This paper discusses the application of system thinking in the context of the Macondo blowout and highlights the loopholes in leadership, technology, communication, and procedures. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the relationship between various components of a system to effectively manage complex problems.
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THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 1 System Thinking: The Case of Macondo Blowout Introduction System thinking is a key trait exhibited by top world leaders and top business managers across the globe. Simple systematic thinking tools are often used by project managers to frame and develop systematic and accurate solutions to the most complex problems in project management(Sheffield, Sankaran, & Haslett, 2012).Within a system, the various components are related to one another and are designed to work towards achieving a common objective (Ladyman, Lambert, & Wiesner, 2013). It is therefore very important to understand the relationship between the variouscomponents of any system in order to understand how it operates. The world we live in today has evolved continuously over the years. The modern innovations that drive the world economies were at some point ideas brought forth by the leading critical thinkers in the society like Albert Einstein(Patel, 2018). This class of people took over leadership roles and created everything from nothing at all. Today, they are remembered through theorems named after them and the books they had written to explain their findings, whether scientific, social or economic. Various industries including mining, banking, advertising, chemicals, and even governments have adopted the concept of project management in their operations(Kerzner & Kerzner, 2017).In project management, systems thinking in a very fundamental component. It is applied by the managers to solve complex problems that arise in line of duty. A good case where systems thinking could have had a great impact is the Macondo blowout. Should there have been
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THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 2 better coordination and precaution, the eleven lives claimed by this disaster may have been saved. The primary objective of this paper is to explain ways in which systems thinking could have been applied in the context of the Macondo blowout in order to contain the situation. The paper highlights the main loopholes identified in the manner in which this disaster was managed, some of which could have been avoided should there have been proper precaution and advanced management skills. The various aspects under which systems thinking concept could have been applied include leadership, technology, communication, risk assessment, employee management, and selection of the contractor among other areas. To open the discussion, we proceed to start the discussion on how technology played a role in escalating the Macondo blowout. Technology Drilling a well by the deep-water operators is certainly a very complex exercise. As such, it not only needs very qualified personnel to execute but also a sophisticated technology with the necessary precautionary measures to have the process under control. Some of the key features that would he keep the process in check include an off show camera to keep track of the activities in the rig, highly sensitive sensors to sense presence of hydrocarbons in the well borne, automated alarm systems to notify the team should there be unusual occurrences, and an electronic system that calculates the basic well monitoring calculations(Graham, et al., 2011).If the technology used has such features, then it would be possible to reduce the risk of exposing not only the workers but also the surrounding environments to disasters like one observed during the Macondo blowout(Oort, Friedheim, Pierce, & Lee, 2011).
THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 3 According to the report on the Macondo blowout presented to the President of the United States, the contractor who was tasked with this important exercise lacked quite a number of the key elements mentioned above. For instance, there was no monitoring mechanism to track the activities on site(Smith, Kincannon, Lehnert, Wang, & Larrañaga, 2013).Also, basic monitoring calculations were done manually, exposing the results to large margins of error and making the process very slow. They also lacked an emergency alert mechanism to notify the team should there be an unusual occurrence throughout the process. This factor not only contributed to the actual occurrence of the disaster, but also to its huge negative impact. Due to the ac of an efficient emergency response mechanism, eleven innocent lives were lost and several injured(Graham, et al., 2011). The disaster also had a huge impact on the surrounding environment. If only the technology used was up to date with key features mentioned above, the impact or even occurrence of this disaster would have been contained. The technology was however not the only area not well handled, the project could have been better if there was good leadership for the project team(John, 2016). Leadership According to the report published by Chief Counsel in regards to the Macondo disaster, there was a consistent lack of good leadership sis among the managers from BP Engineers. This was seen in various circumstances including lack of accountability, constant conflict between managers, irregular reshuffles, lack of teamwork and coordination between the different functions in the same business unit(Bartlit, Sankar, Sean, Graham, & Reilly, 2011).
THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 4 The top managers often disagreed on who should be accountable for some of the most critical decisions in the operation. The BP Engineers also disagreed with the Macondo team on who would own the well after the kick. To make the situation worse, in between the operation period the BP management carried out an organizations restructuring which saw certain staff members promoted to various positions and the separation of BP Engineers to operate as a separate and independent function from the Macondo team. Promotions were done without consideration of the personal qualifications of individuals. These initiatives resulted in delays, lack of order and coordination between the two teams as every function struggled to show that they were in control. The decision-making process also became longer as a result of the reorganization. These wrangles played a role in the Macondo disaster. Should there have been proper and accountable leadership within the team, chances are that the situation could have been noticed earlier enough and appropriate measures are taken to contain it. Research has shown that many projects fail due to lack of proper leadership from the managers(Anantatmula, 2010). This is attributed to the fact that where there is poor leadership, there is no motivation in the team. As a result, they are not adequately prepared mentor to counter challenges they may face in the project later during its implementation(Yanga, Huang, & Wu, 2011). This is was aced in the team undertaking theMacondo drilling project, thus resulting in the fatal disaster. Other than leadership, a problem of communication was also noted within the team. Communication More often, the different groups involved in the Macondo project accessed critical information but failed to share such information with the other groups involved in decision
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THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 5 making within the project(Bartlit, Sankar, Sean, Graham, & Reilly, 2011). This led to most decision makers using incomplete information to make very critical decisions about the project. Decisions made based on inadequate information usually expose the project to a lot of risks (Chai, Liu, & W.T. Ngai, 2013). For instance, even though the BP onshore engineers being aware of the risk that the project would be exposed to, they completely failed to share such critical information with the team on site. The team also failed to eighteen their counterparts involved in pressure testing about the cementing-related risk despite having that critical piece of information(Norazahara, Khan, Veitch, & MacKinnon, 2014). Also, even though the Macondo team ought to have asked the expert opinion from completion engineers in regards to whether they should run a long string or run a liner, this was not done(Bartlit, Sankar, Sean, Graham, & Reilly, 2011). It was not clear when the staff in the rig should consult with those on the shore. This information, despite how important it is to ensure coordination between teams, was not made clear by the BP team. These and many more communication lapses made it practically impossible to have a smooth flow of activities during the project execution phase. Under such circumstance, it would be difficult to take precautionary steps as the risks are not even known to the whole team. Also, even when a disaster strikes, it would be difficult to carry out prompt emergency responses as such actions require very we coordinated flow of information between departments concerned. Better crisis management techniques would have been effected when the disaster struck should there have been a seamless flow of information between the specific departments involved.
THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 6 Procedures As part of the preparation process before undertaking any project, the project manager should prepare clear procedures that would be followed when carrying out the project (Barclay, Kweku-Muata, & Osei-Bryson, 2010). In fact, it is even recommended that the staff members who would be involved in the actual implementation of the project should be well trained on the procedures before embarking on the actual job. This enables a smooth flow of operations and reduces the risks of messing up the project as a result of unprofessionalism. According to Chief Counsel, BP did not lay out procedures to be followed during the project for both rig personnel and onshore team(Bartlit, Sankar, Sean, Graham, & Reilly, 2011). Most of the times, the relevant times would formulate their own procedures and execute them to catch up with deadlines. Some of these procedures had not expert input and therefore exposed the projects to risks such as the fatal blowout it finally faced. An example is when the rig team had scanty negative pressure procedures that didn’t provide them with how exactly this would be done. Most of the time, the management would make late changes to the earlier communicated programs and this caused confusion and frustrations to the departments involved. When the respective team leaders joined hands and made it known to the management that such changes had a negative effect to the daily operations of the engineers and other staff members, BP too no corrective measures to restore order and normalcy in operations. If at all BP had the proper management skills I required to carry out such a sophisticated project, they could have responded to the concerns raised by team leaders more appropriately. This could have been addressed by temporarily stopping the operations and spending some time
THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 7 planning to avoid similar occurrences in the future. This way, the staff members would have felt appreciated and would have owned up the project and execute their respective roles with determination and more caution. Consequently, the disaster may have been avoided or at least contained at its earlier stages. Finally, it is worth noting that BP did not give much focus to managing their staff members involved in this project. This had a role to play in the failure of the project. When staff members are appreciated and constantly trained on the required skills to carry out their duties, they become more efficient and productive at their work(Gul, Akbar, & Jan, 2012). Some of the engineers in the rig were young professionals who not only needed constant guidance but also continuous training. This was never done by BP. Again, the contractor missed out on one of the most fundamental roes it ought to have played towards making the project a success. Conclusion Evidently, it comes out clear that the Macondo blowout was not just an accident, but was largely attributed to human errors by the main contractor, BP. Just to mention a few, the company failed in its communication with staff members, lacked procedures to be followed while executing the project, gave no attention to staff management, ignored major technological considerations for the sophisticated project and showed no leadership to the rest of the staff members. These actions are a complete opposite of the recommended ethical practices in effective project management. This well-intentioned project that turned out fatal would have been more successful if BP managed the project better. If more attention would be given to staff, to procedures, to the
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THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 8 internal and external flow of information, and to staff management, the joint effort and goodwill from the key players could have hoped to evade the disaster. This is a lesson to both companies and individuals involved in project management. The success of any project is dependent on how it is managed and how the crisis is managed throughout the implementation of the project(Zhong & Pheng, 2009). The success of a project is, therefore, a function of chronological and accurate steps, and not an event to be achieved in a day.
THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 9 References Anantatmula, V. S. (2010). Project Manager Leadership Role in Improving Project Performance. Enginnering Management Journal, 22(1), 13-22. doi:10.1080/10429247.2010.11431849: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10429247.2010.11431849 Barclay, C., Kweku-Muata, & Osei-Bryson. (2010, March). Project performance development framework: An approach for developing performance criteria & measures for information systems (IS) projects.International Journal of Production Economics, 124(1), 272-292. doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.11.025: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527309004289 Bartlit, F. H., Sankar, S. N., Sean, G., Graham, S. B., & Reilly, W. K. (2011).Macondo, The Oil Gulf Disaster.National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Chief Cousel. Retrieved from http://www.wellintegrity.net/documents/ccr_macondo_disaster.pdf Chai, J., Liu, J. N., & W.T. Ngai, E. (2013, August). Application of decision-making techniques in supplier selection: A systematic review of literature.Science Direct, 40(10), 3872- 3885. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2012.12.040. Retrieved from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095741741201281X Graham, B., Reilly, W. K., Beinecke, F., Boesch, D. F., Garcia, T. D., Murray, C. A., & Ulmer, F. (2011).Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshow Drilling.Report to the President, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. doi:978-0-16-087371-3
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THE MACONDO BLOWOUT, 2010 11 Oort, E. v., Friedheim, J. E., Pierce, T., & Lee, J. (2011, December). Avoiding Losses in Depleted and Weak Zones by Constantly Strengthening Wellbores.26(04). doi:10.2118/125093-PA:https://www.onepetro.org/journal-paper/SPE-125093-PA Patel, D. (2018, October 24).16 Characteristics of Critical Thinkers.Retrieved May 18, 2019, from Entrepreneurs: https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/321660 Sheffield, J., Sankaran, S., & Haslett, T. (2012). Systems thinking: taming complexity in project management.20(2), 126-136. doi:10.1108/10748121211235787: https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/10748121211235787?journalCode=oth Smith, P., Kincannon, H., Lehnert, R., Wang, Q., & Larrañaga, M. D. (2013, May 07). Research and Process Safety Management: Human error analysis of the Macondo well blowout. 32(2), 217-221. doi:10.1002/prs.11604: https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/prs.11604 Yanga, L.-R., Huang, C.-F., & Wu, K.-S. (2011, April). The association among project manager's leadership style, teamwork and project success.International Journal of Project Management, 29(3), 258-267. doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.03.006: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263786310000566 Zhong, Y., & Pheng, S. (2009). Managing crisis response communication in construction projects – from a complexity perspective.DISASTER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 18(3), 270-282. doi:10.1108/09653560910965637: https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/09653560910965637