Griffith University: SME Financing Literature Review, 2013

This document presents a literature review focused on the financing of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The paper delves into the crucial importance of access to finance for SMEs, highlighting its role in fostering business creation, innovation, and economic growth. It explores the differences in financial behavior between SMEs and large firms. The review examines various financing sources available to SMEs, considering the impact of both SME characteristics and those of owner-managers on financial decisions. The paper discusses key concepts such as the business lifecycle model, pecking order theory, and the influence of firm size, age, ownership type, legal form, and location on financing choices. It also examines the characteristics of SMEs and how they affect financial decisions. The review references a range of empirical studies and theories, providing a comprehensive overview of the factors influencing SME financing strategies and behaviors.

International Journal of Business and Management; Vol. 8, No. 14; 2013
ISSN 1833-3850 E-ISSN 1833-8119
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education
36
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Financing:
A Review of Literature
Abdulaziz M. Abdulsaleh1 & Andrew C. Worthington1
1 Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Australia
Correspondence: Abdulaziz M. Abdulsaleh, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith
Business School, Griffith University, Australia. Tel: [phone]. E-mail: [e-mail]
Received: April 3, 2013 Accepted: May 6, 2013 Online Published: June 18, 2013
doi:10.5539/ijbm.v8n14p36 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v8n14p36
Abstract
There is no doubt that access to finance is of crucial importance for the ongoing and sustainable growth and
profitability of small and medium enterprises sector (SMEs) through its role in facilitating the creation of new
businesses and nurturing the innovation process as well as promoting the growth and development of existing
businesses, which in turn, boost national economic growth. The main motive of this paper is that SMEs
significantly differ from large firms in terms of their financial decisions and behaviour. Hence, the purpose of
this paper is to review the literature on the various financing sources of SMEs taking into account the effects of
both SME characteristics and those of the owner–managers on SME financial behaviour.
Keywords: small and medium sized enterprises SMEs, financing
1. Introduction
The availability of finance has been highlighted as a major factor in the development, growth and successfulness
of SMEs (Ou & Haynes, 2006; Cook, 2001). Financing methods employed by SMEs vary from initial internal
sources, such as owner–manager’s personal savings and retained profits (Wu,Song, & Zeng, 2008) to informal
outside sources, including financial assistance from family and friends (Abouzeedan, 2003), trade credit, venture
capital and angel financiers (He & baker, 2007), and thence to formal external sources represented by financial
intermediaries such as banks, financial institutions and securities markets (Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson,
1996).
According to the financial growth cycle paradigm proposed by Berger and Udell (1998) financial needs and the
financing options available for SMEs change throughout the various phases of a firm’s lifecycle. In other words,
at different stages of the firm’s growth cycle, different financing strategies are required. In general, because of
the unique features that characterise SMEs during the start-up phase, such as informational opacity (Berger &
Udell,1998), a lack of trading history (Cassar, 2004) and the high risk of failure (Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht,
2007), SMEs in this stage depend heavily on insider funding sources.
As SMEs advance through their business lifecycle, they begin to gradually adjust their capital structure (La
Rocca, La Rocca, & Cariola, 2011). During subsequent growth stages as SMEs mature, they start to establish a
track record in addition to the ability to provide collateral. This serves to improve the creditworthiness of the
firm and thereby attracts the attention of investors willingly inject money into the business. As a consequence,
firms begin substituting internal with external financing sources, including venture capitalists, trade credit and
bank loans to name a few. In the more advanced stages of their growth cycle, when SMEs become more
informationally transparent, they may develop access to securitised debt and publicly listed equity markets
(Berger& Udell, 1998).
A number of empirical studies, including Kimhi (1997) and Barton and Gordon (1987), use the lifecycle model
as their chosen approach to understand the financial behaviour of SMEs. In line with these studies, La Rocca et
al. (2011) found that the financial behaviour of SMEs can be, to a large extent, attributed to the lifecycle pattern
which was found consistent over time and quite similar across different industries and institutional contexts. In
addition, in their study of small businesses financing using a sample of 60 SMEs across three cities in China, Wu
et al. (2008) found evidence supporting the business life cycle model.
However, other studies critique the growth life cycle model claiming that it does not offer a complete picture of

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SME financial decisions and behaviour. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) themselves concede that the
lifecycle paradigm is not applicable to all SMEs operating in different industries implying that firm size, age and
information availability -which are intended to constitute the backbone of this particular paradigm- are not
perfectly correlated. Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald and Gardine (2005) partially agreed with the model stating
that SMEs financing cannot be standardized. Moreover, according to their results and contrary to the growth
lifecycle model suggestion that the financial needs and options of SMEs lie on some size/age/information
continuum, only firm size was found to be a significant predictor (in some, but not all cases) of capital structure
decisions in SMEs.
The SME financing pattern explained by Berger and Udell (1998) contrasts with the hypothesis given under
pecking order theory. The pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) suggests that the capital structure
decisions of a firm are a function of the firm’s age. As postulated by this theory, internal sources of funding are
prioritised while the use of external sources is delayed until the internal sources are exhausted. As such, when
seeking funds, a firm prefers internal equity to external debt, short-term debt to long-term debt, and external debt
to external equity. Therefore, the order of preference for the financing sources for a firm should follows internal
equity, issuing debt, and then issuing equity (Cassar & Holmes, 2003).
Consistent with pecking order theory and contrary to the lifecycle model, Gregory et al. (2005) argue that older
firms should be less reliant on external financing sources than younger firms. They attribute this to the fact that
because older firms have more opportunities to accumulate retained earnings than younger firms, more internal
funds are available to finance their operations. Work by Sanchez-Vidal and Martín-Ugedo (2005) on the Spanish
SMEs also supports the pecking order theory.
The pecking order theory was tested by Helwege and Liang (1996) who examined the financial decisions of a
sample of young small businesses between 1984 and 1992. According to their empirical results, financing
patterns followed by the firms in their sample did not match the pattern suggested by the pecking order theory.
They further found, contrary to what the theory suggests, no evidence of significant relationship between the
raising of finance externally and a deficit in internal sources. Additionally, while theory predicts that equity
issuance should be avoided by firms with greater information asymmetry their results show that asymmetric
information variables have no power to affect such decisions.
