Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Lessons Learned from System Engineering and Risk Management

This essay analyzes the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the importance of system engineering and risk management in preventing such disasters. It also discusses the international standard AS/NZS 15288:2003 and the impact of organizational structure and culture on quality assurance procedures.

PPMP 20012
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Introduction
In past, there have been various disasters that have occurred due to failure in system engineering
and impact of such failure. The oil spill in Deepwater horizon is one of such disaster that will be
studied in detail in this essay. This event is considered as the largest oil spill in the waters of
United States of America. In addition to that, it also resulted in the loss of lives of the people
working in on this oil rig. Due to the effect of this oil spill on the environment, a commission
was made named “National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling”. The main purpose of formation of this commission was to investigate the main reasons
that resulted in this disaster and the manner in which events of such magnitude can be avoided in
future (Reddy et.al, 2012). The report prepared by this commission was submitted to the
president of the United States of America. This essay has also focused on the international
standard “AS/NZS 15288:2003” issued in relation to system engineering and system life process
if man-made systems. Following this standard will help to avoid more disaster such as of Deep-
water Horizon.
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The event of the oil spill in Deep-water horizon occurred on the evening of April 20, 2010, in
which an explosion occurred due to escape of hydrocarbons from Macondo well to Deep-water
horizon. The fire started due to this explosion continued for a period of 36 hours and 11 people
lost their lives to this fire. This oil spilt in water continued for 87 days and polluted various water
bodies around the rig (McNutt et.al, 2012). The after effects of this water spill make this even of
national and international importance. There were various commissions that were studying the
nature and cause of this accident. The company that was conducting the underwater drilled on
the deep-water horizon was BP Exploration & Production Inc. and commission was also formed
by this company to investigate the reason of spill. The investigation was started just after the
news of explosion broke down but during the initial stages, the investigation was restricted as
there was no physical evidence present after explosion and access to workers that survived the
explosion was also restricted (Mason et.al, 2012).
Main reasons that were identified in the investigation conducted by these two commissions are as
follows-
Hydrocarbons were not properly isolated by the cement barriers prepared for the purpose of
isolation. It was identified in the investigation that cement barriers were put in in the wellbore
annulus a day before the accident (White et.al, 2012). The main purpose of this cement barrier
was to prevent hydrocarbons from entering in the deep-water horizon. It was identified that the
quality of cement put into making this barrier was not high. The investigation team also
concluded that there was no testing, design, quality checks were conducted on the cement
barrier. As a result, cement barrier could not do the main activity for which it was installed and it
could not isolate the hydrocarbons.
Isolation of hydrocarbons was also not done with the help of shoe track barriers that was also
prepared for such purpose. Shoe racks were installed in the bottom of the casing for isolation of
hydrocarbons if the cement barrier does not work (Silliman et.al, 2012). There were two barriers
that were installed in the shoe track. If an explosion happens it indicates that the both of the
barriers in the shoe track don’t work. This was not possible unless and until the quality assurance
of these barriers were not conducted. This also shows the lack of quality assurance procedures
undertaken by the supervisors on the deep-water horizon.
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The negative pressure test is undertaken for abandoned well. There was a negative pressure test
conducted on the abandoned well to check the quality of barriers implemented to isolate
hydrocarbons and results of this test were recorded. In the process of the investigation, it was
observed that the results of this test are not optimum and results show that these barriers might
not be effective (Gutierrez-Miravete, 2013). The leaders of BP and Transocean read the results in
a wrong manner and stated in their reports that the barriers installed were these barriers were
enough to isolate the hydrocarbons. This wrong assessment was one of the biggest reasons
behind the oil spill in the deep-water horizon.
Employees were not able to identify the influx at an earlier stage. Due to the acceptance of
wrong results, the standard sets for an overbalanced well was considered as the normal balance
of the well. This standard shows the level of influx in the well. Due to this, the hydrocarbons
reached the level over the acceptable level that resulted and it passed the BOP. This makes the
crew of oil rig delay by around 40 minutes as they were not aware of the high influx in the well
and all the procedure that could have neutralized the overflow were delayed by 40 minutes
(Ramseur & Hagerty, 2013). This quantum of the delay was enough to cause such a disaster in
the oil rig that resulted in the heavy explosion.
Failing in taking control of the well. The initial action that was taken to control the explosion in
the well was not sufficient and delay of 40 minutes contributed additionally. The fluids were
directed towards the Mud Gas Separator (MGS) which was not a right action in this situation. In
conclusion, it can be said that the crew members and leaders at deepwater horizon were not able
to identify the problem correctly as it was which resulted in taking right corrective actions.
The result of diversion to Mud Gas Separator. It was identified that the action of directing the
fluid in the well was a wring corrective action and this action of crew resulted into gas venting
into the oil rig. The correct action would be to divert the fluid to the overboard rather than MGS.
