University of Queensland SCIE1000: Reflections on Scientific Method

This essay, written for a SCIE1000 philosophy course, critically examines the scientific method, specifically contrasting inductivism and falsification. The student begins by defining and contrasting inductive and deductive approaches, referencing the views of Albert Einstein, who emphasizes falsification. The essay then delves into the inductivist perspective, exploring the challenges posed by David Hume's problem of induction. It presents Karl Popper's falsification theory as an alternative, arguing that scientific progress relies on deductive reasoning and the ability to disprove hypotheses. The student agrees with Popper's approach, while acknowledging some limitations. Ultimately, the essay concludes that falsification offers a more robust and efficient method for generating scientific knowledge, despite identifying flaws in both methodologies. The essay references Lange (2011), Doria (2009), and Popper (2002) to support its arguments.

“Reflections On Scientific Method”
SCIE1000
Philosophy Assignment – Semester 2 2020
Jayden Keatley
44524386
A notable quote by Albert Einstein states, “No amount of experimentation can ever prove me
right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.” (SCIE1000 2020), despite its validation,
captures an interpretation of acquisition in science where a hypothetico-deductive might find
this quote to be formally accounted and creditable, as any kind of knowledge has come from
experimental falsification rather than from experimental confirmation of a hypothesis.
However, an inductivist would argue that the validity of scientific endeavor is to be
approached rationally. This paper aims to evaluate how an inductivist would respond to this
claim and convey their approach of validating science through reason to the inductivist rather
than the interpretation of knowledge through a falsifiable method to validate science. I will be
addressing my response to the hypothetico-deductive account, basing and concluding my
argument around which rational method is more plausible and coherent in the field of
science.
To begin with, I wish to define an inductive versus a deductive account in scientific methods.
An inductivist will propose that an approach to a scientific method should be apparent by
scientific regulations derived from observations or current data as a means of extrapolation
known as induction (SCIE1000 2020). Through this ideology, generalizations and scientific
experiments that discover the structure of natural occurrences as a product of induction, are
subjected to parameters, requiring an adequate level of statements for generalizations, in
addition, these observations are to be repeated given certain conditions. This prerequisite for
inductive thinking gives rise to a law where given these premises, any case or universal
statement made under such law would primitively be considered as a standard approach for a
hypothesis. Looking at Einstein’s statement that presents falsification, an inductivist would
find themselves refusing such a statement given the universal law without conflict coming
between acceptable statements and this law.

Though induction can be recognized as the gold standard in science, it can find itself under
debate, particularly when expressed in philosopher David Hume’s approach of induction. The
problem with Hume’s idea of induction is that probability and assumption diminish any
logical thinking. Cited in Lang (2011), Hume quotes “Probability is founded on the
presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and
those, of which we have had none; and therefore ‘tis impossible this presumption can arise
from probability.” An example based around this argument is where Hume states that the
subsequent slice of bread consumed is guaranteed to be nutritional as previous experience
from consumed slices of bread was nutritional (Lang 2011). Hume’s account may seem
problematic given that some would find science justifiable in making predictions inductively
however finds itself unquestionable. Also, this account is contradicted, limiting the range of
inductivist’ uncertainty. An opposing theory finds that knowledge is created by speculation
and disapproval, giving inductivism a parable standing (Doria 2009). This theory is known as
hypothetico-deductivism, also referred to as falsification.
Philosopher Karl Popper recognized falsification, strongly holding a position subjected to
induction, and is accepted in the scientific community. Popper suggests that induction is
unjustifiable, opposing that science is based on deductive suppositions and hypothesis, as an
established way to falsify such a hypothesis. He affirmably enforces the idea that science and
knowledge should rely on deductive and theoretical understanding, where theories in science
are not about whether they are true, but instead proving them to be false, and without further
requiring any kind of inductivist account or theories based on this account (Doria 2009).
From this perspective, an inductivist account is invalid and irrational, Popper states that
observation requires a chosen object, it needs a point of view, and needs to be selective,
suggesting that any scientific observation requires theoretical background information
otherwise this observation is invalid (Popper 2002). Popper further suggests that science
requires creativity and irrational observations as a common ground for expanding and
developing in the field of science, where an inductivist would not give a personal opinion and
speculative imaginations a place in science (SCIE1000 2020).

Despite an inductivist theory representing a traditional approach in the field of science, I
strongly agree with Poppers’ falsification theory, as inductivism conveys an inexpert
understanding of the hypothesis. When approaching a scientific experiment, a deductivist will
be strong-minded to prove whether a theory is valid, while an opposing inductivist will
purely focus on one outcome meanwhile rejecting all other outcomes in support of such a
hypothesis, finding bias in this hypothesis, which could potentially lead to misleading results.
One also might find that an inductivist jumps to a conclusion declaring such a hypothesis as
immediate truth or as a premature declaration. This inductivist approach coincides with
Hume’s approach that suggests assumptions based on observations are an adaptation of
uniformity in nature where any observation that has already occurred, is a precursor for the
same observation expected in a future occurrence (Lang 2011). However, in saying that I
support the falsification account, I do find some dispute towards Poppers’ theory. His theory
of disapproving hypothesis hinders and finds conflict in any advancement on scientific
technology that primarily looks for new theories and not trying to falsify old ones. For the
theory to be tested, underlying principles and theories are required. During the experiment, if
irregularities are found and are persistent, problems then arise which might discourage all
other principles or even causing the hypothesis to be rejected which then brings scientists to
the forefront of trying to compensate for these irregularities found (SCIE1000 2020).
In conclusion, and despite identifying flaws in both the inductive and hypothetico-deductive
methods, I agree with Poppers’ account of falsification as it has a robust approach and
intuitive understanding with the aforementioned statement by Albert Einstein. From an
inductivist point of view, there is appropriateness for science to be strictly essential and
permitted from reason, however, falsification ideology proves to remain a more efficient
method for producing hypotheses and knowledge and has allowed improvements in the
quality of science.

References
Lange, M., 2011, ‘Hume and the Problem of Induction’, Handbook of the History of Logic. pp.
43–91.
Doria, Nilson Guimaraes, 2009, ‘No more than Conjectures: Popper and the Ethics of Scientific
Enterprise’, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2), p.116.
SCIE1000 2020, ‘Theory and practice in science: Seventeenth Edition’, School of
Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland