Evaluation of Remuneration Structure of Woodside Petroleum and Santos

The report evaluates the remuneration structure of Woodside Petroleum and its competitor, Santos in the Australian market. It analyses the effectiveness of control systems within companies and reviews the details of remuneration committee and membership. The report also analyses the allocation of executive remuneration and the mix of performance measures used.

Running head: MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
Managerial Accounting
Name of the Student:
Name of the University:
Author’s Note:
Course ID:

1MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
Executive Summary:
The current report is concerned with evaluating the remuneration structure of Woodside
Petroleum and its competitor, Santos in the Australian market. It has been evaluated that the
presence of an effective control system within the organisation is essential, as it helps in
improving the efficiency of the employees and reduces the level of slack conducted by the
workforce. Without an efficient control, system organisations are not able to reduce the level of
unethical practice within the organisation and control the attributes of their workforce. it is
inherent that Woodside Petroleum has maintained an effective remuneration structure in line
with its overall financial performance. However, deficiencies could be observed in the executive
remuneration structure of Santos because of the poor financial health in the Australian market.
The net income of Woodside has increased coupled with fall in outstanding shares for
Woodside and the situation is just the opposite for Santos due to negative net income. Hence, the
returns of the shareholders are maximised for Woodside Petroleum. It needs to be also seen that
there has been considerable amount of improvement as per the allocation of executive
remuneration for WoodSide petroleum in compared to Santos. In terms of the long term financial
highlight the company is depicted to be in a better position. This is evident with a cash flow
generation of $ 832 million.

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Table of Contents
1. Introduction:................................................................................................................................3
2. Review of topic and review of literature:....................................................................................3
2.1 Executive performance and remuneration in public companies:...........................................3
2.2 Effectiveness of control systems within companies:.............................................................5
3. Company reviews:.......................................................................................................................6
3.1 Details of remuneration committee and membership:...........................................................6
3.2 Allocation of executive remuneration:..................................................................................8
3.3 Mix of performance measures used:....................................................................................11
3.4 Company performance versus executive pay:.....................................................................17
4. Summary of findings:................................................................................................................19
5. Analysis and comparison of remuneration methods used:........................................................20
5.1 Best result in terms of shareholder returns:.........................................................................20
5.2 Best result in short-term:.....................................................................................................21
5.3 Best result in long-term:......................................................................................................22
6. Conclusion:................................................................................................................................23
References:....................................................................................................................................24

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1. Introduction:
The report aims in identifying the role of remuneration, which is depicted in the annual
report of an organisation. Remuneration report is mainly depicted in the annual report as per the
rulings of Companies Act, where the organisation needs to detect all the remuneration that has
been provided to the directors of the company. Remuneration report also allows the investors to
understand the level of income, which is generated by the directors of the company during
declining profit and improving earnings. The report mainly exists to evaluate the remuneration
report of Woodside Petroleum for the fiscal year of 2017. Further evaluation on the company is
conducted in the overall assessment where its remuneration report is analysed, while other
financial performance measures are also taken into consideration. With the summary of findings
and the comparison of the remuneration report, the assessment portrays the company’s
performance over the fiscal years.
2. Review of topic and review of literature:
2.1 Executive performance and remuneration in public companies:
Both executive performance evaluation and remuneration in public companies are
depicted in the annual report of the organisation. The remuneration report depicted in the
financial statement directly indicates the level of bonuses and monetary benefits that has been
provided to the directors and executives of the organisation. This identified remuneration system
is adequately evaluated by the auditors and regulator to identify whether the organisation is
correctly providing remunerations to its directors and executives. In this context, Riaz, et al.,
(2015) stated that organisation with the help of remuneration report is able to detect the level of

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income that is distributed to directors and executives of the organisation. The level of
remuneration that is provided to the directors is considered to be as bonuses for the efforts
delivered by the Managing Directors. On the other hand, Hooghiemstra, Kuang and Qin (2017)
argued that investors are able to evaluate the loopholes in the current accounting system of
organisations, when they are able to identify that high remunerations are provided to director
while the organisation is making losses.
The remuneration report directly involved different types of methods that are used by the
organisation in paying the directives and executives. There are two different levels of payment
such as share-based payments and monetary payments. The organisation mainly provide share
based payment to the director and executive for long duration, while restricting the level of trees
that could be conducted for a particular period. This eventually helps in supporting the overall
share value of the organisation if the directors and executive think of selling their portion of
shares. Furthermore, the monetary benefit that is provided by the organisation is mainly for the
services that were conducted during the fiscal year. The bonuses are based on future share based
payments, which are provided to the executive for their services during the fiscal year.
According to Faghani, Monem and Ng (2015), the remuneration provided by the company to the
executive is based on the performance evaluation, which is conducted on annual basis to identify
the most efficient executive of the company. Moreover, Riaz, et al., (2015) indicated that
motivating the executive with monetary benefits for an effort during the fiscal year eventually
helps in improving the motivation level of employees. Therefore, with the remuneration report,
the organisation is able to detect the level of expenses that is conducted on executives and
directors for their initiatives. This eventually allows the investors to detect the level of expenses

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and determine whether the remuneration amount is feasible and viable for the directors or
executives.
2.2 Effectiveness of control systems within companies:
Presence of an effective control system within the organisation is essential, as it helps in
improving the efficiency of the employees and reduces the level of slack conducted by the
workforce. Without an efficient control, system organisations are not able to reduce the level of
unethical practice within the organisation and control the attributes of their workforce. Scott
(2015) mentioned that without the presence of adequate control system within the organisation
the management is not able to exercise decisions, which could improve productivity and
efficiency of the company. Without the presence of an adequate control system businesses are
not able to develop and execute strategic plans, which helps in generating higher revenue in the
end. Therefore, it could be understood that organisations using the control system are able to
fulfil their objectives and obtain sustainable growth by adequately utilising the available
resources. The organisation also needs to have an adequate internal control system to support the
legal and regulatory standards that has been imposed by the adequate authorities. Hence, it could
be understood that without the presence of effective control system organisations are not able to
operate their 100%, which directly affects their capability to reach higher levels of revenue and
income (Argyris, 2017).
There are different benefits of an effective control system, which can be used by the
organisation to improve the timing of their decision making process. Furthermore, an effective
control system would increase the quality of information that can be received by different
departments of the organisation (Kerzner and Kerzner, 2017). This eventually helps in
minimising the lead-time that is taken for transferring data from one department to other. This

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adequate effectiveness would eventually help in reducing the time taken for the decision making
process, which increases their operating conditions This improvement in the control system
would eventually allow the organisation to successfully complete the financial report on time
without delay. Furthermore, organisations with the help of the control system are able to design
and maintain adequate executive performance and reward system, which could be used for
motivating employees. This kind of systems is eventually helpful to motivate the workforce and
minimise the employee turnover ratio of an organisation. Sayles (2017) stated that with the use
of adequate reward system organisations are able to maximize the output of a workforce present
within the company. Therefore, it can be understood that within an effective control systems the
organisation is set on right track, where the operations and efficiency would eventually improve.
3. Company reviews:
3.1 Details of remuneration committee and membership:
After critical evaluation of the annual report of Woodside Petroleum in 2017, no
disclosures have been made regarding the number of members present in the remuneration
committee, while for Santos, three members are present in the remuneration committee of the
organisation. The remuneration committee is accountable for reviewing as well as
recommending the board regarding the remuneration policy of the organisation while assessing
its efficiency and compliance with the relevant standards (Beaumont, Clarkson and Tutticci,
2018). Moreover, another responsibility of these committees is to review and recommend the
individual levels of remuneration related to the key personnel of the two organisations. The
memberships of the committees and their chairpersons would be determined based on the
business situations by the respective boards (Scott, 2015).

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The remuneration committees of both the organisations hold time to time meetings in a
specific financial period depending on both external and internal situations. Moreover, both the
organisations use independent consultants in order to gather professional advice related to
executive remuneration as well as other matters associated remuneration and there is direct
relationship between these services and the remuneration committees (Goh and Gupta, 2016).
The chairpersons of the committee are engaged in evaluating the associations and costs to be
incurred for the management consultants. Finally, it has been identified that the remuneration
committees of both organisations obtain recommendations from their consultants to adhere to the
“Corporations Act 2001”.

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3.2 Allocation of executive remuneration:
In accordance with the remuneration reports of Woodside Petroleum and Santos in 2017,
three kinds of remuneration are inherent for the executives, which are demonstrated as follows:
Fixed remuneration:
This type of remuneration could be described as the total yearly compensation received
by an individual for providing services to the entity (Kanapathippillai, Mihret and Johl, 2017).
For Woodside Petroleum, fixed remuneration is dependent on the scope of the role of the
executives and their individual skill, knowledge and experience levels. This is benchmarked for
competitiveness in opposition to regional and global rivals so that the organisation could draw
and retain greater quality executives. On the other hand, for Santos, fixed remuneration
comprises of base pay as well as superannuation and it is reviewed yearly and benchmark is
conducted in opposition to comparable peer organisations.
Short-term incentive (STI):

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With the help of STI, the participants could seek the opportunity of making cash and
incentives associated with deferred equity where specific results could be achieved in the
financial period (Kent, Kercher and Routledge, 2018). For Woodside Petroleum, the STIs are
depended on the outcomes of the annual corporate scorecard along with individual performances
against knowledge performance indicators.
For Santos, the organisation is involved in providing yearly STI program so that the
interests of the executives could be aligned with the delivery of short-term financial and
operational targets for the period.

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Long-term incentive (LTI):
As indicated by Méndez, Pathan and García (2015), this is a reward system designed so
that the long-term performance of the employees could be improved by giving rewards not
having any association with the stock price of the organisation. Both Woodside Petroleum and
Santos have aligned their LTI plans in such a manner that their long-term performance and
executive performance are matched with the interest of the shareholders. The award amounts
depend on the market benchmarks, key skills, individual performance and potential for success
(Moriarty, 2018).

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3.3 Mix of performance measures used:
Different financial and non-financial measures are utilised in order to assess the business
performance of both Woodside Petroleum and Santos. For these two organisations, the measures
of financial performance used include the following:
Earnings per share:
Particulars Details
Woodside Petroleum Santos
2016 2017 2016 2017
Profit/loss for the year A $ 973 $ 1,120 $ -1,047 $ -360
Number of outstanding
shares B 936 920 1,799 2,181
Earnings per share A/B $ 1.04 $ 1.22 $ -0.58 $ -0.17
Table 1: Earnings per share of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)

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2016 2017 2016 2017
Woodside Petroleum Santos
$-1.00
$-0.50
$-
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$1.04
$1.22
$-0.58
$-0.17
Earnings per share
Figure 1: Earnings per share of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
According to the above table, it could be observed that the earnings per share of
Woodside Petroleum have increased from $1.04 in 2016 to $1.22 in 2017; however, the same has
been negative in both the years for Santos. Earnings per share assist in analysing the capability of
an organisation to generate returns for its equity holders (Peetz, 2015). This is because the net
income of Woodside has increased coupled with fall in outstanding shares for Woodside and the
situation is just the opposite for Santos due to negative net income. Hence, the returns of the
shareholders are maximised for Woodside Petroleum. However, the executive remuneration of
both the organisations has increased considerably.
Return on equity:
Particulars Details Woodside Petroleum Santos

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2016 2017 2016 2017
Net income/loss A $ 973 $ 1,120 $ -1,047 $ -360
Total equity B $ 15,662 $ 15,880 $ 7,080 $ 7,151
Return on equity A/B 6.21% 7.05% -14.79% -5.03%
Table 4: Return on equity ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
2016 2017 2016 2017
Woodside Petroleum Santos
-20.00%
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
6.21% 7.05%
-14.79%
-5.03%
Return on equity
Figure 4: Return on equity ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
From the above figure, it is evident that the return on equity of Woodside Petroleum has
increased from 6.21% in 2016 to 7.05% in 2017; however, the ratio has been negative for Santos

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in 2016 and in 2017, the trend is similar as well. According to Price (2018), return on equity
measures the rate of return that the shareholders expect to earn from their investments made in
the organisation. In other words, it signifies the capability of the organisation to increase returns
on investments collected from the shareholders (Qu, et al., 2018). For Woodside, increased net
income has helped the organisation in providing adequate return on investment to the
shareholders. However, the negative net income has barred the ability of Santos to provide any
return on investment to its shareholders.
Return on investment:
Particulars Details
Woodside Petroleum Santos
2016 2017 2016 2017
Net income/loss A $ 973 $ 1,120 $ -1,047 $ -360
Total assets B $ 24,753 $ 25,401 $15,262 $ 13,706
Return on investment A/B 3.93% 4.41% -6.86% -2.63%
Table 5: Return on investment ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016
and 2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)

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2016 2017 2016 2017
Woodside Petroleum Santos
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
3.93% 4.41%
-6.86%
-2.63%
Return on investment
Figure 5: Return on investment ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016
and 2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
The above figure clearly inherits the fact that the return on investment of Woodside
Petroleum has increased from 3.93% in 2016 to 4.41% in 2017, while the same is negative for
both the years in case of Santos. In this context, Riaz and Kirkbride (2017) advocated that this
ratio assists the investors to gain a thorough insight of the likely benefits to be obtained in future
in contrast to the current investments. The tough competition in the market has caused poor
returns to the shareholders for Santos.
The non-financial measure utilised for analysing the performance of Woodside Petroleum
is the balanced scorecard method. However, Santos does not use this approach. Therefore, this
approach would be applicable only in case of Woodside, which is demonstrated briefly as
follows:

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Financial perspective:
Woodside has an objective of reducing its business expenses. This is achieved by
increasing productivity and optimising the business processes. For this, the organisation has
designed a five-year plan and the implementation process is conducted in separate steps.
Moreover, it is seen to be engaged in greater return activities so that the overall profits could be
increased. Lastly, the risks are minimised by transferring from net profit to portfolio broadening
of fee-related products. This would assist in providing protection to the bank (Riaz, Ray and Ray,
2015).
Customer perspective:
Woodside has formulated a long-term plan so that sufficient customers could be
ensured for positive financial performance. It has kept aside considerable amount of funds for
research and development to gain additional knowledge about the customers for meeting their
needs in a better manner (Riaz, Ray and Ray, 2015).
Internal processes perspective:
After identification of customer needs, Woodside is involved in cross-selling of
products because it has the availability of proactive staffs. This has been possible due to the
strong interpersonal relationships maintained by the employees with the customers.
Learning and growth perspective:
Balanced scorecard is used so that additional motivation could be provided to the
employees in order to ensure positive work results. In addition, resources are assigned in those
areas having the potential of fetching maximum profits.

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3.4 Company performance versus executive pay:
Price/earnings ratio:
Particulars Details
Woodside Petroleum Santos
2016 2017 2016 2017
Market price per share A $ 0.31 $ 0.33 $ 0.04 $ 0.05
Earnings per share B $ 1.04 $ 1.22 $ -0.58 $ -0.17
Price/earnings ratio A/B 0.30 0.27 -0.07 -0.30
Table 2: Price/earnings ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
2016 2017 2016 2017
Woodside Petroleum Santos
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
-
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.30 0.27
-0.07
-0.30
Price/earnings ratio
Figure 2: Price/earnings ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017

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(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
According to the above figure, it has been identified that there has been slight decline in
price/earnings ratio for Woodside, while the same is negative for Santos. The standard ratio is
considered to be above 1 (Riaz, et al., 2015). However, the future earnings are expected to
increase for Woodside in future. Therefore, it could be said that the executive remuneration of
the organisation is in line with the financial performance.
Dividend payout ratio:
Particulars Details
Woodside Petroleum Santos
2016 2017 2016 2017
Dividend per share A $ 0.83 $ 0.98 $ 0.04 $ -
Earnings per share B $ 1.04 $ 1.22 $ -0.58
$ -
0.17
Dividend payout ratio A/B 79.84% 80.50% -6.87% 0.00%
Table 3: Dividend payout ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)

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2016 2017 2016 2017
Woodside Petroleum Santos-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
79.84% 80.50%
-6.87% 0.00%
Dividend payout ratio
Figure 3: Dividend payout ratio of Woodside Petroleum and Santos for the years 2016 and
2017
(Source: Woodsideannouncements.app.woodside, 2018: Santos.com, 2018)
In terms of dividend payout, the ratio has increased over the year for Woodside due to the
rise in net income. However, the net loss suffered by Santos over the years has restricted its
ability of providing dividends to the shareholders (Safari, Cooper and Dellaportas, 2016). This
again supports the fact that the executive remuneration of Woodside has been effective in both
the years.
4. Summary of findings:
From the above evaluation, it is inherent that Woodside Petroleum has maintained an
effective remuneration structure in line with its overall financial performance. However,
deficiencies could be observed in the executive remuneration structure of Santos because of the
poor financial health in the Australian market. The net income of Woodside has increased

20MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
coupled with fall in outstanding shares for Woodside and the situation is just the opposite for
Santos due to negative net income. Hence, the returns of the shareholders are maximised for
Woodside Petroleum. Woodside has formulated a long-term plan so that sufficient customers
could be ensured for positive financial performance. It has kept aside considerable amount of
funds for research and development to gain additional knowledge about the customers for
meeting their needs in a better manner Moreover, the other financial measures reveal the same
scenario and in terms of non-financial measures, Woodside is placed in a favourable position in
contrast to Santos (Riaz, et al., 2015).
5. Analysis and comparison of remuneration methods used:
5.1 Best result in terms of shareholder returns:
The shareholders return refers to the measurement of performance of the companies by
analysing the stock and shares over a specified time period. In the chosen company of Woodside
petroleum, they have a clear strategy to deliver the shareholders returns in three horizons with
respect to time. The horizon 1 consists of the year from 2017 to 2021; the horizon 2 includes the
year from 2022 to 2026 and the horizon of the years after 2027. The horizons are cash
generation, lower capital intensity development and unlocking the values. Safety integrity and
reliability in the production of hydrocarbon products helps in achieving the superior shareholders
return (Fuzi, Halim and Julizaerma, 2016). In 2017 the EPS was 122 cents for Woodside
petroleum and 51.6 cents for Santos. In comparison with the Santos Annual Report 2017, it can
be identified that share price and dividend yield is taken in consideration to measure the
shareholders return. However, in the annual report, the Board of directors of the company of
Santos there is no declaration of the final dividend. The company is confident that prioritising

