Safety and Risk Management in UK Train Accidents: A Case Study Report

This report provides an in-depth analysis of a train accident that occurred at the Grimston Lane footpath crossing in the UK, examining the safety and risk management systems in place. It details the accident's background, focusing on the EU and UK regulations governing railway safety, and the role of the Office of Rail and Road. The report identifies the hazards and risks involved, including the pedestrian's misjudgment and the skewed crossing design. It highlights safety breaches by Network Rail, particularly in risk assessment and asset inspection, leading to the accident. The report further discusses the recommendations made by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), policy changes, and implementation strategies, such as the "Transforming Level Crossings" framework. It also covers the measures taken to improve visibility and safety at the crossing, including vegetation removal and deck replacement. The report concludes by emphasizing the importance of effective risk and safety management in preventing such incidents and ensuring the safety of railway operations.

Running head: SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 1
Train Accident in the UK
Name of Student
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Train Accident in the UK
Hazards and risks are part and parcel of everyday living both at the workplace and in the
private space. Hazards can be defined as conditions that have the potential to cause illness, injury
and deaths. It can also end up with damage of goods and equipment and disrupt operations. Risk
can broadly be defined as the probability that hazard will occur and cause injury. Workplaces are
replete with hazards which are attendant with operations of production. Risk and safety
management can therefore refer to the sets of processes that are used in formulating and
implementing actions to mitigate hazards that are identified. The safety and risk management
are dependent on the state legislation and policies that govern the Occupational Health and
Safety Plan of each country. The risk and safety policies on train accidents in the UK works
under directives set by the EU and transposed into law in the UK.
Background on Train Risk and Safety Management in UK
The European Union (EU) policy framework on occupational safety and health (2014-
2020) provides the basic framework which has been legislated into law in the UK (EUR-Lex,
2017). The policy defines rules and structures on occupational risks, prevention and safer work
environment promotion. The EU further sets out specific regulations that govern the risk and
safety management of train operations amongst all member states. Regulation 2016/796 of the
European Agency for Railways (ERA) states that guaranteeing high levels of railway transport
are part of its core mandate (Biennial Report, 2016, p.1). The agency works with Member states
and industry stakeholders in monitoring performance in safety in a multidimensional approach to
safety (Kozuch, &Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2017). Data collected is shared with the National
Safety Authorities and investigative bodies of each member state.
In the UK the office of Rail and Road is tasked with giving oversight to the railway
sector. Health and safety issues are comprehensively addressed by this office (ORR, 2017).

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Passenger safety information such as gaps on platforms and stepping distances are provided.
Statistics and data are also available on signals, rolling stock, level crossings, train protection and
crime. Under the 1974 Health and Safety at Work, investigative and enforcement authority was
conferred to this office (ORR, 2017).This aims to ensure that safety is undertaken as a multi-
disciplinary approach (Crutchfield &Roughton, 2013, p. 3).Occupational health guidance and
advice to railway stakeholders is also given. Strategy and guidance on railway operations are
also set out by this office. This agency is also tasked with giving annual reports on safety and
health performance on Britain’s Railway.
Train Accident- Grimston Lane footpath crossing February 2016
The information on the train accident was retrieved from a report given by the Rail
Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). A pedestrian was struck and killed by a train while
crossing the Lane footpath level crossing in Suffolk (Trimley). The accident happened on
Tuesday at 12:19 hours and involved a train traveling from Ipswich whose destination was
Felixstowe. According to the report, the pedestrian acknowledged hearing the train horn signal
by raising his arm. The accident was caused probably by misjudging the time he needed to cross
before the train reached him. He could also have misjudged the time that the train would take to
reach him (Romanowska, Jamroz, Kustra, 2017).Another assumption that was posited is that he
may not have been able to clearly see the train before deciding to cross. He could also not be
aware of the train because of the misalignment of the crossing.
The victim was 82 year old Stanley Sawyer and is classified as “vulnerable users” by the
Network Rails guidelines (RAIB, 2016, p.14). The victim had was under medication for
dementia which had been diagnosed earlier. The crossing which the deceased use was skewed
and did not cross the railway line at an angle of 90 degrees. This increased marginally the length

