Stare Decisis: Examining its profound significance in legal evolution

This essay delves into the doctrine of stare decisis, a cornerstone of English and common law, examining its profound impact on legal development. The doctrine, also known as judicial precedent, dictates that higher court decisions bind lower courts within a jurisdiction, while decisions from other jurisdictions serve as persuasive authority. The essay elucidates key principles such as ratio decidendi (binding reasoning) and obiter dictum (non-binding comments), illustrating their application through landmark cases like Donoghue v Stevenson. It highlights the doctrine's advantages, including promoting certainty, justice, and efficiency by saving court time and ensuring consistent application of the law. While acknowledging criticisms regarding rigidity and potential obsolescence, the essay concludes that stare decisis, particularly through ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, significantly contributes to the evolution of legal rules and principles, fostering a more flexible judicial system. The essay also notes the diminished significance of stare decisis in courts of last resort, which possess the power to overturn previous decisions.

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Introduction
One cannot cast aspersions on the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis has a profound
significance in the growth and development of the law. It is an English and common law doctrine
expressed in a Latin phrase which means’ let the decision stand’. The doctrine has also been
referred to as judicial precedent. The idea inherent in the doctrine of stare decisis is that the
decision that has been made by a higher court is binding on lower court with a particular
jurisdiction (Lee, 1999). However, the decision that is made by another court from other
jurisdictions acts as a persuasive authority. The degree of persuasiveness of a decision made by
another court from another jurisdiction is conditional on the level of the court where the
precedent was decided and how the level of maturity of the legal system. In other cases, a
precedent from another court outside a certain jurisdiction will be more persuasive based on the
assumption that the decision was made recently although this is not a normative practice. It is
instructive to note that there are peculiar instances where decision from another court will be
persuasive due to the collective reputation and confidence that the judge who decided the case
inspires in the legal profession. Precisely, the primary aim of this essay is explain the how the
doctrine of stare decisis has contributed to the development of the law.
The doctrine of stare decisis implies that the decision that has been made by a higher court will
be binding on a lower court notwithstanding the fact that there may be a possibility that the
decision was erroneous (Kozel, 2010). Further, the doctrine implies that the decision made by
another court is binding on another court which is an equal court with the court that has made the
previous decisions and is of the same jurisdiction (Murgan et al, 2015). According to the doctrine
a court must make a decision is the same manner that it was made in another court if the facts of
the case are similar (Glanville and Smith, 2006) It bears noting that the all the facts of the new
case must not be similar to the decided case. The significance of the idea that a court will be
bound by a previous decision is that when the judge makes the judgment he typically sets out the
material facts of the case, the law that is applicable to the case and the decision based on the facts
and the law. The current judge is expected to apply the law that was applicable in the previous
case and the reasoning that was applied by the judge if it is found that the material facts of the
current case are similar to the previous case.

The underlying principle embedded in the doctrine of stare decisis is ratio decidendi. This
principle implies that a court will be bound by the primary reasoning behind the decision of the
previous judge. It should be borne in mind that the doctrine of stare decisis does not imply that
the whole decision of the judge is binding on another court. The only relevant part of the
judgment that is binding is the main reason that informed the judge’s decisions and the law that
backed that reasoning. It can be argued that lower court will be bound to apply the legal
reasoning that was applied by the judge in the previous case. Conversely, another principle
inherent in the doctrine of stare decisis is Obiter dictum. These are comments that are made by a
judge ‘as a by the way’ about a case that he making a decision on. These comments may be
relevant in arriving at the final decision but they are usually not the basis of the final decision
that is made the judge. Although the ration decedendi of a case is binding, an obiter dictum is not
binding and only acts to persuade the court. Ideally an orbiter dictum carries less weight than a
ratio decidendi with respect to their binding nature.
The neighbor principle and the rule guiding the concept of duty of care in negligence that was
brought to force by the Lord Artkin in the land mark case of Donoghue v Stevenson( 1932) and
applied by the court in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (1936) remains to be rigorous example
of the application of stare decisis. However, it is imperative to note that the neighbor principle is
an orbiter dictum and is not binding it has been used to persuade the reasoning of the judge.
Middletown J. A. in Sweney v. The Department of Highway (1933) averred that the essence of
the doctrine of stare decisis is that it promotes certainty of the law. This means that the law,
through the doctrine of stare decisis is developing uniformly. On the other hand it can also be
argued that the doctrine of stare decisis promotes justice and fairness. This is exemplified in a
circumstance where there are two similar people who both manifest similar facts. It would be
utterly unreasonable and contrary to justice and fairness to treat one person better than the other.
The doctrine of stare decisis dictates that the reasoning that was applied in the previous case
should be applied in the present case for justice and fairness to reign.
In Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd (1944) the court noted that although decisions that have
been made by higher courts are binding on lower courts, the decision may be over turned by the
highest court of the land or the court of last resort such as the Supreme Court (Moschzisker,
1924).