Despite the effort that has been made to theorize SME financial behaviour resulting in the different financing
patterns followed by SMEs, it seems that different theories suggest different approaches. However, there is
general agreement on the effect of SME characteristics and those of entrepreneurs on the financing methods
chosen and employed by SMEs. In the following section, the effects of the characteristics are briefly discussed
before going beyond and reviewing the literature on SMEs financing sources.
2. SMEs Characteristics
In general, the characteristics of SMEs affect their financial decisions and behaviour and ultimately the firm’s
performance and growth. In this context, the literature has identified several characteristics peculiarly related to
the SMEs sector as factors influencing the financial behaviour of firms in this sector. These include firm size and
age, ownership type and legal form, geographical location, industry sector and asset structure (reflecting the
ability to provide collateral).
2.1 Size and Age
Even though there is no consensus amongst researchers about the criteria that should be employed to measure the
size of the firm (typically total assets, sales or the number of employees), the notion that firm size has an effect
on SME’s activities and its potential to expand appears to receive general agreement. A firm's size is usually
coupled with its age as they tend to have similar influence on the firm’s life cycle. This influence can be strongly
observed in the decision making process in the firm about whether one particular sort or another of finance
should be chosen and utilized (Cassar, 2004). Studying firms financing and capital structure using a sample
consisted of 292 Australian firms, Cassar (2004) concluded that the “larger” small firms are, the more they rely
on long-term debt and external financing, including bank loans. This is consistent with Storey (1994) who found
that in the case of SMEs, the owner–manager’s personal savings are more important as a source of funds during
the start-up stage than outside finance such as loans and overdrafts from banks. From another angle, the extent to
which firm size can impact the availability of finance to the firm was measured by Petersen and Rajan (1994).
They argued that as firms grow, they develop a greater ability to enlarge the circle of banks from which they can
borrow. They then provided evidence that firms dealing with multiple banks and credit institutions are nearly
twice as large as those with only one bank.

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As younger firms are usually characterised by informational opacity (Berger & Udell, 1998) as a consequence of
not having an established track record, this may lead to the reluctance of banks and other financial institutions to
lend to these firms. According to Klapper, Sarria-Allende and Sulla (2002), younger enterprises (those
established less than four years), are more reliant on informal financing and far less on bank financing. This is
supported by Quartey (2003) who concluded the significant positive effect of firm age on the ability to access
external finance. In addition, in their investigation of the impact of firm and entrepreneurial characteristics on
SME access to debt finance in South Africa, Fatoki and Asah (2011) observed that SMEs established more than
five years have a far better chance to be successful in their credit applications compared with SMEs established
for less than five years.
2.2 Ownership Type and Legal Form
There is a positive relation between SME leverage and the type of organisational structure (Coleman & Cohn,
2000). This is in line with Abor (2008) who identified the form of business as one of the factors explaining the
capital structure decisions of Ghanaian SMEs. In addition, ownership structure and the type of firm were found
to have a significant impact on the use of bootstrap financing. Van Auken and Neeley (1996, p. 247) state that:
“Owners launching firms organised as either a sole proprietorship or non-construction/manufacturing firms
should be prepared to use more bootstrap financing than other firms. Owners of these types of firms should be
prepared to develop a financial plan that incorporates the use of greater variety of financing alternatives than
owners of firms organised other than a sole proprietorship non-construction/manufacturing firms. As such, a sole
proprietorship of non-construction/manufacturing firms should recognize the potential for the associated greater
number of constraints and difficulties in raising start-up capital”.
From the financier’s point of view, as SMEs are by nature characterised by concentrated ownership and control
in the same owner–manager, which leads to maximizing the information asymmetry problem, the reluctance in
lending to SMEs and the extensive use of collateral are understandable and justified (Hutchinson, 1999).
Consistent with this, Petty and Bygrave (1993) inferred that the lack of separation between the firm and the
owner affect the financing preferences of the firm.
In terms of legal form, Cassar (2004) notes that incorporation may be perceived by banks and other finance
suppliers as an encouraging sign of the firm’s formality and creditability. Consequently, incorporated firms
appear to be in a very favoured position in receiving external funding in comparison with unincorporated firms.
Other studies (Storey, 1994) concluded that limited private companies are more likely to be reliant on bank
financing.
2.3 Location
The geographical area where a firm is located in the proximity of banks is also believed to have an influence on
the firm’s ability to gain external finance. For example, SMEs located outside major cities face greater
difficulties in acquiring external finance, especially long-term debt, compared with their counterparts operating
in cities (Abor, 2008). In the same regard, Fatoki and Asah (2011) added that the geographical location of SMEs
close to their banks advantages them in that they can better cement relationship lending with those banks. As a
result, SMEs are better able to access bank loans using no more than soft qualitative information.
A study conducted by Okpara and Wynn (2007) reported poor location results in inaccessible businesses to both
customers and suppliers as one of the reasons for SME failure in Nigeria. Additionally, another study by Reddy
(2007) examined the challenges and obstacles encountered by SMEs in Fiji. They found that in spite of the
relatively high cost of rentals, SME owners preferred to move their firms’ activities to urban areas to escape the
negative impact of the local environment features of rural areas on raising external finance, including poor local
transportation and communications infrastructure, and consequently on the performance and growth of their
firms which made their survival more difficult where such a climate exists.
2.4 Industry Sector
A number of studies evidenced that factors related to the industry sector in which a firm operates also explain
capital structure and financial decisions (Mackay & Phillips, 2005; Michaelas, Chittenden & Poutziouris, 1999).
Firms in the services sector, for example, can differ from those operating in manufacturing or construction in
terms of financial needs and choices. Michaelas et al. (1999) empirically analysed the different capital structure
determinants across time and industries utilizing a sample of 3,500 randomly selected SMEs across ten industries
in the UK. They summarised that the impact of industry on short-term and long-term debt varies greatly across
industries.
The effect of industry classification on the capital structure of Ghanaian SMEs was examined by Abor (2007).

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The results of the study revealed some differences in the funding preferences of the Ghanaian SMEs across
industries. SMEs in the agriculture sector and medical industries rely more on long-term and short-term debt
than their counterparts in manufacturing. Abor (2007) further concluded that short-term credit is more used in
wholesale and retail trade sectors compared with manufacturing SMEs, whereas construction, hotel and
hospitality, and mining industries appear to depend more on long-term finance and less on short-term debt.
2.5 Assets Structure
As the provision of collateral plays an indispensable role in easing SME access to debt finance. SMEs that have
more fixed assets tend to utilise higher financial leverage (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984). The reason for this is
that these firms can borrow at lower interest rates as their loans are secured with these assets serving as collateral.
This explains why Coco (2000) describes collateral as the lender’s second line of defence.
In their investigation of the role of collateral and personal guarantees using a unique data set from Japan’s SME
loan market, Ono and Uesugi (2009) found that a positive relationship between the use of collateral and the
strength of the borrower–lender lending relationship results in easier SME access to external sources of finance.
A similar conclusion was reached by Odit and Gobardhun (2011) when examining the factors determining the
use of financial leverage by SMEs in Mauritius. They concluded that access to debt finance is affected by the
positive association between the debt ratio and the asset structure. Furthermore, they revealed that SMEs with a
lower portion of tangible assets in their total assets are more likely to encounter difficulties in applying for
outside finance because of the inability to provide the collateral required.
3. Owner-Manager Characteristics
The personal characteristics of the owner-manager also make a difference to the firm’s ability and likelihood of
accessing external finance (Irwin & Scott, 2010; Cassar, 2004). The reason is that the owner–manager in SME
has the dominant position in the firm in their role as the primary decision maker. For example, Berggren,
Olofsson and Silver (2000) reasoned that most owner–managers in SMEs do not prefer to finance firm
operations using external finance, particularly as it entails changes in ownership structure whereby such
financing may lead to control aversion. In the same vein, it has been shown that SME owner–managers
themselves exert a noticeable influence on their firms’ financing decisions and subsequently performance and
growth (Vos, Yeh, Carter, & Tagg, 2007; Coleman, 2007).
3.1 Owner-Manager Gender
Female and male entrepreneurs generally differ in the way they finance their businesses (Verhuel & Thurik, 2001;
Carter & Rosa, 1998). As reported in the enterprise literature, the issue of differences in financing sources related
to gender among SMEs is more highlighted during the introductory (start-up) stage. For example, Verhuel and
Thurik (2001) found that although men and women do not significantly differ with regard to the type of capital,
women SMEs owners appear to have a smaller amount of start-up capital. In addition, women-owned SMEs
begin in business with less than half of capital amount used by men and face more credibility issues when
dealing with bankers (Badulescu, 2011). In parallel, Mijid (2009) found higher loan denial rates and lower loan
application rates among female entrepreneurs. Coleman (2007) also provided evidence of credit discrimination
against female entrepreneurs as they were more frequently charged higher interest rates and asked to pledge
additional collateral in order for loans to be granted.
Explanations given in the literature for differences between men and women entrepreneurs with respect to access
to finance can be categorised into discrimination, abilities and preferences, and competition (see Harrison &
Mason, 2007). Moreover, Verhuel and Thurik (2001) divided the impact of gender on SMEs capital into direct
and indirect effect. The former “gender effect” refers to the fact that while male and female entrepreneurs may
share characteristics but they are different in the way in which they finance their firms. However, the latter
“female profile” can be more attributed to differences related to business type, management and experience.
3.2 Owner-Manager Age
It is often found that the personal financing preferences of entrepreneurs appear to change according to age.
According to Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios (2001), the effect of the owner–manager’s age on the financial
behaviour of SMEs can be noted in that unlike younger entrepreneurs, older entrepreneurs are less likely to
invest additional finance into their firms. This finding is in line with that of Van der wijst (1989) who suggests
that older SME owner–mangers are more reluctant when it comes to accepting external ownership in the firm.
Further, Vos et al., (2007) examined SME financial behaviour utilizing two data sets from the UK and the US
consisting of 15 750 and 3 239 SMEs, respectively. The results show that younger owner–managers tend to use
more bank overdrafts and loans, credit cards, own savings, and family sources than older owners who appear to

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be more dependent on retained profits.
Clarifying the connection between the financial growth cycle of SMEs and the owner–manager’s life cycle,
Briozzo and Vigier (2009, p. 37) state that;
“As the firm and its owner grow older, information asymmetries decrease, granting easier access to debt (a
supply-side effect), while the owner’s risk aversion and personal costs of bankruptcy increase with age, and thus
he or she desires to use less leverage (demand side effect)”.
3.3 Owner-Manager’s Education and Experience
Employed by institutional financiers as a proxy for human capital, the educational background of the SME
owner–manager is often positively related to the firm’s usage of leverage (Coleman, 2007). A study by Bates
(1990) examining the impact of owner–manager’s personal characteristics on SME longevity across a wide
sample of SMEs owned–managed by men across the US between 1976 and 1986 concluded that
owner–managers who had higher levels of education were more likely to retain their firms operating throughout
the period of study. He further emphasised that the level of education of entrepreneurs is a major determinant of
banking loans amounts offered to SMEs. As for the demand side, Storey (1994) asserts that higher levels of
education provide entrepreneurs with greater confidence in dealing with bankers and other funders when
applying for loans.
Turning to experience, as measured by the number of years in an industry, Cole (1998) found that experience
also enhances the availability of credit. In fact, Nofsinger and Wang (2011) hypothesised that the experience of
the entrepreneur is one factor that explains the difference in external financing levels available to SMEs. The
findings of the study proved this hypothesis. They further explained that prior experience in the industry
positively correlates with the share of external financing in the firm and added that the cumulative experience of
the owner–manager plays a crucial role in overcoming some of the problems that hinder SME access to external
finance, including information asymmetry and moral hazard. From the lender’s perspective, as experienced
entrepreneurs are believed to be better performers than less experienced entrepreneurs, it is then rational to factor
experience into the process of evaluating the creditworthiness of SMEs (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein,
2010).
4. Sources of SMEs Finance
4.1 Equity Financing
Due to moral hazard and problems with information opacity typically being more severe during the initial stages
of SME development, internal equity financing, as best represented by owner–manager personal savings, is a
critical source of funding for SMEs in these early stages (seed financing and start-up). Subsequently, in later
stages, in order to develop and grow SMEs tend to reduce their dependence on these sources and start seeking
alternative channels for raising capital. Internally generated profits and venture capital exemplify just two of the
other equity options SMEs seek to expand as they grow.
In general, “…equity capital is that capital invested in the firm without a specific repayment date, where the
supplier of the equity capital is effectively investing in the business” (Ou & Haynes, 2006, p. 156). Equity
capital can be raised either internally or externally. Internal equity is funds obtained from the current
owner–manager(s), family, and friends or from the retained earnings within the firm. External equity, however, is
capital acquired from external channels other than the existing partners and their relatives.
As mentioned above, equity financing is preferred over debt as a mode of financing for new and young SMEs as
they undergo a typical cash shortage and are generally unable to secure loans with collateral during the founding
phase. The advantages of equity financing in this regard are twofold (Ou & Haynes, 2006). First, unlike debt,
equity offers long-term financing with minimum cash outflow in the form of interest. Second, equity capital
helps enhance the new/young firm’s creditability by indicating that the firm has the approval of sophisticated
financial professionals.
Ou and Haynes (2006) determined two situations when SMEs pursue financing from equity capital sources in
order to meet expansion needs. The first case is when SMEs face financial distress coupled with a lack of
alternative sources of finance. The second case is when cash outflows exceed the cash inflows generated from
regular sources. Ou and Haynes (2006) attributed this attitude adapted by SMEs in these two particular cases to
the reluctance of regular lenders to lend to the firm because of uncertainty about the firm’s future growth
opportunities. As a result, these firms are usually classified as high risk. Inconsistent with this, in their
investigation of the determinants of financing mode chosen by young innovative SMEs in Germany,
Schäfer,Werwatz and Zimmermann(2004) found that risky SMEs are more likely to receive equity financing.

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Other arguments suggest that some SMEs owner–managers may choose not to use equity as a source of
financing in order to avoid any undesirable changes in the ownership of their firm (Reid, 1996). Other
entrepreneurs, nevertheless, may choose to source funding from external equity in order to share the risk with
less risk-averse investors. However, the valid judgement of the importance of the external equity for SMEs
should be based on the eventual success of firms that receives it, not on the quantity that the firm utilises (Berger
& Udell, 1998).
4.1.1 Venture Capital
Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries. Venture capital is that form of financing in which funds are raised
from investors and redeployed by investing in high-risk informationally opaque firms which for the most part are
young or start-up firms (Potter & Porto, 2007). Further, venture capitalists decide the timing and type of
investment in addition to their role in monitoring, screening and contracting (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989).
Moreover, by performing these functions, venture capitalists virtually participate in strategic planning and
decision making in the firm. The venture capital market includes a variety of organisations, including public
corporations, small business investment corporations and private limited partnerships.
Compared to other more conventional financing sources, venture capital displays some particular characteristics.
To start with, investments employing venture capital often involve high levels of asymmetry information and
uncertainty as well as higher intangible assets (Gompers, 1995). In addition, Hellmann (1998) explained that the
situation in which a company has a sufficiently large incentive for active monitoring takes place only when the
venture capitalist has a concentrated stake invested in that company. He added, monitoring in such cases may
include spending more time in the company and regular meetings with the managers. Finally, venture capitalists
can provide the firm with strategic access to new suppliers and clients as well as strategic partners (Bygrave &
Timmons, 1992).
As discussed, venture capital investment is uniformly associated with high risk and uncertainty. For example,
when providing external finance to firms, venture capitalists encounter a significant adverse selection problem
and moral hazard (Smolarski & Kut, 2011). Another problem that may arise is the agency problem (Berger &
Udell, 1998). This occurs in the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur when the latter
lacks sufficient information or skills to make optimal production decisions. This problem might also be
combined as information about the project is imperfect and revealed over time (Bergemann & Hege, 1998). In
order to alleviate these problems and reduce uncertainty, particular mechanisms can be implemented. In this
context, Gompers (1995) emphasised three control strategies. These strategies are: (i) the use of convertible
securities, (ii) the syndication of investment, and (iii) the staging of capital infusions.
According to Cumming (2006), most venture capital transactions include convertible securities. Bascha and
Walz (2001) asserted that unlike traditional debt and/or equity instruments, convertible securities have the ability
to mitigate the agency problem effects by leaving the owner–manager with some control during the investment
period. In addition, as the price of conversion is a function of performance, the venture capitalist has a better
chance to recover the investment if the venture is not successful. Other studies show other motivations for
employing convertible debt, with examples including reducing the risk-shifting incentives of the entrepreneur
(Green, 1984), resolving problems arising with debt financing and gaining indirect equity financing when issuing
traditional equity is unattractive (Stien, 1992).
Syndication is a common form of venture capital risk alleviation and refers to two or more venture capitalists
sharing in a single financing round. The syndication mechanism is used in order to decrease problems associated
with adverse selection through the participation of a co-investor sharing the investment risk (Smolarski & Kut,
2011). A study by Cumming (2006) reached a broadly similar conclusion stating that venture capital syndication
significantly mitigates adverse selection problems. Additionally, Lerner (1994) suggested that adverse selection
problem can be efficiently mitigated in the presence of high information asymmetry in venture capital financing
by implementing the syndication strategy. It was also found that syndication reduces the entrepreneur’s
opportunistic behaviour (Wright & Lockett, 2003).
Another main characteristic of venture capital is staged financing. As the term suggests, venture capital staging
refers to that mode of financing in which venture capitalists invest in stages in order to maintain the project
under control (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2004). Gompers (1995)
provided evidence indicating that staged investment enables venture capitalist to gather more information
allowing him/her to monitor the firm prior to refinancing decisions to be made. As such, the venture capitalist
has the option of abandoning the project if and when any unattractive information regarding the investment
emerges. Wang and Zhou’s (2004) results showed that the staging financing plays a crucial role in controlling

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moral hazard. Therefore, it is an effective mechanism in controlling agency problems.
Not only do venture capitalists provide an alternative source of funding for SMEs, they also help resolving many
informational problems plaguing SMEs. Hence, by helping increasing the financial flexibility of SMEs, they
offer them the chance of sourcing finance from other financial channels, such as banks and insurance companies.
However, the supply of venture capital appears to be relatively inflexible, at least in the short-term, as it requires
years of experience to develop the necessary skills (Kortum & Lerner, 2000).
