Commercialization of Technological Innovation: A Strategic Analysis

This report analyzes the factors contributing to the successful development and commercialization of technological innovations, focusing on the interplay between a firm's strategic orientation (Prospector, Analyzer, Defender) and its market strategy. It examines how firms can navigate the innovator's dilemma by selecting appropriate target markets and implementing effective market orientations. The report builds links between Christensen's work on the innovator's dilemma and Moore's work on crossing the chasm. It also explores the relationship between customer-market orientation and the development of disruptive innovations. The study emphasizes the importance of developing contradictory skill sets to succeed across various innovation types and customer segments, drawing on market strategy and market orientation literature to refine the understanding of technological innovation commercialization. The report discusses the adoption and diffusion cycle, the chasm between visionaries and pragmatists, and the role of cross-market communication in successful commercialization.

Successful Development and Commercialization of
Technological Innovation: Insights Based on Strategy Type
Stanley F. Slater and Jakki J. Mohr
H ow can market leaders avoid the innovator’s
dilemma and continually develop disruptive
innovations to retain their leadership posi-
tion? We argue that the capability to successfully de-
velop and commercializeone type of disruptive
innovation—technologicalinnovation—isbased on
the interaction between a firm’s strategic orientation
(Prospector, Analyzer, Defender) and (1) its selection
of targetmarket;and (2) the way it implements its
market orientation.The insights offered by this
framework assist in predicting whether a firm’s stra-
tegic orientation enhancesor thwartsits ability to
successfully commercialize disruptive innovations and
also suggests the development of critical,yet contra-
dictory,skill sets in order to remain successfulover
time.
How can industry leaders reinvent themselves by
developing and successfully commercializing disrup-
tive innovations that challenge their existing business
models? Known as the innovator’s dilemma, Christen-
sen (1997) argued that market leaders have difficulty
diverting resources from the development of sustain-
ing innovations, which address known customer needs
in established markets, to the development of disrup-
tive innovations,which often underperform estab-
lished productsin mainstream marketsbut offer
benefits some emerging customers value.
Christensen’s (1997) initial research focused prima-
rily on technologicalinnovations,broadly defined as
those that introduce a different set of features,per-
formance,and price attributesrelativeto existing
products and technologies.In other words,techno-
logical innovations create new products based on new
underlying technologicalunderpinnings.Over time,
further developments improve the new technology’s
performance on the attributes mainstream customers
do value, to a level where the new technology begins
to cannibalize the existing technology.This progres-
sion reflects the classic S-shaped curve prevalent in the
study of technologicaldiscontinuities (e.g.,Chandy
and Tellis, 2000;Shanklin and Ryans,1987).The
focus of this article is on these technologicalinno-
vations, though distinctions exist between other types
of innovations and their dimensions.For example,
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2004) distinguish disrup-
tive innovations further based on their radicalness, or
new products based on a new technology relative to
whatalready exists in the industry.Their empirical
research shows that all disruptive innovations are not
necessarily radical (e.g., Schwab’s discount brokerage
businessmodel), nor are all radical innovations
necessarily disruptive (e.g.,cordless phones relied on
substantially new technology relative to wired phones
but were not disruptive to the industry). Some can be
both radical and disruptive (e.g., cellular phones).
Through his studiesof disruptiveinnovations,
Christensen(Christensen,1997; Christensenand
Bower,1996;Christensen and Raynor,2003;Chris-
tensen,Scott,and Roth, 2004)has spawned a sub-
stantial stream of research investigating many aspects
of the innovator’sdilemma (e.g.,Danneels,2004).
One componentof Christensen’s arguments is that
because incumbents listen too carefully to their cus-
tomers,they are disrupted by industry newcomers
that serve emerging customer segments. For example,
Christensen and Bower (1996, p. 198) state that mar-
ket-oriented firmscannotcreate disruptive innova-
tions since ‘‘firms lose their position of industry
leadership . . . because they listen too carefully to their
customers.’’ At its heart, this issue ties to both the se-
lection of a firm’s target market (emerging customer
segments versus existing customer segments) as well as
Address correspondence to: Stanley F. Slater, College of Business,
Colorado State University,Fort Collins, CO 80523-1275.Tel: (970)
491-2994. Fax: [phone]. E-mail: [e-mail].
J PROD INNOV MANAG 2006;23:26–33
r 2006 Product Development & Management Association

the way a firm implements its market orientation (e.g.,
listening to current customers’ articulation of existing
needs or conducting proactive research on potential
customers’unarticulated needs;see also Henderson,
this issue).
For those who study the successful commercializa-
tion of technologicalinnovation,a logicalquestion
arises as to the overlap between Christensen’s work
and the influential work of Geoffrey Moore in Cross-
ing the Chasm (1991, 2002). Moore’s work highlights
the difficulties firms face in commercializing new tech-
nologies, focusing on (among other things) the choice
of the initialmarketsegmentto targetand how to
modify the initialmarketing approach that was suc-
cessfulwith early adoptersof the productso that
mainstream customers will also embrace the new tech-
nology. These issues were also identified in Danneels’s
(2004) critique of Christensen’s (1997) work. For ex-
ample,Danneels discusses the complexities in fore-
castingwhen mainstream customerswill actually
embrace the new technology and in selecting a target
market for the new innovation when the firm has not
previously served customers in that target market.
Given the commonalitiesbetween Christensen’s
(1997) and Moore’s (1991, 2002) works in understand-
ing the successful development and commercialization
of technological innovations, one purpose of this ar-
ticle is to build links between Christensen’s influential
work on the innovator’s dilemma and Moore’s work
on crossing the chasm. A second purpose is to explore
whether or nota customer–marketorientation is a
liability in developing disruptive innovations.
The common thread in this article binding these
two somewhat distinct purposes together is our belief
that a firm’s strategic orientation (in particular, based
on the Miles and Snow [1978] typology of prospectors,
analyzers, and defenders) offers useful insights for un-
derstanding why some firms are more successfulat
commercializingtechnological innovations than
others. This typology is well validated and continues
to receive quite a bitof empiricalattention (e.g.,
DeSarbo et al.,2005;Hambrick,2003;Vorhies and
Morgan, 2003).
In particular,we examine how firm strategy (i.e.,
prospector, analyzer, defender) can explain success in
commercializing technologicalinnovationswith re-
spectto (1) the customergroupsthe firm targets;
and (2) its approach to being marketoriented.For
clarity, it is importantto realize thatwe are not
offering a new classification of Christensen’s disrup-
tive-sustaining innovation typology.Rather,we are
suggesting thatby overlaying the Milesand Snow
(1978) typology of firm strategy onto the disruptive-
sustaining innovation typology,additionalinsights
regarding which firmsare more likely to develop
and benefit from sustaining or disruptive innovations
may be gleaned.
Market Strategy and Success with
Disruptive Innovations
Market strategy isconcerned with how businesses
achievecompetitiveadvantage.Miles and Snow
(1978)developed a comprehensive framework that
addressesthe alternative waysorganizationsdefine
and approach their product-market domains and con-
struct structures and processes to achieve success in
those domains.They identified three archetypesof
how firms address these issues.Prospectors seek to
locate and exploit new product and market opportu-
nities, whereas defenders attempt to seal off a portio
of the total market to create a stable set of products
and customers.Analyzers occupy a position between
the two extremes by combining the strengths of both
the prospector and defender to cautiously follow pros
pectors into new product-market domains while pro-
tecting a stable set of products and customers.
In conjunction with Moore’s (1991,2002)and
Christensen’s (1997)work, we draw on the market
strategy implementation literature (e.g., Matsuno and
Mentzer,2000;Olson et al.,2005;Slater and Olson,
2001)and marketorientation literature (e.g.,Kohli
and Jaworski,1990;Narver and Slater,1990;Slater
and Narver, 1998) to refine our understanding of suc-
cess in developing and commercializing technological
innovations, as illustrated in Figure 1. Our argument
is that, based on their specific strategy type, firms de
velop skill sets associated with success for some—but
not all—types of situations in commercializing tech-
nologicalinnovations.For example,firms that are
adept at satisfying needs in the innovator and early
adopter segments are mostlikely to possess the re-
sources and capabilities to develop disruptive inno-
vations.Moreover,these firms’specific approach to
being market oriented allows them to use innovative
research techniques to discover customer knowledge
that becomesthe foundation for disruptiveinno-
vation. Conversely,firms that are successfulat satis-
fying needs in mainstream markets are more likely to
develop sustaining technologies or incrementalinno-
vations.Their more traditionalapproach to market
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
27

orientation is to listen to customers and to develop
innovations based on customer feedback.
However,to be successfulacross a range of inno-
vations (both sustaining and disruptive),firms must
also develop skill sets of other strategy types. For ex-
ample,a firm that tends to be more successfulwith
late majority customers may need a more proactive
approach to developing customerknowledge;new
techniques of market research may help it avoid fo-
cusing myopically only on existing customers and may
facilitate the development of disruptive technological
innovations. In essence, the capability to develop con-
tradictory skill sets is vital.
We first examine the relationship between selection
of target market and strategy type and then explore
the relationshipbetweenmarket orientationand
strategy type.
Selection of Target Customer Group
A widely adopted perspective on the success of new
innovations is the adoption and diffusion cycle, based
on the work of Rogers (1995).The basic premise of
the adoption and diffusion process is that there are
differentcategoriesof adopters,each with unique
characteristics and buying needs (see Table 1). These
categories of adopters fall along a normal, bell-shaped
curve,such thatthe bulk of the marketplace falls
within the early-majority and late-majority adopter
categories. Successful diffusion implies a smooth pro-
gression from one category of adopters to the next,
which is necessary for a firm to create leadership in its
industry.
Moore’s (1991) work built on research by Rogers
(1995) and identified the existence of a chasm,or a
gulf, between the visionaries(innovatorsand early
adopters) and the pragmatists(early-majority,
mainstream market).The idea of a chasm has been
Market Segments:
Innovators
Early Adopters
Early Majority
Late Majority
Laggards
Customer Orientation
Responsive
Proactive
Performance
Market Strategy:
Prospector
Analyzer
Defender
Figure 1.SuccessfulDevelopmentand Commercializationof
Technological Innovations
Table 1.Segments of Innovation Adopters
Segment
Descriptive
Label Characteristics
Early Market
Innovators Technology
Enthusiasts
Appreciate innovation for its own sake
Motivated by the idea of being a change agent in their reference group
Interest in new ideas leads them out of narrow circles of peers into broaders circles of innovators
Willing to tolerate initial glitches and problems that may accompany any innovation just coming
to market and are willing to develop makeshift solutions to such problems
Early Adopters Visionaries Look to adopt and use innovation to achieve a revolutionary improvement
Attracted by high-risk, high-reward projects
Because they envision great gains from adopting innovation, not very price sensitive
May demand personalized solutions and quick-response, highly-qualified sales and support
Mainstream
Market
Early Majority Pragmatists Rather than looking for revolutionary changes, motivated by evolutionary changes
to gain productivity enhancements
Averse to disruptive change; want proven applications, reliable service, and results
Want to reduce risk in the adoption of the innovation
The bulwark of the mainstream market
Late Majority ConservativesRisk averse and technology shy; price sensitive
Need completely preassembled, bulletproof solutions
Adopt innovation just to stay even; often rely on a single, trusted adviser to help them make
sense of technology
Laggards Skeptics Want only to maintain the status quo
Tend not to believe that innovation can enhance productivity and resist new technology purchases
Buy only if they believe all their other alternatives are worse and cost justification is absolutely solid
28 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
S. F. SLATER AND J. J. MOHR

empirically validated in work by Goldenberg,Libai,
and Muller (2002).In their study ofthe pattern of
diffusion of a large number of innovative products in
the consumer electronicsindustry, they found
that between one-third and one-halfof the cases
exhibited a ‘‘saddle’’(i.e.,a lull in sales after initial
market take-off that stymied the steady adoption and
diffusion process). Their work also showed that word-
of-mouth effects among categoriesof adopters
(i.e.,cross-marketcommunication)were the critical
factor in determining the size and duration ofthe
sales slump.