The gas venting in the oil rig became a source of ignition in the rig and that resulted in an
explosion.
The hydrocarbon ignition could not be prevented by the fire and gas system installed by the
crew. In the events that resulted in the explosion, the hydrocarbons moved to the areas which
were categories as high probability ignition areas (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012). There were gas
and fire detection system in place that was supposed to inform regarding and gas leaks. This
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system failed and did not detect any gas leak and crew members were not aware of any such
event. These gas systems were supposed to be tested on a regular interval of time but there is a
possibility that they were not tested in recent times before the explosion occurred.
Emergency battery failure. There were two systems that operated on the battery which was
supposed to be shut down the safety valves automatically. The crew members were trying to do
so but control limes were destroyed in the explosion. One of the two battery operated system had
no batter and other had defective switches as a result of which both of these could not have been
started. This battery operated safety system were also not checked prior to disaster as defective
batteries and switchboard could have been easily identified (Varella & Jacobs, 2017).
This report concluded that there was not a single event that was the main reason for this oil spill.
This disaster was a result of a various chain of event that triggered other event and it could not be
controlled by the crew at the oil rig. As per the view presented by the chief executive officer of
BP, Tony Hayward there were several parties that were responsible for this event including BP,
Halliburton and Transocean.
On an overall evaluation, it can be said that there were various processes that were not properly
implemented by crew and leaders at the oil rig that could have prevented the happening of this
disastrous event. Hence it is important to follow certain standard while conducting such process
related to system engineering. There are various standards that are issued in this respect and one
of such standard i.e. AS/NZS 15288:2003. This is an international standard that is issued to
management the life cycle of a system that is constructed by a human. AS/NZS 15288:2003
gives a set of policies and structures that can be implemented during any stage of the structuring
of a system (Walden, Roedler, Forsberg, Hamelin and Shortell, 2015). In nutshell, this standard
gave policies and procedures that should be adopted by an organization from the initial stage of
constructing a system to disassembling of such structure at the end of its life period. Following
this standard can avoid another disaster that could have large repercussions on the environment
and human life.
Structure, experience, forms and culture of an organization can also have a huge impact on the
proper working of systems implemented by an organization. There should be a reporting
responsibility in respect of the quality assurance activities undertaken an organization, especially
where such activities are very essential. There should be a hierarchy of such operations that
should be followed properly so that people cannot avoid their duties and all quality assurance
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policies and procedures are followed (Stark, 2015). Experience and culture of an organization
can also help in establishing policies and procedures for quality assurance of system engineering.
General system management is an integral part of system engineering. System engineering helps
in designing a system that has a combination of technical, social and natural elements. System
engineering helps in structuring such a system that can effectively conduct its operations for
which it is designed and formulated. If system engineering should have been followed in
designing of hydrocarbon barriers then the whole disaster could have been avoided (Messenger,
& Abtahi, 2017). There are various steps and policies that are given in system engineering that
should be followed by an organization while designing, testing, implementation and other step
taken in the system development life cycle.
Engineering risk identification and management is also an integral part of system engineering.
This helps in identification of potential risk factors that can affect the system and carrying out
corrective measures at initial stages that can prevent happening of a disaster such as the events in
the deepwater horizon. It is essential for every organization to keep them updated in relation to
increasing day to day risk that can have a potential impact on operation in relation to the system.
This type of management is implemented by every organization that is dependent on their
systems for business operations. For example, international space station gives vital importance
to risk management in relation to their space station and other equipment. Engineering risk
management could have easily identified various activities that were not as per standards in deep
water horizon such as non-operational safety measures, wrong analysis of test results,
unpreparedness of crew, deficiencies of barriers etc. (Meyer & Renders, 2016) These type of
events can occur with any organization but the important thing is the manner in which such
organization deal with such situation.
A business valuation can also be an important factor that can lead an organization to maintain its
quality assurance procedures. It is common that is the value of a company is higher than it would
conduct quality of steps taken in an organization more seriously as compared to other
organizations. This is because of the reason that the impact of uncertain activities that arises due
to low-quality business processes would be high in case of a business with a higher valuation of
its assets. The same concept should have been adopted by companies involved in the extraction
of oil on deepwater horizon as the process was of great value for all companies involved. The
importance can be evaluated by its impact on human lives, natural resources and environment
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(Loosemore, Raftery, Reilly, & Higgon, 2012). In addition to this is also resulted in huge
financial losses for these companies.
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Conclusion
It can be concluded with the help of analysis of the reports prepared by National Commission on
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” and “BP Exploration & Production Inc.”
that there is no specific reason for the event that occurred in Deepwater horizon as it was
outcome of chain of deficiencies on part of various parties involved. This event could have been
avoided by effective system engineering and risk management. There are various lessons that can
be taken by other organization from these events that could help in preventing any other such
event as their repercussion are very high on the environment.
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