4.1.2 Business Angels
Unlike other external sources of financing, business angel finance is not intermediated. It is instead an informal
market for direct finance (Berger & Udell, 1998). Angels are highly-selective wealthy individuals with long
business experience who invest directly in high growth SMEs with which they have had no previous relationship
(Madill, Haines, & Riding, 2005). This form of investment is usually based on an equity contract, typically
common stock. Though angels by definition are individuals, they sometimes coordinate their investment in small
investment groups.
According to Harrison and Mason (1992), there are three features that make angel financing an appropriate
option for SMEs. First, angels are more active in the early stages of enterprises (seed and start-up) closing the
so-called ‘equity gap’ by forming a ‘bridge’ between internal financing sources and outside investors. Second, by
having lower rates of rejection and being a more patient form of capital with longer exit horizons, angel
financiers tend to be more obliging to the needs of SME owner–managers. For example, German entrepreneurs
have ranked business angels as the most desirable funding providers (Brettel, 2003). Finally, unlike venture
capitalists, angel investors prefer to invest in their local economies where the majority of SMEs operate.
Angel investors are a crucial source of financing for many SMEs, especially start-ups. According to Morrissette
(2007), the amount of capital that angels provide is estimated to be eleven times that provided by venture
capitalists. Data collected by Shane (2012) from different surveys conducted between 2001 and 2003 showed
that between 140 000 and more than 260 000 angels injected investments between $12.7 and $36 billion into
between 50 000 to 57 000 ventures each year. In Germany, for example, a study by Stedler and Peters (2003)
estimated the total capital assets for each business angel in the country at €2.5million to €5 million distributed
across a portfolio of between 1 and 5 firms, all start-ups.
The extent to which angels are involved in the firms in which they invest is debatable. Barry (1994) claimed that
angels are not active investors. Yet, other empirical research show opposing results (e.g. Harding & Cowling,
2006; Landström, 1993). In terms of benefits, Mason and Harrison (1996) questioned a sample of 20 dyads
regarding the role played by business angels apart from their financial stake. The respondents reported that
nonfinancial contributions made by angels included assistance with management functions, finance and
accounting functions, strategic advice, financial advice, general administration, networking and marketing.
Further, 50% of the entrepreneurs rated these angel contributions as either helpful or extremely helpful.
Worldwide, and based on quantitative analysis, angel financing dominates venture capital financing in terms of
both the number of firms utilizing it and the financial value of investment (Fairchild, 2011). However, as a
source of financing, business angels have two main limitations (Wall, 2007). First, few angels are prepared to
inject additional money into a firm to enable it to grow and be a real competitor in its market. Second, most
angel investors do not have neither the skills nor the interest in investing in a firm after it has access to other
external sources of finance, including public equity markets.
4.2 Debt Financing
It is well known that capital structure decisions, in SMEs as in large firms, relate to the use of either equity or
debt or both. However, Berger and Udell (1998) believe that in the case of SMEs, this is partly incorrect because
information opacity is more severe in SMEs. Issuing additional equity to satisfy the firm’s financial needs would
then lead to a dilution in ownership and control. Therefore, in order to keep full ownership and control of their
businesses, SMEs owner–managers may prefer to seek debt financing rather than external equity.
Three significant differences between debt financing for SMEs and that of large firms have been identified in the
literature (Wu et al., 2008). First, unlike managers of large firms who usually have the choice of broader range of
debt financing resources, SMEs tend to be more attached to commercial lenders, especially institutional lenders,
as a source of short-term debt financing that can be renewed for long-term debt. Second, as information
asymmetry problems are more acute in SMEs than in large firms, long-term lending relationships are important
for SMEs in order to deal with the resultant agency problems along with the other three conventional
mechanisms; signalling, monitoring and bonding (the provision of guarantee or collateral). Third, in

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concentrated owner–managed SMEs, and contrary to what the agency theory suggests, it is not clear whether
debt can lower the agency costs that result from information asymmetry arising due to different motives of
owners and managers.
Choosing between short and long-term debt is important when making capital structure decisions. Short-term
debt decisions are influenced by the benefits and disadvantages associated with its use (García-Teruel &
Martínez-Solano, 2007). Jun and Jen (2003) summarised short-term debt advantages as a funding source. These
advantages include (i) zero interest rate in some short-term debt cases such as in the case of trade credit; (ii) in
comparison to long-term loans, short-term debt has generally lower nominal interest rates; (iii) short-term debt is
easy to adapt according to the firm’s financial needs; and (iv) lower costs of flotation than those of long-term
loans. In addition, from the lender’s point of view, short-term debt is an efficient way to deal with asymmetry
information problems as firms have to repay the debt and any associated charges over a shorter constant period
(Myers, 1977). However, the main drawback of short-term debt is the higher level of risk. Hence, financially
weak firms would prefer long-term debt as they perceive short-term debt benefits do not abolish its additional
risks (García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2007).
4.2.1 Trade Credit
One of the most important sources of external financing for SMEs is trade credit. For instance, Berger and Udell
(2006) estimated that one-third of the total debt of SMEs in the US in 1998 was represented by trade credit.
According to García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano (2010) trade credit is a delay in the payment for goods or
services after they have been delivered or provided as a result of an agreement between the supplier and the firm.
Therefore, for the firm this is a source of financing appears in the balance sheet under current liabilities, whereas
for the supplier it is an investment in accounts receivable.
The rationale behind the widespread use of trade credit among SMEs has been argued in the literature.
Ellihausen and Wolken (1993) attributed this attitude to both transaction motive and financing motive. The
transaction motive suggests the better ability for both parties (the seller and the buyer) to predict their cash needs
in the short-term. As such, cash management transaction costs can be economized. The financing motive is that
SMEs resort to trade credit when alternative sources of finance are unavailable or more expensive. In addition,
(Fatoki & Odeyemi, 2010) argued that trade credit financing is preferred by new and young SMEs when the risk
of default is high during the early years of operations. Moreover, in relation to financial motives, firms with
easier access to credit market can act as a financial intermediaries and offer funding for firms that face
difficulties in accessing external financing (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2001).
