Australian Bushfire Risk Management

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The assignment delves into Australia's strategies for managing bushfire risk. It analyzes historical data, policy implementations like the 'Prepare, stay and defend or leave early' policy, and community preparedness during events like the 2009 'Black Saturday' bushfires. The analysis includes perspectives on household decision-making, the effectiveness of risk reduction measures, and lessons learned from past disasters.

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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
ASSIGNMENT
INSTITUTION
TUTOR
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
ABSTRACT
The Black Saturday fires remain among the most renowned disasters to strike the state of
Victoria. Owing to the low level of preparation, however, a lot of property was damaged
including residences and people’s property were destroyed totaling up to 2006 homes and 171
lives lost. Currently, no individual has been named in terms of arson and therefore the better part
of the report by the Victoria Bushfire Royal Commission indicate that is was result of natural
causes. Presently, the report has had a significant contribution as many way forward objectives
were drawn from the report. Further research has also been done following the limitations of the
report submitted and also counts as a contribution.
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
Contents
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................................i
1. INTRODUCTION:................................................................................................................................1
1. HOUSE LOSS SURVEY FINDINGS...................................................................................................3
2. CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO PROPERTY LOSSES...................................................................5
3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VICTORIAN ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL REPORT...................5
4. CONCLUSION:.....................................................................................................................................6
Bibliography..................................................................................................................................................7
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
1. INTRODUCTION:
The event of the black Saturday bushfires is, to date, one of the biggest recorded disaster in the
state of Victoria. It was a series of fires that started in January 2009 with the biggest bushfire
disaster happening on the 7th of February. It was responsible for the deaths of 171 people and the
destruction on 2006 homes throughout the state.
Figure 1: Map of Victoria and affected areas
Though the ignition of the fires is still thought to be arson, no party has been identified as having
orchestrated the event and as such, it has been considered and treated as a natural disaster. The
Victorian Royal Commission was tasked with the responsibility of preparing a final report in
order to identify probable causes and also help generate a network of solutions in case of an
emergency in the future.
While a suspicion remains that the fires started as a results of arson, it is also attributable to the
climatic conditions of the area where a heat wave had provided a surge in temperatures as shown
in figures 2 and 3 below:
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
Figure 2: Temperatures recorded during the Black Saturday weekend. Source:
https://nishaisawesomeatgeog.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/
Figure 3: Melbourne City temperatures between January and February 2009. Source:
https://nishaisawesomeatgeog.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
1. HOUSE LOSS SURVEY FINDINGS
From the house loss survey, it is evident that not much planning had been done prior to the fires
to provide for a preventive solution. The state government, people and nation as a whole had
been using policies that, while effective in dealing with smaller fires, could not be implemented
on a fire event of the magnitude of the Black Saturday fires. Numerous houses and property that
were lost could have been salvaged or saved had effective planning been done. It was noted,
however, that the disaster management operations by both the government and non-
governmental organizations were exemplary and it is because of them that a large portion of the
affected areas survived (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, 2010).
National Level: At a national level, planning activities for the eventualities of a fire disaster were
misplaced as suggested by Denis O’Bryan in his paper “House loss rate in a severe bushfire.” He
goes on to clarify that, following a paper by Ahern and Chladil written in 1999 in response to a
similar bushfire crisis, it was suggested that close proximity to vegetation is directly proportional
to the chance of a residential structures being consumed the same fire (Ahern and Chladil, 1999).
O’Bryan in his paper called it out as a policy based on misquoted text (O'Bryan, 2014).
It was noted that the correlation between proximity to vegetation, trees and presence of trees,
proximity of combustible materials to the house or other vegetation in the compound, and the
damage to houses and property was totally coincidental as both affected and unaffected houses
had similar statistical values. It is further suggested that, rather than distance between vegetation
and trees, the relevant authorities should have concentrated on distance from the ember source as
the primary parameter for prevention of damage to residential property by the fires (O'Bryan,
2014).
State and Territory Level: Both O’Bryan’s paper and the commission’s report indicate that there
were inadequate regulatory policies for the prevention of the bushfires. The commission’s report
indicate that the preparatory advice given by the County Fire Authority (CFA) was also not
sufficient to help residents plan well in order to prevent fire damage to homes. This is indicated
by the fact that 24% of houses that were prepared in compliance to the CFA advice were still
either damaged or destroyed with casualties and fatalities still being reported in these incidents
(O'Bryan, 2014).