Some firms are able to reach only a smallniche
market of technology enthusiasts, whereas other firms
are able to successfully commercialize their inventions
by reaching a broader base of customers in the main-
stream market as well. Moore (1991) argued that the
chasm arises because (1) criticaldifferences between
visionaries and pragmatists make cross-market com-
munication extremely difficult for technological inno-
vations (e.g.,Goldenberg,Libai, and Muller,2002);
and, more critically, (2) the marketing strategies firms
use to effectively reach the early market for technol-
ogy innovations do notspeak to the very different
needs of the mainstream market.
The question is to what extent a firm’s strategy type
affectsits ability to be successfulat marketing to
variouscategoriesof adopters,which is where the
intersection of firm strategy and success in commer-
cializing technology innovations becomes relevant.
Insights from Market Strategy
Becausemarket segmentationand targetingare
the foundation of market strategy, firm performance
is determined, at least in part, by the match between
target market selection and market strategy type. The
importance ofthis match is highlighted in a recent
study of technology-oriented businessesby Slater,
Hult, and Olson (2005),who examined the perform-
ance implicationsof targetingcustomeradoption
categoriesby strategy type.For prospectors,they
found a positive relationship between targeting the
innovator and early-adopter segments and perform-
ance and a negative relationship between targeting the
early-majority segmentand performance.This sug-
gests thatprospectors,who excelat exploiting new
productand marketopportunities,have a difficult
time reaching outto more mainstream customers
to successfullycommercializetheir technological
innovations.Conversely,for analyzers,they found a
positive relationship between targetingthe early-
adopterand early-majority segmentsand perform-
ance and a negative relationship between targeting th
innovator segment and performance;this latter find-
ing implies that analyzers may not have the capabil-
ities to develop the innovationsthat technology
enthusiasts value.
The findings from Slater,Hult, and Olson (2005)
and related studies (Conant, Mokway, and Varadara-
jan, 1990; Slater and Olson, 2001), which suggest tha
different strategy types have resources and capabiliti
that enable them to successfully target different mar-
ket segments,are quite consistent with Christensen’s
(1997)work. Market-share leaders tend to be anal-
yzers and defendersbecausethose strategy types
targetthe early-and late-majority segments ofthe
market comprising approximately two-thirds of mar-
ket demand. Of course, there is variation in the size o
the categories based on the nature of the innovation
and how its benefits are communicated,but the idea
of a normal, bell-shaped distribution is widely accept-
ed and has been confirmed by research using the Bas
model (e.g., Mahajan, Muller, and Bass, 1990). Anal-
yzersand defendersalso havethe marketing and
operationalcompetenciesto succeed in thoseseg-
ments(Slater and Olson, 2001;Slater,Hult, and
Olson, 2005).As Christensen notes,thesemarket
leaders are largely unsuccessfulwhen attempting to
introduce innovations into niche markets.One key
reason for this is that defenders prefer predictability;
as a result,they tend to be neither innovation nor
technology oriented.In contrast,analyzers,though
not as risk averse as defenders, prefer incremental in
novation to disruptive innovation.
A critical implicationarising from this inter-
section of strategytype and selectionof target
market is the idea that businessesmust develop
what are often contradictory resources and capabili-
ties to be successfulin appealing to a wide range of
customertypes.For example,for prospectorsto
appeal successfully to all categories of adopters, they
must develop some of the resources and capabilities
analyzers.Similarly,for analyzers and defenders to
avoid the innovator’s dilemma by successfully devel-
oping and introducing disruptiveinnovationsthat
appealto technology enthusiasts—customers in the
early market—they mustdevelop some prospector
resourcesand capabilities.More specificinsights
related to these ideas are discussed in the conclusion
section.