The role of trade credit as a source of raising financing for SMEs is even more important in countries with less
developed banking and financial systems where asymmetric information problems are more pronounced. In
China, for example, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) attributed the accelerating growing of the country’s economy,
rather than formal external finance, to alternative sources, foremost of which is trade credit. Supporting this,
Yano and Shiraishi (2012) investigated the efficiency of trade credit as an alternative channel for funding rural
SMEs in China using firm-level microdata over the period from 1999 to 2005. They concluded that offering
more trade credit to SMEs can assist these firms in their post-entry survival, thereby strengthening their
opportunity to thrive.
Another example comes from Russia where the financial and banking system is also typically considered less
developed. Employing data from a survey of 352 Russian firms in 1995, Cook (1999) emphasized the unique
positive role of nonfinancial firms, namely trade credit suppliers, acting as financial intermediaries in addressing
problems with information asymmetry. Cook (1999) explained two ways through which trade credit can
surmount capital market imperfections. First, as trade credit suppliers have more information on their partners’
businesses, trade credit can mitigate the problem of information asymmetry enabling them evaluate and control
the credit risk of their buyers. Second, by using trade credit SMEs can demonstrate their creditworthiness to
banks, consequently, banks will be more willing to lend to them on the basis of this signal.
Some researchers (e.g. Wilson & Summers, 2002) argue that trade credit can be a costly financing source for
SMEs if the buyer delays the payment beyond the specified date in the agreement. Nevertheless, Berger and
Udell (2006) believe that in spite of some drawbacks, trade credit remains a crucial financing source for most
SMEs, especially the young. They further explained that trade credit has the ability to provide the desired
cushion during credit crunches, contractions of monetary policy or other shocks that may make other funding
suppliers unwilling to provide financing to SMEs.

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4.2.2 Nonbank Financial Institution Debt
As finance institutions tend to differ from banks in their lending policies possibly in part because of regulatory
differences (Berger & Udell, 1998) and following Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010) who
separate bank finance from other nonbank financial institutions funding, the focus in this section is on nonbank
financial institutions as the role of banks will be discussed in the later section.
In spite of the important and unique role played by nonbank financial institutions, including credit unions,
pension funds, finance houses, investment trust companies, finance companies and insurance companies, in
meeting the financial needs of SMEs, the market for nonbank debt has been largely ignored in the finance
literature (Arena, 2011). Nonetheless, some researchers have attempted to investigate this role. For example,
Atieno (2001) investigated and assessed the role of such institutions in facilitating the access to credit by SMEs
in rural Kenya. He attributed the dominance position of these institutions as funding providers to SMEs to the
fact that their procedures for loan applications are shorter than those of commercial banks. He adds another
advantage makes this financing source favourable to SMEs which is longer loan maturity periods.
Nonbank debt offers a channel for SMEs to raise funding in both developing and developed nations. In
Zimbabwe, for example, loans granted by nonbank financial institutions account for nearly 30 percent of total
debt, and were ranked second in order of importance by domestic SMEs (Aryeetey, 1998). A more recent study
conducted by the Federation of Small Businesses found that 15,000 financial institutions in the US competed to
lend to SMEs, of which half were nonbank lenders in the form of credit unions (Goff & Nasiripour, 2012). Still
in the US, an earlier study by Denis and Mihov (2003) using a sample of 1,560 new debt issuers firms during
1995–96 showed that of total amount of debt of $350 billion raised by the firms in the sample, nonbank debt was
responsible for almost $40 billion.
Johnson (1997) explained that while banks prefer short-term debt as their liabilities are also short term, nonbank
financial institutions such as insurance companies are generally in favour of long-term loans as they have
long-term liabilities. However, Johnson (1997) believes that nonbank financial institutions can act as a financial
intermediate between banks and public debt.
In general, the main advantage that encourages SMEs to use more debt than other external sources of finance in
their capital structure is the tax shield benefit. In addition, when seeking external funding, SME owner–managers
tend to limit the use of equity in order to meet control aversion and maintain control of their firms (Hutchinson,
1995). However, Abor (2008) found that SMEs with many shareholders (group-owned SMEs) may choose to
utilize low debt levels to avoid bankruptcy and the agency costs accompanied with debt financing.
4.3 Bank Finance for SMEs
A large body of the existing literature has documented that banks are the main external capital provider for
SMEs sector in both developed and developing countries (Vera & Onji, 2010; Ono & Uesugi, 2009; Zhou, 2009;
Wu et al., 2008; Carey & Flynn, 2005; Cole & Wolken 1995). De Bettignies and Brander (2007) assume that
bank loans are available for SMEs on competitive and fair basis.
In order to optimize their capital structure, Moro, Lucas, Grimm, & Grassi (2010) suggested that SMEs should
only focus on bank financing. Keasey and McGuinness (1990) argued that in spite of the fact that bank financing
is more expensive in comparison to other sources of finance, it generates a higher rate of return for SMEs. They
further conclude that bank finance can help SMEs accomplish better performance levels than other financing
sources can do. The explanation given by them is that SMEs employ the funds more efficiently when they are
monitored by, and answerable to banks.
From the perspective of banks, SMEs segment represents a strategic profitable part of bank business. In this
regard, de la Torre, Martinez and Schmukler (2009) described the engagement between SMEs and banks as
integral. They explained that banks do not only provide the necessary capital for entrepreneurs to establish new
SMEs or expand the existing ones they also offer a variety of services and financial products. The findings of
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez (2008) have highlighted a number of factors perceived by banks as drivers
to finance SMEs. The most important factor is the great potential of profitability associated with the involvement
with SMEs as banks perceive this sector as unsaturated with good prospects. Another factor is the possibility to
seek SMEs clients through their relations with their large clients. Banks involvement with SMEs is also driven
by the intense competition in other sectors such as the large business and retail customers.
The empirical literature on bank financing to SMEs emphasises some mechanisms, techniques and models
developed and adopted by banks to lend to SMEs such as relationship lending (e.g., Petersen & Rajan, 1994),
factoring (e.g., Soufani, 2002) and scoring (e.g., Frame, Srinivasan, &Woosley,2001) just to mention some.