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of the path across the railway and may have contributed to this fatality. It would have
necessitated the pedestrian to look over their shoulder before making the crossing. This particular
crossing may be more difficult for persons who are elderly to use. Mr. Sawyer was known to
have regularly crossed the railway in the past while using a walking stick (RAIB, 2016, p.14).
This was due to a problem with his left leg which required the use of a walking aid. On this
particular day, he was not use it and this could have contributed to the accident.
Safety Breaches
The UK is known to have one of the safest records in usage of trains in Europe (Data
Blog, 2016). The main safety breach can be attributed to the failure Network Rail not to make
allowance for vulnerable users who regularly make level crossings. Network Rail owns the
railway infrastructure in this particular area of operation. Vulnerable users have been shown to
account for more than 60% of fatalities witnessed in similar level crossings. These vulnerable
users require more time than the standard allowance provided by Network Rail. The current
allowance for traverse speed is 0.75 m/s while the victim was crossing the railway at 05 m/s
(RAIB, 2016, p.29).The skew of the railway crossing also contributed to the fatality as it did not
avail to him the best position to view the incoming train. This may have contributed to the
miscalculation he may have made in the time needed to traverse the crossing.
Level crossing accident account for 26% of all train accidents in the EU (Biennial Report,
2016, p.31). Passive level crossings account for 47% of all level crossings in the EU (Biennial
Report, 2016, p.54). This particular crossing in the UK falls under this category which
significantly contributes to accidents. The lack of active level crossing (LC) mechanisms such as
automatic user warning and protection could have contributed to the fatality of Mr. Sawyer.
Additional measures such as an active LC with rail-side protection could have significantly

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reduced the probability of the accident resulting in a fatality (Yan, Gao, Tang & Zhou, 2017).
Network Rail failed on two levels of level crossing management: level crossing management and
asset inspection. The risk assessment consists of collecting data on level crossings with regards
to the use, condition and environment.
This is then followed by making recommendations after analyzing the data and
improvements can then be made. The asset inspection involves regular inspections which
identify defects and appropriate rectification is undertaken ( Hopkins, 2014) The last risk
assessment and asset inspection undertaken in 2015 availed a number of control options that
would have significantly eradicated the risk and improved safety at the crossing (RAIB, 2016, p.
19). None of the following options was implemented: installation of miniature standard stop
lights or overlay stop lights and replacing the skewed timber deck with rubber decking which
was straight. These breaches in risk assessment and safety management by Network Rail
contributed to the fatal accident at Grimston level crossing. The above recommendations were
instead seen as long-term options for the future.
Recommendations, Policy change and Implementation. RAIB made several
recommendations following the investigation into the accident that occurred at Grimston. The
train and infrastructure owner and operator were tasked with identifying the effects of the
skewed level crossing on behavior of the users (RAIB, 2016, p.36). The effects should be
identified in relation to the passivity of the crossing and include the sightings by users of the
approaching train. The operator should also undertake a review of its internal processes on level
crossing risk management (Hopkins, 2014). This should incorporate all risks management on
level crossings and the effect of the skewed alignment. Recommendations should be made
operational with level crossing managers who should be given the new appropriate training.

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Network Rail developed a new long-term policy framework titled “Transforming Level
Crossings”. The operator proposes to highlight the decking across the railway with markings
which show the crossings as danger zones by 2025 (RAIB, 2016, p.35). This will help
pedestrians to make the decision to cross after sufficiently assessing that it is safe to do so. The
second policy action that was planned is to automate the level crossing systems by the year 2039.
This will transform the current passive crossings to become active in status (Hongwen &
Yuguang, 2014). Network Rail also advised RAIB that it would allow some allowance for
vulnerable users based on professional judgment. Bantry & Montgomery (2016) state that this
would factor in the aging population some of whom suffered from dementia related conditions.
Following a report authored by ORR on the level crossing, Network Rail undertook some
measures to remedy the problem. This was based on hazard identification, control and
monitoring of outcomes undertaken (Khan, Rathnayaka & Ahmed, 2015, p.124) Vegetation
which was redundant and obscured sighting of the approaching train was removed (RAIB, 2016,
p.34).The same applied to structures which also contributed to reducing visibility of the
incoming train at Thorpe Lane. This helped in improving the visibility of the trains using the
Grimston level crossing. Paths that approach the level crossing have also been fenced. The
skewed timber deck across the deck was also replaced with rubber decking. The alignment was
changed to make the crossing to be perpendicular to the track. This eliminated the skewed
alignment and shortened the crossing time.
Hazards and risks are a common occurrence in most workplaces. Mitigating the hazards
calls for plan which incorporates risk and safety features. The risk and safety management within
the UK on train operations is based on European standards. The policy framework postulated is
transposed into national laws and regulations. The train accident which occurred at Grimston was

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the result of breaches in safety and risk management. The investigation that followed identified
gaps in the risk assessment and asset management process. Recommendations that were made
and implemented helped in eliminating the hazard that was identified. The new policy
framework adopted projects to eliminate more potential risks in the future in the risk and safety
management plan.

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