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
29

Market Orientation
Another key factordetermining a firm’sability to
successfully develop and commercialize technological
innovation is how it comes to understand customer
needs. As noted at the outset, experts have essentially
taken two viewsin this regard.On the one hand,
Christensen (1997, p. 18) stated that established firms
are ‘‘held captive by their customers’’ (i.e., they listen
too carefully to them).As a result,Danneels (2004)
points out that Christensen’s work has often been cit-
ed as an argument against a customer orientation. On
the other hand, Slater and Narver (1998) drew on an
extensive body of research concerning the nature and
benefits ofa market-oriented culture to argue that
market-oriented businesses can avoid the innovator’s
dilemma by being committed to understanding both
the expressed and latentneedsof their customers
through the processesof acquiring and evaluating
marketinformation in a systematic and proactive
manner and to continuously creating superior cus-
tomer value.To what extent are these views ofthe
value of being customer oriented at odds with each
other? And to what extent does understanding of firm
strategy inform this debate?
Recent research (Atuahene-Gima et al., 2005; Nar-
ver, Slater, and MacLachlan, 2004) has shown that a
proactive market-oriented culture is more strongly as-
sociated with innovativeness and new product success
than is a customer-led culture.A proactive market
orientation involves a set of behaviors through which
a business attempts to discover, to understand, and to
satisfy the latent needs of customers. Atahuene-Gima
(1995,p. 287) concluded that ‘‘market orientation is
more strongly related to new product performance at
the early stage of the product life cycle than at the late
stage. . . Such an environmentseemsto warrant
greater marketintelligence and information sharing
within the firm.’’Moreover,recent research by Go-
vindarajan and Kopalle (2004) shows that firms able
to develop truly disruptive innovations have a cus-
tomer orientation focused on emerging customer seg-
ments rather than on mainstream customer segments.
Indeed,a customerorientation focused on main-
stream customersegmentsis shown to inhibit the
development of disruptive innovations.Importantly,
these two dimensions of customer orientation are not
on opposite ends of a continuum but are independent
of each other, suggesting that firms can develop both
orientations simultaneously (see also Narver,Slater,
and MacLachlan, 2004).
One implication from these findings is the need to
distinguish between current and potential customers.
Being customer oriented does not imply an exclusive
focus on current customers.Instead,a customer-
oriented firm can serve current customers and remain
vigilant for unserved merging markets (see also Day,
1999; Chandy and Tellis, 1998). Further, as Danneels
(2004)notes,if firms had a deep understanding of
their customers’ needs—both expressed as well as la-
tent and unexpressed (Slater and Narver, 1998)—then
the more reactive,narrow notion of customer orien-
tation would be rejected.
Insights from Market Strategy
We suggest that Christensen’s (1997; Christensen and
Bower, 1996) and Slater and Narver’s (1998) positions
are not necessarily in conflict with one another but
rather are on different sides of the same coin and are
resolved by understanding how a firm’s strategy type
informs its specific approach to being market orient-
ed. Defenders and,to a lesser degree,analyzers are
much more likely to be constrained by two factors.
First, the tyranny of the served market (Hameland
Prahalad, 1994)—or a tendency for firms to focus very
specifically on solving existing customers’ needs with
a currenttechnology—obscuresthe possibility that
customer needs may change over time and may be
solved in radically different ways.Second,core rig-
idities (Leonard-Barton,1992)resultin preferences
for information sources and existing views of the mar-
ket, in turn strangling a firm’s ability to innovate.