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Relationship lending is a powerful mechanism used to reduce problems related to opaqueness in firms especially
SMEs. Under relationship lending, “soft” information is gathered by a financial institution (usually small local
bank) through continuous contact with the firm (usually SME) in the provision of financial services (Berger &
Udell, 1998, p. 645). The information will be then used to evaluate the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur as a
part of the loan process to ensure that the potential loan will be repaid. The strength of the relationship lending,
measured by its duration or the breadth of the relationship, was found positively correlated to the availability of
funds for SMEs (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). In addition to this, the literature reports other benefits including;
lower cost of credit, protection against credit crunches and the provision of implicit interest rate or credit risk
insurance (Berger & Udell, 1998). Other study suggested that in order to increase credit supply for SMEs
trust-based relationship lending is more effective than the establishment of longer or more concentrated
bank-borrower relationship (Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010).
Based mainly on “hard” quantitative information, credit scoring is a lending technology used by financial
institutions especially banks to evaluate informationally opaque loans applicants. Unlike the information in
relationship lending which need long time to be acquired, the hard data required by credit scoring technology are
readily gathered usually from consumer credit bureaus and commercial credit bureaus. It has been evidenced in
the literature that credit scoring method increases the credit availability for SMEs. Berger, Frame and Miller
(2002) concluded that implementing credit scoring leads to an increase in the supply of credit to SMEs.
Additionally, Frame et al. (2001) found that for the banks included in their sample the portfolio share of SMEs
increased by 8.4% as a result of adopting credit scoring technology. Moreover, according to Berger and Frame
(2007) this increase can be split into; (1) increasing the quantity of credit extended; (2) increasing lending to
relatively opaque, risky borrowers; (3) increasing lending within low-income areas; (4) lending over greater
distances; and (5) increasing loan maturity.
Another transactions technology employing hard information to lend to opaque SMEs is factoring. Factoring is
a method to raise short-term finance whereby clients’ account receivables are purchased by a specialized firm or
a bank for a pre-agreed fee plus interest (Soufani, 2002). Consequently, the specialized firm or the bank takes the
responsibility to control and manage a debtor portfolio of a firm. In simple words, factoring is the process
resulting in exchanging the account receivable of a firm for cash. As SMEs usually lack the sufficient collateral
to obtain finance, as such, using accounts receivable as collateral, that is factoring, to raise finance is
significantly important decision to increase SMEs’ liquidity (Soufani, 2002). It was found that factoring as an
alternative source of finance can play a crucial role in alleviating financing gaps faced by SMEs (Soufani, 2002).
4.4 Government Assistance and Initiatives
In both developed and developing countries, governments have recognized that the SME sector faces constrained
access to external financing which may negatively affect its crucial role in achieving national development goals.
As such, many governmental initiatives and programs have been implemented to ensure SMEs have easier
access to financing, of which credit guarantee loans, factoring programs and subsidised fees are typical
examples.
According to Mensah (2004, p. 3), government official schemes are those introduced by government either alone
or with the support of donor agencies to increase the flow of financing to SMEs. It has been argued that such
programs and schemes have the capability to ease the access of SMEs to additional credit (Boocock & Shariff,
2005). However, Riding, Madill and Haines (2007) maintain that government schemes aim at assisting access to
finance for SMEs can be effective only under well-specified conditions. In addition, as SMEs are subjected to
credit rationing due to their small size and information asymmetry Zecchini and Ventura (2009) suggested that in
order to be effective such schemes should aim at lowering the degree of discrimination against SMEs borrowers
in terms of lending costs and unmet demand for fund. Moreover, as for SMEs operating in the export sector,
Albaum (1983) recommended that it should be taken into account that not all firms are at the same phase of
export development, thus a set of programs targeting firms at different stages of export development is essential.
One example of governmental assistance programs in industrialized countries is that of Small Business
Financing Program in Canada (Klyuev, 2008). Under this program, the Canadian government may guarantee up
to 85 percent of loans less than $C250000. During financial year 2005–06, this program enabled SMEs to attain
more than 10,000 loans with total value exceeded $C1 billion. Another example is from the UK. Launched in
1981, the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme aims at facilitating SME access to finance by providing
guarantees for SMEs loans (OECD, 2000). Over the period 1998–99, approximately 45 000 loans to SMEs were
guaranteed with a value of £189 million.
In developing countries, different pictures emerge. In Croatia, a developing and transition economy, the

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government implemented the National SME Loan Scheme jointly with eight local commercial banks in 2000.
The program aimed at increasing the supply of financing targeting SMEs and decreasing the cost of borrowing.
However, contrary to expectations, the program suffered from a low rate of loan approvals with only 5% and
29% of applicants approved in the first two years; 2000 and 2001, respectively (Cziráky, Tišma, & Pisarović,
2005). This was attributed to the inconsistency in lending criteria employed by the banks involved in the
program. To the contrary, another example positively illustrates the role of such programs, is the Kilimanjaro
Cooperative Bank Scheme targeting rural SMEs in the region of Kilimanjaro in northern Tanzania. In his
evaluation of this program, Satta (2006) concluded that in terms of loan productivity the Kilimanjaro
Cooperative Bank Scheme outperformed all other schemes from Asia, Latin and Central America and the Middle
East with 500 active borrowers for each credit officer and an efficiency ratio of 30%.
Three major reasons rationalize government intervention on behalf of SMEs in finance markets, namely, credit
market failure, price distortions and dynamic externalities (Bechri, Najah & Nugent, 2001). Nonetheless,
government direct intervention to enhance SME access to finance may also lead to undesirable consequences
(OECD, 2004). Some indirect mechanisms and policies can help achieving these programs’ objectives. The role
of tax legislation is a case in point. In addition, it is assumed that in order to be effective SME financing scheme
should meet two principal criteria (Mensah, 2004). First, provide SMEs with their financial needs. Second, they
should be sustainable.
4.5 Islamic Finance for SMEs
As recently as the 1970s, Islamic finance has emerged as a new trend with promising potential in the field of
finance. The rapid growth of Islamic finance is not confined to Islamic countries as it also has spread to
non-Muslim countries with sizeable Muslim populations, including the US, the UK and Australia.
It is argued in the Islamic financing literature that many of microfinance elements are in accordance with the
Islamic finance’s broader objectives. Obidullah and Lattif (2008) believe in the possibility of a successful
marriage between the two disciplines. They underpin their belief by clarifying some aspects which these two
have in common. According to them both Islamic finance and microfinance encourage entrepreneurship as well
as risk sharing between the financier and the entrepreneur. Islamic microfinance adds that both disciplines
prioritize developmental and social goals by advocating the participation of the poor in the economic activities.