The government taskforce’s research also indicated that some residents were caught up in the fire
because no timely information about it had been given and only noticed when it was too late. A
large number of the people interviewed report having gotten the information about the fire and
its whereabouts from friends and family who had either been affected themselves or had gotten
the information from some other source. It has been reported that, while most radio and
television stations talked about the fire, they did not air warning messages in good time. This and
other sources indicate that a majority of the residents who got an evacuation message either via
radio or via some other means only got it when it was too late to do anything but escape
immediately (Booth et al., 2015).
This indicates a flaw in the disaster communication system, an observation which was also made
later by the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry after the 2011 Brisbane flooding
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
(Insurance Council of Australia, 2011). While the government cannot entirely be blamed for
untimely information, it raises a few eyebrows when the lack of it may have been directly or
indirectly responsible for the deaths of 171 people. The following graph shows the disasters that
have occurred in Melbourne over the last century and their location.
Figure 4: Map of natural disaster distribution in Victoria. Source:
https://nishaisawesomeatgeog.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/
Individual/ Household Level: Another thing learnt from the house loss survey is the
ineffectiveness of the ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ strategy. This is because, as seen
in the overall demographics, a majority of the people who died, died in their homes. Some died
in their yards abut as seen in the reports and data presentation, most people who died did so
trying to defend their homes. The policy advises to either leave early or stay behind and prepare
well for the fire. This advice may have been effective in a different scenario but with the poor
communication in this particular case, most people did not have time to adequately prepare for
the fires (McLennan et al., 2012).
While some people were unprepared because of lack of enough time due to poor communication,
some were unprepared because they did not see the need to. This is evidenced in the report when
4 out of every 5 people interviewed who were unprepared for the fires acknowledge that they did
not see the need to. This has raised questions about the state and national government’s role in
ensuring proper bushfire preparedness. For a state that had experienced a similar disaster but of a
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
slightly lesser magnitude back in 1999, it would be expected that they would have had
preparatory measures at least when the first fires broke out. However, it can be noted that a large
factor contributing to how the people reacted was an assumptive attitude that sought to play
down the threat until it was too late (O'Bryan, 2014).
2. CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO PROPERTY LOSSES
Among the conditions that gave rise to these losses are the poor advisories and regulations. This
is evidenced above by the fact that CFA advisories on preparedness still did not help preserve the
buildings affected by the fires. Another example is given where 12% of houses that were
destroyed or damaged were compliant with either AS 3959 while another 14% were compliant
with WMO regulations. The compliance to those regulations seemingly made no difference to
the preservation of the houses and property. This shows a fault in the regulatory measures put in
place as they were not effective at the time (O'Bryan, 2014).
Another condition that provided for the losses was the attitude of the people on the wake of the
disaster. A majority of the people who had not prepared their houses for disasters are noted to
have not done so because they saw no need to. While it can be argued that the bushfires caught
the nation by surprise, it is also a wonder that people living in areas with bushes would not put
up the right measures in order to put up a formidable defense. While this condition is not
attributable to the loss of property, it cannot be attributable to the loss of life (Hayes et al., 2010)
Another condition that proved to contribute to the loss of houses and other effects is the lack of
proper communication. As the reports indicate a very late warning alert form the radio stations, it
is assumable is that poor condition did serve as a condition for the overall fire effect. In the past,
proper communication has helped people going through a natural disaster similar to the one in
this case. It is therefore possible to assume that it would have a similar effect on the population
in question. Poor communication in this case includes with television and radio (Attiwill and
Adams, 2013).
3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VICTORIAN ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL REPORT
Among the contributions of the Victorian Royal Commission Final Report, the biggest is the
identification of the sources and possible causes of bushfires and how they spread. Despite
having experienced a similar tragedy of less magnitude back in 1999, the data, having been
compared has shown some consistency ruling out the coincidences and unverified information.
The repetitive data was compiled both by the state’s commission and independent parties either
consulted by the state or publishing their work online. With this information, further preparation
plans can be drawn and better preparation methods can be achieved. The information here
provides a reference point in case of any planning activities (O’Neil and Handmer, 2012).
The report indicated that a lot of policies and regulations that were in place then had been either
ineffective or not implemented well enough. One of the best examples of this is the fact that 24
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
out of 26 houses burnt up completely were located in Marysville, a region that has had strict
building codes. The building codes, having been highly prioritizing, must have given a false
sense of preparedness leading to many losing their lives and property. This report has therefore
contributed to the body of knowledge about bushfires and the then method of preparedness in
case of further study.