Analyzers and defenders listen too closely to custom-
ers,which can inhibit innovation,constraining it to
ideas customers can envision and articulate and lead-
ing to safe, but bland, offerings. This may be due to a
variety of reasons, such as customers giving marketers
bad information.For example,during a marketing
research project, customers may say they love a new-
product idea but then not buy the product when it
comes out on the market. Marketers may also need to
ignore feedback aboutwhat customers say they do
not want. For example, some products that met with
initial customer resistance included fax machines and
overnight express delivery.On the other hand,pros-
pectors,by nature, possesscorporateimagination
(Hameland Prahalad,1991),which enables them to
replenish theirstock of ideas continuously;they
have an ability to create a vision of the future con-
sisting of markets that do not yet exist and based on a
30 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
S. F. SLATER AND J. J. MOHR

horizon not confined by the boundaries of the current
business.
Once again, analyzers and defenders must augment
their skill sets with those more characteristicof
prospectors.One means for doing this is to rely on
novel types of market research to provide new types of
insights for innovation. For example, customers may
not always be able to articulate their needs;that is,
they have needs of which they are not aware; the needs
are real but are not yet in the customer’s awareness. If
these needs are not satisfied by a provider, there is no
customer demand or response. They are not dissatis-
fied, because the need is unknown to them. If a pro-
vider understandssuch a need and fulfillsit, the
customer is rapidly delighted.Based on this belief,
usefulinformation can be gleaned through observa-
tion of what customers do under normal, natural con-
ditions.
The techniques overviewed in Table 2 offer insights
based on how customers behave rather than on what
they say (Leonard-Barton,1995;Mohr, Sengupta,
and Slater,2005).If implemented correctly,custom-
er-visit programs,empathicdesign,lead-userre-
search,end-user (customers ofcustomers)research,
and targeting developing markets can reveal new pie
es of information that may have a direct impact on
developing innovative products or services.
Conclusion
In order to successfully develop and commercialize
disruptive innovations, not only does the firm need to
conceptualize and develop the innovation in the first
place; it must also be successful in reaching more tha
just a niche market of innovators–early adopters.In
other words, it must overcome the innovator’s dilem-
ma as wellas cross the chasm.These two problems
faced by allfirms—but especially those operating in
high-technology markets or driven by technological
innovations—are related in that they both derive from
the underlying skill set the firm brings to its marketin
strategy.
Table 2.Research Tools for High-Tech Markets
Customer Visit
Program
Systematic process of visiting customers with a cross-functional team to understand customer needs.
Benefits include:
face-to-face communication to facilitate the transfer of complex, ambiguous, and novel information
field research that enables personnel to see the product in use, to talk to actual users of the product, an
to gain a better understanding of the product’s role in the customer’s total operation
firsthand knowledge of customer’s problems and needs
interactive conversation that allows for clarification, follow-up, switching gears, and addressing surprisin
and unexpected insights
interaction with multiple decision makers to learn about all of the players’ various needs and desires
Empathic Design Based on the idea that users may not be able to articulate their needs clearly; focuses on understanding
needs through empathy with the user world rather than from users’ direct articulation of their needs.
For example, users may have developed ‘‘workarounds’’—modifications to usage situations that are
inconvenient yet so habitual that users are not even conscious of them. Or customers may not be able to
envision the ways new technology could be used.
Based in anthropology and ethnography, empathic design allows the marketer to develop a deep
understanding of the current user environment, to extrapolate the evolution of that environment into the
future, and to imagine the future need that technology can satisfy.
Lead-User Process Collects information about both needs and solutions from the leading edges of a company’s target marke
and from markets facing similar problems. Lead users may have needs months or years before the mass
market and, as such, are positioned to benefit significantly by obtaining early solutions to those needs.
Customers that tend to innovate are lead users—customers that are well ahead of market trends and ha
needs that go far beyond those of the average user. In some cases, lead users may have developed a so
to their needs that marketers can then commercialize for other users.
Research on
Customers’ Customers
Focuses on downstream markets to generate market intelligence; provides understanding of downstream
customers’ preferences, allowing for new insights and avoiding surprises in the market.
