Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Lessons Learned from System Engineering and Risk Management

PPMP 20012
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Introduction
In past, there have been various disasters that have occurred due to failure in system engineering
and impact of such failure. The oil spill in Deepwater horizon is one of such disaster that will be
studied in detail in this essay. This event is considered as the largest oil spill in the waters of
United States of America. In addition to that, it also resulted in the loss of lives of the people
working in on this oil rig. Due to the effect of this oil spill on the environment, a commission
was made named “National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling”. The main purpose of formation of this commission was to investigate the main reasons
that resulted in this disaster and the manner in which events of such magnitude can be avoided in
future (Reddy et.al, 2012). The report prepared by this commission was submitted to the
president of the United States of America. This essay has also focused on the international
standard “AS/NZS 15288:2003” issued in relation to system engineering and system life process
if man-made systems. Following this standard will help to avoid more disaster such as of Deep-
water Horizon.
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The event of the oil spill in Deep-water horizon occurred on the evening of April 20, 2010, in
which an explosion occurred due to escape of hydrocarbons from Macondo well to Deep-water
horizon. The fire started due to this explosion continued for a period of 36 hours and 11 people
lost their lives to this fire. This oil spilt in water continued for 87 days and polluted various water
bodies around the rig (McNutt et.al, 2012). The after effects of this water spill make this even of
national and international importance. There were various commissions that were studying the
nature and cause of this accident. The company that was conducting the underwater drilled on
the deep-water horizon was BP Exploration & Production Inc. and commission was also formed
by this company to investigate the reason of spill. The investigation was started just after the
news of explosion broke down but during the initial stages, the investigation was restricted as
there was no physical evidence present after explosion and access to workers that survived the
explosion was also restricted (Mason et.al, 2012).
Main reasons that were identified in the investigation conducted by these two commissions are as
follows-
Hydrocarbons were not properly isolated by the cement barriers prepared for the purpose of
isolation. It was identified in the investigation that cement barriers were put in in the wellbore
annulus a day before the accident (White et.al, 2012). The main purpose of this cement barrier
was to prevent hydrocarbons from entering in the deep-water horizon. It was identified that the
quality of cement put into making this barrier was not high. The investigation team also
concluded that there was no testing, design, quality checks were conducted on the cement
barrier. As a result, cement barrier could not do the main activity for which it was installed and it
could not isolate the hydrocarbons.
Isolation of hydrocarbons was also not done with the help of shoe track barriers that was also
prepared for such purpose. Shoe racks were installed in the bottom of the casing for isolation of
hydrocarbons if the cement barrier does not work (Silliman et.al, 2012). There were two barriers
that were installed in the shoe track. If an explosion happens it indicates that the both of the
barriers in the shoe track don’t work. This was not possible unless and until the quality assurance
of these barriers were not conducted. This also shows the lack of quality assurance procedures
undertaken by the supervisors on the deep-water horizon.
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The negative pressure test is undertaken for abandoned well. There was a negative pressure test
conducted on the abandoned well to check the quality of barriers implemented to isolate
hydrocarbons and results of this test were recorded. In the process of the investigation, it was
observed that the results of this test are not optimum and results show that these barriers might
not be effective (Gutierrez-Miravete, 2013). The leaders of BP and Transocean read the results in
a wrong manner and stated in their reports that the barriers installed were these barriers were
enough to isolate the hydrocarbons. This wrong assessment was one of the biggest reasons
behind the oil spill in the deep-water horizon.
Employees were not able to identify the influx at an earlier stage. Due to the acceptance of
wrong results, the standard sets for an overbalanced well was considered as the normal balance
of the well. This standard shows the level of influx in the well. Due to this, the hydrocarbons
reached the level over the acceptable level that resulted and it passed the BOP. This makes the
crew of oil rig delay by around 40 minutes as they were not aware of the high influx in the well
and all the procedure that could have neutralized the overflow were delayed by 40 minutes
(Ramseur & Hagerty, 2013). This quantum of the delay was enough to cause such a disaster in
the oil rig that resulted in the heavy explosion.
Failing in taking control of the well. The initial action that was taken to control the explosion in
the well was not sufficient and delay of 40 minutes contributed additionally. The fluids were
directed towards the Mud Gas Separator (MGS) which was not a right action in this situation. In
conclusion, it can be said that the crew members and leaders at deepwater horizon were not able
to identify the problem correctly as it was which resulted in taking right corrective actions.
The result of diversion to Mud Gas Separator. It was identified that the action of directing the
fluid in the well was a wring corrective action and this action of crew resulted into gas venting
into the oil rig. The correct action would be to divert the fluid to the overboard rather than MGS.
The gas venting in the oil rig became a source of ignition in the rig and that resulted in an
explosion.
The hydrocarbon ignition could not be prevented by the fire and gas system installed by the
crew. In the events that resulted in the explosion, the hydrocarbons moved to the areas which
were categories as high probability ignition areas (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012). There were gas
and fire detection system in place that was supposed to inform regarding and gas leaks. This
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