Ibrahim (2003) argued that Islamic financing methods are better suited in satisfying the financial needs of SMEs.
The focus in Islamic financing and investment, he explains, is on the transaction itself instead of the partner’s
creditworthiness. As such, entrepreneurs are granted funding without an obligation on them to provide strict
securities or collateral which SMEs often lack. He adds that because profit and loss sharing is pivotal in Islamic
finance, any securities or collateral demanded is not against the risk of loss, rather against possible fraud or
repayment evasion.The most popular Islamic financing methods are:
4.5.1 Musharakah
Musharakah as a mode of Islamic finance can be defined as “form of partnership where two or more persons
combine either their capital or labour together, to share the profits, enjoying similar rights and liabilities”
(Al-Harran, 1993, p. 47). In this form, the profits are shared according to a pre-determined agreed ratio, however,
in the case of loss it will be shared based on capital contribution ratio. Additionally, In Musharakah contract all
partners are entitled to have a role in the management of the project.
According to Lewis and Algaoud (2001) Musharakah contract can be either permanent or diminishing contract.
In the former contract, which may last to limited or unlimited period depending on the original agreement,
annual equal shares of the profit/loss are ensured for both parties based on pre-agreed deal. In the latter, however,
capital is not permanent since the financier receives profits on a regular basis diminishing his/her equity.
Consequently, this will gradually increase the total capital of the client till he/she becomes the only owner of the
project.
Ibrahim’s (2003) findings highlighted some advantages of Musharakah contracts. First of all, compared to the
rate of return of conventional finance (interest rate), rates of return for the capital provider in Musharakah are
large, thus, financially, for the financing institution financing through Musharakah is profitable. Similarly, the
rate of return of the partner’s capital is slightly higher than his/her share in the total capital even if this share is
less than the financier’s. This because the inclusion of management effort in Musharakah. Another advantage for
the entrepreneur is that since Musharakah does not require strict collateral guarantees so that it does not leave the
entrepreneur with a heavy burden of debts or any other obligations. In addition, Musharakah is a suitable
technique of financing for both fixed and working capital.

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Nonetheless, under Musharakah contract some ambiguity may exist regarding the title to assets in case of default
or dissolution. In order to partially offset the increased risk in such situation, the procedure could be taken is to
register the project’s assets under the co-ownership concept provided by a partnership or corporation
arrangement. Yet, capital providers especially banks may prefer to opt other Islamic financing method such as
Murabahah.
4.5.2 Murabahah
Among all Islamic financing modes Murabahah is the most distinct and the most popular. Under Murabahah
contract the financier (often Islamic bank) purchases or imports certain goods or commodities (assets or raw
materials) ordered by the client and then resells them to the entrepreneur after adding a negotiated profit margin
(Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999). Under this contract the payment is due in installments. It can be inferred that
Murabahah transaction entails two contracts. The first contract is that one between the financier (usually the
bank) and the supplier of the goods/commodities. The second is between the financier and the client who applied
for the goods/commodities. The fundamental principles that characterize Murabahah contract are summarized in
(Gait & Worthington, 2007). First, the goods/commodities must be clearly classified and identified on the base of
accepted standards and must be provided by the time of sale. Second, at the time of sale goods/commodities
must be completely owned by the financier. Third, the entrepreneur must be informed of the cost price at the sale
point. Finally, both the time of goods/commodities delivery and the due date of payment must be clearly
specified.
Khan and Ahmed (2001) considered the most important advantage of Murabahah is that since the financier
collateralizes the debt beyond the good/commodity itself, as such, the risk of loss becomes much less than the
risk of credit transaction in conventional transactions. In addition, Ibrahim (2003) asserted that Murabahah
contracts will ensure that the client will have the intended goods/commodities so that avoiding using the money
in a different purpose which is usually the case in the conventional loan contracts. Moreover, unlike Musharakah
contract and as mentioned earlier, in Murabahah there is no ambiguity concerning title to the assets as they
remain owned by the financier till the payment finalized.
4.5.3 Mudarabah
Gafoor (2006) described Mudarabah contract as a profit sharing and loss absorbing rather than profit and loss
sharing contract. Mudarabah is a contract between two parties; a capital owner and an investment manager,
under which profit is distributed in accordance to a ratio that is pre-agreed between the two parties at the time of
the contract, whereas, financial loss is borne solely by the capital provider and the manager losses his/her effort
and the expected profit. In other words, Mudarabah refers to two parties involve together to establish a project
whereby one party (individual or bank) provides the capital needed and plays no further role in the project while
the other (entrepreneur) offers his/her skills, experience and effort. Profits are then divided between the two
parties on the base of pre-determined ratio. In the case of loss, however, the financier entirely bears the financial
loss and the entrepreneur bears the operating losses and receives no reward for his/her effort. One exception that
the entrepreneur becomes liable for the amount of capital invested is in the case of negligence and breach of the
terms of the contract (Abdulrahman, 2007).
Segrado (2005) has categorized Mudarabah contracts into three categories. First category is demand deposits in
which deposits are not restricted, payable on demand and do not share in any profits. Second category is that of
mutual investment deposits where these deposits are combined with the bank’s money with the aim to participate
in mutual investment transactions conducted by the bank. Under such deposits, the percentage of profit is fixed
at the end of the financial year of the bank. The third of these categories is special investment deposits under
which deposits will be invested in a specific project or investment in accordance with the depositor’s request. In
this case the depositor will be entitled to receive profits and is liable for the losses, given that the bank is not
negligent or in default. At the end of the deposit period, the bank receives its share of profit against its
contribution of experience and management, while the depositor receives his/her share of profit as a capital share
contributor.
Due to agency issues accompanied with it, Mudarabah has been perceived as a risky product. As entrepreneurs
usually do not keep track records or financial statements (Segrado, 2005; Abdulrahman, 2007) it is difficult to
determine the actual profit to be shared between the two parties. Additionally, Warde (2000) concluded that
Mudarabah contract was often associated with moral hazard and adverse selection. Part of the reason for this is
because honesty, transparency and trustworthiness presumably characterize the entrepreneur cannot be
guaranteed. As such difficulties are likely to be unavoidable in Mudarabah contracts, Segrado (2005) suggestsed
that specific training to overcome these issues is needed, thus, he confirms that Mudaraba mode might be more