Target developing
markets
Provides a unique opportunity to inspire radical innovations with price-performance breakthroughs
(Prahalad, 2004).
For example, a car being developed for the Indian market will sell for $3,000. While it lacks sophisticatio
demanded by developed markets, the cost structure of parts and subsystems for this car pose a major
disruption to suppliers of the major auto firms.
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
31

Firms typically become industry leaders (analyzers,
defenders) by appealing to a broad base of customers
in the marketplace (i.e., the mainstream market) and
by continually meeting their needs for value over time.
These firms are able to develop sustaining innovations
based on customerinput to continually hold their
position of marketleadership.But, paradoxically,
thesevery skills put them at risk of being out-
innovated by industry newcomers.
The root causesof the innovator’s dilemma are
the tyranny of the served market and core rigidities
most common to analyzerand defenderfirms.To
solve the innovator’sdilemma,a firm must attack
the rootcauses ofthe dilemma by developing new
ways of looking at the world developing proactive
marketlearning competencies such asthe ones we
described.
On the other hand,based on their ability to see
opportunity from a fresh perspective,industry new-
comers—or prospectors—are able to develop disrup-
tive innovationsthat appealto emergingmarket
segments and to eventually supersede prior industry
leaders. Whether or not these industry newcomers are
able to successfully establish themselves in any indus-
try depends critically on their ability to augment their
skill set with the capabilities to serve mainstream cus-
tomers as well. To penetrate the mainstream market,
prospectors must expand their focus from the inno-
vator and early-majority segments and must demon-
strate clear advantage over existing solutions (Rogers,
1995).They mustdevelop distribution systems that
reach the mainstream market and offer their products
at a lower price to reduce the financial risk associated
with adopting the innovation (Slaterand Olson,
2001).Not every prospectorcan develop analyzer-
like marketing capabilities,nor should they.Often,
it makes more sense for the prospector to ally with
another organization already possessingthese
capabilities.
Blending the insights from marketstrategy with
those from innovation managementmay illuminate
why some firms succeed with disruptive innovations
and others do not. Importantly, augmenting a firm’s
capabilities based on other strategy types can be crit-
ical to ongoing success.
References
Atuahene-Gima,Kwaku (1995).An Exploratory Analysis of the Im-
pact of Market Orientation on New Product Performance. Journal
of Product Innovation Management 12(4):275–293.
Atuahene-Gima, Kwaku, Slater, Stanley F. and Olson, Eric M. (2005).
The ContingentValue of Responsiveand Proactive Market
Orientations for New ProductProgram Performance.Journal of
Product Innovation Management 22(6):464–482.
Chandy,Rajesh and Tellis,Gerard (2000).The Incumbent’s Curse?
Incumbency,Size, and Radical Product Innovation.Journal of
Marketing 64(3):1–17.
Christensen, Clayton M. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Boston: Harvard Business
School Press.
Christensen, Clayton M. and Bower, Joseph (1996). Customer Power,
Strategic Investment, and the Failure of Leading Firms. Strategic
Management Journal 17(3):197–218.
Christensen, Clayton M. and Raynor, Michael E. (2003). The Innova-
tor’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Christensen, Clayton M., Scott, Anthony and Roth, Erik (2004). See-
ing What’s Next: Using Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry
Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Conant,Jeffrey S.,Mokwa, Michael P. and Varadarajan,P. Rajan
(1990). Strategic Types, Distinctive Marketing Competencies,and
OrganizationalPerformance:A Multiple Measures-Based Study.
Strategic Management Journal 11(5):365–383.
Danneels,Erwin (2004). DisruptiveTechnologyReconsidered:A
Critique and Research Agenda.Journal of Product Innovation
Management 21(4):246–258.
DeSarbo, Wayne, C., Di Benedetto, Anthony, Song, Michael and Sin-
ha, Indrajit (2005). Revisiting the Miles and Snow Strategic Frame-
work: Uncovering InterrelationshipsbetweenStrategictypes,
Capabilities,EnvironmentalUncertainty,and Firm Performance.