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debt repayment is the right course of action to position the company to fund growth opportunities
from a position of strength and obtain shareholder returns that is sustainable (Santos.com, 2018).
5.2 Best result in short-term:
The key short terms results for Woodside Petroleum needs to be inferred with the start up
of Brunelio field in 2017. In addition to this, it is also able to become the First LNG production
team from Train 1. The production of the LNG Train 1 was commenced after the LNG cargo was
delivered to japan in 12 November 2017. The domestic gas plant with a producing capacity of
200TJ every day is also depicted to be most noted perk of the company. The company was also
able to commence the processing options for the third-party petroleum contracts from 2017
which has been seen to take the production of the company to a new level (Kannadhasan, Goyal
and Charan, 2016).
The best short-term results for Santos need to be considered with the reduction of the
carbon emissions and displacing of the coal with natural gas. It has been also seen that various
types of the improvement measures initiatives taken by the company are evident with the
economic development which are combined with the renewable energy solution and combined
gas. The company is also seen to hold a significant position as a national supplier of domestic
gas in Australia (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2015). Some of the various types of the other
initiatives of the company need to be also considered as per the increasing LNG sales among the
Asian consumers. In a very short period of time span the company has been able to prove itself
as the market leader for the lowest cost facilitator in Australia. This is also associated to the
positive contribution towards the communities pertaining to provide the jobs for the supply of the
various types of the impediments of the energy supply and local partnerships. Some of the other

22MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
developmental opportunities of the company need to be identified with the improvements as per
delivering the cultural responsibilities (Salman and Hassan, 2016).
5.3 Best result in long-term:
The prime aspects for the long-term performance increase of Woodside Petroleum are
depicted with various types of the increased profit after tax has increased by 18%. In terms of the
long term financial highlight the company has generated a cash flow $ 832 million. It needs to be
also understood that the company was able to achieve the long-term goal of the maintaining unit
production of $ 5.2/boe and decreasing overall total recordable injury rate by 21% in 2017. The
delivery of the near-term production of the production growth of the company is depicted is seen
with the depicted with the consideration of the various types of the project which are considered
as the commence of greater Enfield drilling project and commissions of the greater western flank
infrastructure (Petria, Capraru and Ihnatov, 2015).
The long-term project goals of Santos are achieved with the depiction of the strong
performance in terms of the sales volume, production and sales revenue. The cash flow
transformation and the underlying increase in the profit has been considered with the various
types of the increase which are relevant as per the increasing operating cash flow. However, in
compared to free cash flow the company has been depicted with a decreasing performance,
which is seen to be evident with a decrease over the next four years (Pigé, 2017). The company
has been further able to maintain a lower cost pertaining to the unit production cost. This has
been also significant reduction in the capital expenditure. The long-term improvement off the
company is seen to be evident with the decrease in the total debt in the last four years (Shah and
Arora, 2014).

23MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
6. Conclusion:
The overall findings of the report have been able to state that Woodside petroleum is
depicted to be in a better position in terms of the Executive performance and remuneration in
public companies. In addition to this, it needs to be also seen that the Effectiveness of control
systems is seen to be in a better position for the Woodside petroleum. It needs to be also seen
that there has been considerable amount of improvement as per the allocation of executive
remuneration for WoodSide petroleum in compared to Santos. In terms of the long term financial
highlight the company is depicted to be in a better position. This is evident with a cash flow
generation of $ 832 million. Santos on the other hand has been depicted with a decreasing
performance, which is seen to be evident with a decrease over the next four years. It needs to be
also discerned that WoodSide petroleum has been depicted with a better mix of performance
measures used. It needs to be also discerned that in 2017 the EPS was 122 cents for Woodside
petroleum and 51.6 cents for Santos. In comparison with the Santos Annual Report 2017, it can
be identified that share price and dividend yield is taken in consideration to measure the
shareholders return. However; in the annual report, the Board of directors of the company of
Santos there is no declaration of the final dividend.

24MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
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