The report released also highlighted the need for further research on bushfires. It provided a
starting point offering statistical data both for the affected regions, property and individuals and
the mode of both ignition and spread. It is with this in mind that researchers have been able to
recommend solutions for the unpreparedness. The report’s contribution to the research sector,
while not entirely exhaustive has also helped study the human behaviour in a hid to provide for
better interventions in the future. Further researches and comparisons have been done and a
database created allowing for accurate and timely information management (O’Neill and
Handmer, 2012).
The report, in highlighting the behavioural tendencies of the people, also contributed to
identifying possible places and centers of mass relief. When the fires broke out and people ran, a
majority of them, as indicated in the report, admitted to running to public spaces e.g. schools,
parks, hospitals, police stations and churches. These places, at the time, seemed more secure than
their homes. Having observed this, we can say that the report contributed to disaster management
of recurrent and similar crises. While this is different from personal preparedness, disaster
management goes a long way in mitigating the effects of the disasters and helping the people
affected deal with the aftermath of it all (Hughes and Mercer, 2009).
4. CONCLUSION:
It is noteworthy that, aside from a few regulations that have been incorporated to enable the
government to mitigate the effect of the fire, that no lasting solution has since been established.
With this in mind, it is also noteworthy that fire preparation is important both by the individual
or house hold, or the regional authority. As such, further research is still needed on this field in
order to improve the chances of both human and property survival (Ladds et al., 2017).
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BLACK SATURDAY FIRES, 2009
Bibliography
Ahern, A., and Chladil, M., 1999. How far do bushfires penetrate urban areas? In Bushfire 99
Australian Bushfire Conference, Albury.
Attiwill, P. M., & Adams, M. A. (2013). Mega-fires, inquiries and politics in the eucalypt forests
of Victoria, south-eastern Australia. Forest Ecology and Management, 294, 45-53.
Booth, K., Tranter, B., & Eriksen, C. (2015). Properties under fire: why so many Australians are
inadequately insured against disaster.
Handmer, J., & Tibbits, A. (2005). Is staying at home the safest option during bushfires?
Historical evidence for an Australian approach. Global Environmental Change Part B:
Environmental Hazards, 6(2), 81-91.
Haynes, K., Handmer, J., McAneney, J., Tibbits, A., & Coates, L. (2010). Australian bushfire
fatalities 1900–2008: exploring trends in relation to the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave
early’ policy. Environmental science & policy, 13(3), 185-194.
Hughes, R., & Mercer, D. (2009). Planning to reduce risk: the wildfire management overlay in
Victoria, Australia. Geographical Research, 47(2), 124-141.
Insurance Council of Australia. (2011). Flooding in the Brisbane River Catchment, January
2011. Sydney: ICA Hydrology Panel.
Ladds, M., Handmer, J., & Magee, L. (2017). A pragmatic approach to improving Australian
disaster data.
McLennan, J., Elliott, G., & Omodei, M. (2012). Householder decision-making under imminent
wildfire threat: stay and defend or leave?. International Journal of Wildland Fire, 21(7),
915-925.
O’Neill, S. J., & Handmer, J. (2012). Responding to bushfire risk: the need for transformative
adaptation. Environmental Research Letters, 7(1), 014018.
O'Bryan, D. (2014). House loss rate in a severe bushfire. Melbourne, Victoria: Published by Red
Eagle Bushfire Protection Services.
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. (2012). Final Report. Queensland: Queensland
Floods Commission of Inquiry.
Stephens, S. L., Adams, M. A., Handmer, J., Kearns, F. R., Leicester, B., Leonard, J., & Moritz,
M. A. (2009). Urban–wildland fires: how California and other regions of the US can
learn from Australia. Environmental Research Letters, 4(1), 014010.
Tibbits, A., Handmer, J., Haynes, K., Lowe, T., & Whittaker, J. (2008). Prepare, stay and defend
or leave early. Community Bushfire Safety’.(Eds J Handmer, K Haynes) pp, 59-71.
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. (2010). Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final
Report. Publisher Parliament of Victoria, Australia.
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Whittaker, J., & Handmer, J. (2010). Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black
Saturday research. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, The, 25(4), 7.
Whittaker, J., Haynes, K., Handmer, J., & McLennan, J. (2013). Community safety during the
2009 Australian ‘Black Saturday’bushfires: an analysis of household preparedness and
response. International journal of wildland fire, 22(6), 841-849.
Whittaker, J., & Mercer, D. (2004). The Victorian bushfires of 2002–03 and the politics of
blame: a discourse analysis. Australian Geographer, 35(3), 259-287.
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