Strategic Management Journal 26(1):47–74.
Goldenberg, Jacob, Libai, Barak and Muller, Eitan (2002). Riding the
Saddle:How Cross-Market Communication Can Create a Major
Slump in Sales. Journal of Marketing 66(2):1–16.
Govindarajan,Vijay and Kopalle,Praveen (2004).Can Incumbents
Introduce Radicaland Disruptive Innovations?Working Paper
#04-001. Marketing Science, Cambridge, MA.
Hambrick,Don (2003).On the Staying Power of Miles and Snow’s
Defenders,Analyzers,and Prospectors.Academy of Management
Executive 17(4):115–118.
Hamel, Gary and Prahalad, C.K. (1991). Corporate Imagination and
Expeditionary Marketing. Harvard Business Review 69(4):81–92.
Hamel,Gary and Prahalad,C.K. (1994).Competing for the Future.
Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Kohli, Ajay and Jaworski,Bernard (1990).Market Orientation:The
Construct,Research Propositions,and ManagerialImplications.
Journal of Marketing 57(3):53–70.
Leonard-Barton, Dorothy (1992). Core Capabilities and Core Rigidi-
ties: A Paradox in Managing New Product Development. Strategic
Management Journal 13(6):111–125.
Leonard-Barton,Dorothy (1995).Wellsprings of Knowledge.Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Mahajan, Vijay, Muller, Eitan and Bass, Frank (1990). New Product
Diffusion Models in Marketing: A Review and Directions for Re-
search. Journal of Marketing 54(1):1–26.
Matsuno,Ken and Mentzer,John T. (2000).The Effects of Strategy
Type on the Market Orientation-Performance Relationship.Jour-
nal of Marketing 64(4):1–16.
Miles, Robert E. and Snow, Charles C. (1978). Organizational, Strat-
egy, Structure, and Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Mohr, Jakki, Sengupta,Sanjit and Slater,Stanley (2005).Marketing
High Technology Products and Innovations.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Moore, Geoffrey (1991, 2002). Crossing the Chasm. New York: Harp-
erBusiness.
32 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
S. F. SLATER AND J. J. MOHR

Narver, John C. and Slater, Stanley F. (1990). The Effect of a Market
Orientation on BusinessProfitability. Journal of Marketing
57(4):20–35.
Narver, John C., Slater,Stanley F. and MacLachlan,DouglasL.
(2004).Responsive and Proactive MarketOrientation,and New
Product Success.Journal of Product InnovationManagement
21(5):334–347.
Olson, Eric M., Slater, Stanley F. and Hult, G. Tomas M. (2005). The
Performance Implications of Fitamong Business Strategy,Mar-
keting Organization Structure,and Strategic Behavior.Journalof
Marketing 69(3):49–65.
Prahalad,C. K. (2004).Why Selling to the Poor Makes for Good
Business. Fortune 150(10):70–72.
Rogers, Everett (1995). The Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed. New York:
Free Press.
Shanklin,William and Ryans,John (1987).Essentials ofMarketing
High Technology. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Slater, Stanley F., Hult, G.Tomas M. and Olson, Eric M. (2005). Key
Success Factors in High-Tech Markets. Working Paper. Colorado
State University.
Slater,Stanley F. and Narver,John C. (1998).Customer-Led and
Market-Oriented:Let’s Not Confuse the Two.Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 19(10):1001–1006.
Slater, Stanley F. and Olson, Eric M. (2001). Marketing’s Contribution
to the Implementation of Business Strategy: An Empirical Analysis.
Strategic Management Journal 22(11):1055–1068.
Vorhies,Douglas W.and Morgan,Neil A. (2003).A Configuration
Theory Assessment of Marketing Organization Fit with Business
Strategy and Its Relationship with Market Performance. Journal of
Marketing 67(1):100–115.
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION J PROD INNOV MANAG
2006;23:26–33
33