It is of interest to note that there are various advantages of the doctrine of stare decisis that
promote the growth and the development of the law. The chief advantage is that it saves the time
of the court. This is because a judge does not have to take more time and apply more intellectual
energy on a case since the reasoning he will apply to arrive at his conclusion will rely on the
reasoning that has been espoused by the previous judge. Ideally, the solution to the current case
before a judge is embodies in the reasoning of a past decision with similar facts. A rigorous
example is the case of Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd and London Dockland
Development Corporation (1997) where the judge deciding the case did not have an imperative
to engender a new precedent since the principle of actionable nuisance was already determined
by the judges in other cases such as in Malone v Laskey (1907) and in Bone v Seal (1975). It can
also be argued that the doctrine of stare decisis has also plays a pivotal role in promoting
consistency is application of the law. It aids judges by preventing them from making erroneous
judgments since they have to follow a determined path. It gives added relevance to note that the
decision of a judge that has applied the doctrine of stare decisis is strong and may hardly be
contested. This is premised on the fact the reasoning is backed by consistent rules of practice and
law that are entrenched in previously decided cases.
The notion that the doctrine of stare decisis is effective in the development of the law has also
received a scathing attack from the legal firmament. The contention is that the principles that are
embodied in the previous case may be outdated and weak (Marshall, 1989). This stems from the
fact that the principles may fail to apply to contemporary situations. Suffice to say, interactions
in the modern world have become more complex and may not be similar to old situations
reflected by the old cases. It has also been contended that the doctrine of stare decisis in a major
impediment for judges who are out to develop new legal rules and principles. This is because the
principle does not give judges the liberty to depart from past decisions and make new
jurisprudence. From these dissenting views about the rigidity of the doctrine of stare decisis, the
emerging assumption is that the doctrine does not leas to the development of the law. In fact it is
not a necessary tool for the development of law but an impediment
Conclusion
It is a plausible conclusion that the ratio decidendi and Obiter dicta of case play a profound role
in promoting the development of new rules and principles in law. This creates a more flexible

judicial system where legal practitioners such as lawyers and judges can use an array of
principles entrenched in the previous decisions to support their arguments. Against this
backdrop, it can be conceded that the courts of the last resort have diminished the significance of
the doctrine of stare decisis because they are not bound by any decisions made by another court
even its own decisions. Further, they have the power overturn any previous decisions.

References
Bone v Seale [1975] 1 All ER 78
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
Glanville, T. and Smith, A.T.H., 2006. Glanville Williams: learning the law. Sweet &
Maxwell.
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 85
Kozel, R.J., 2010. State Decisis as Judicial Doctrine. Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 67, p.411.
Lee, T.R., 1999. Stare decisis in historical perspective: From the founding era to the Rehnquist
Court. Vand. L. Rev., 52, p.645.
Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141.
Marshall, L.C., 1989. " Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
Decisis. Michigan Law Review, 88(2), pp.177-238.
Moschzisker, C., 1924. Stare Decisis In Courts Of Last Resort, 37Harv. L. Rev,
409(42110.2307), p.1329428.
Murgan, M.G., Ghafur, A. and Ansari, A.H., 2015. Operation of judicial precedent in Malaysia
and Nigeria: A comparative analysis.
Sweney v. The Department of Highways [1933] O.W.N. 783 (C.A.)
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718 CA