the police to
the court should not be excluded. The dissenting judges got it wrong to address the issue
related to the search of mobile phones incidental to the arrest amidst privacy being at stake.
This is because of the three reasons which I have discussed above.

References
R v Fearon 2014 SCC 77