International Relations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

This article discusses the impact of nuclear technology on international relations and the efforts towards non-proliferation. It explores the NPT, disarmament agreements, and export control systems. The article also highlights North Korea's role in undermining the NPT and the need for global cooperation towards non-proliferation.

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International Relations
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International Relations
Introduction
The advent of nuclear technology was a fortune for the world. However, the test of time
proves otherwise with nuclear technology rising to be among the most dangerous phenomenon to
peace and tranquility in the globe. Several states including the United States and Russia have
engaged themselves in a nuclear race in an effort to assert their global position and power
(Fuhrmann & Lupu, 2016). According to Pearson (2018), efforts by the United Nations to have
countries go slow in the processing of nuclear armaments have been futile as many nations
continue processing the dangerous arms and others are joining the race. The crisis between North
Korea and the United States creates a shift of nuclear weapon balance between the two nations
something that threatens the world peace (Hill, 2013). Today, North Korea stands among the
nations with the highest threats of nuclear arsenal amounting to a world threat. However, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by nations to prevent the spread of the arms and the
processing technology appears to have come to save the situation. The nuclear disarmament
agreement represents the biggest commitment by the nuclear weapon states and the cornerstone
for having an end of atomic weapon regime in the world (Sands & Mihalik, 2016). Despite the
efforts by the United States and the international community to end the nuclear regime in volatile
countries, there have been replete periods of crisis and stalemate and the countries have been a
key challenge to the global non-proliferation regime.
Combination of Norms
The combination of disarmament norms appears to have botched. The advocacy for
halting the creation of arms by leading nuclear states is a disappointment as most countries such
as North Korea (Knopf, 2018). The international approach inclined towards eradicating the

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unpredictable and rising nuclear capability of North Korea requires reinvigoration. For instance,
a council on foreign relations report highlighted that there is a need to mount efforts to encourage
abandonment of nuclear processing among nations. Non-strategic nuclear weapons from North
Korea remain a rising concern for the international community. The recent evidence by the
Development of Low Yield Warheads exacerbates a worrying trend as these weapons pose a
fumbling threat that could lead to a nuclear confrontation (Perkovich, 2014). The norms
enshrined in the NPT are a fable as the efforts to engender a nuclear-free society remains a
dream. The problem lingers because the disarmament exercise appears to help some nations
secure their global and strategic position by preventing others from rising. Indeed, the situation
with North Korea elucidates the whole concept of disarmament as a political and economic war
meant to place the United States and its allies on the advantageous side making the norms of the
NPT a failed reality.
The rhetoric of nuclear non-proliferation appeared to gain new momentum with the rise
of Donald Trump into US presidency. Throughout Obama regime, he opted for strategic patience
and he did not engage in utterances with the queer North Korea administration. However, vocal
Trump appears to leave no stone unturned by confronting Kim Jong Un in his face (Kim & Han,
2018). For instance, President Trump elicited the much controversial statement on the nuclear
weapon when he responded to his counterpart that he has a nuclear button on his hands too that
was more powerful than that of North Korea. Essentially, the arms race is on and as the two
leaders show, the world has lost the war and fight against armaments. The fact that the two
leaders agreed to share a table for the first time in May 2018 is a historic win in the non-
proliferation efforts (Tanter, 2017). However, their war of words may sometimes show non-
tolerance of states to the course of disarmament. The pledge by the two leaders to change their

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countries relationships was a significant effort towards disarmament. According to Kim and Han
(2018), they signed a joint statement pledging to trail on a path to pursue everlasting peace and
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Importantly, Trump agreed to put on hold the US-
South Korea military training and Kim consented on destroying a test site for missile engine. The
two leader’s efforts signify significant momentum towards the process of non-proliferation and
its norms that will lead to world peace and tranquility.
Non-Proliferation Agreements and Treaties
The advent of NPT was a turning point in the history of nuclear weapons as it marked the
beginning of peaceful resolution of arms crisis. The following years after the treaty would mark
nation engaging in agreements meant to bring a new face of relations. For example, North Korea
agreed to the NPT in 1985 becoming a state party to the agreement. The need by the leading
nuclear power and weapon processors to have the arms curtailed convinced North Korea that it
was safe with the treaty as all the parties were to show efforts to engender a nuclear-free world
(Grape, Svärd, Hellesen, Jansson & Lindell, 2014). In 2002, the United States and Japan agreed
under the Agreed Framework that they would build light water reactors for North Korea in
exchange for the freezing of all nuclear activities by the nation. However, there were bumpy
efforts and the achievements were minimal. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization made substantial progress in constructing infrastructure for light water reactors in
North Korea (Craig & Ruzicka, 2013). However, the change of administration in the key
countries of the agreed framework led to the abortion of the treaty. According to Grape et al,
(2014), the 2002 confrontation by the United States that North Korea was developing uranium
power plan, which the country partially confirmed. Without and in debates, North Korea was
adamant to stick to the agreed framework and in 2003; it announced the breach of the NPT.

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Despite the collapse of the agreed framework, the six-party talks took the course for NPT
where the United States, China, Japan, Russia and Republic of Korea joined forces to discuss the
nuclear situation in North Korea. The Six-Party Talks had little progress and in 2005 North
Korea admitted that it had nuclear weapons and ready to withdraw from the activities of the talks
because the united states wash harsh and hostile (Frieman, 2014). By 2006, North Korea
unleashed it nuclear capacity by conducting a test of one-kiloton weapon program. The Security
Council was mad and passed resolutions against the nation passed under Chapter VII of the
charter of United Nations (Craig & Ruzicka, 2013). However, China engaged North Korea, in
2007 the six-party dialogue resumed, and it agreed to dismantle its nuclear facilities. Apparently,
the issues of the impasse over North Korea nuclear program have no resolve at the NPT (Grape
et al., 2014). Its non-commitment to the resolutions of the treaty and tumbling stand makes it
clear that North Korea has never been committed and will never agree to reduce its nuclear
processing. Moreover, the stand taken by the great nations appear to be an impediment to finding
a lasting solution to the problem. However, the new relationship between Trump and Kim may
lead the way to find a lasting solution if both parties will act in good faith.
UN Resolution of Non-Proliferation
The United Nations has held a resolve position toward nuclear weapons. The non-
proliferation process is at the core of the organization to have all nations conform to the agenda.
In 2016, the UN reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to international
peace, tranquility, and security (Pearson, 2018). Therefore, it adopted a resolution calling for all
states that have not accepted to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty organization
(CTBTO) to do so. One hundred and sixty six nations have already deposited their tools of
ratification of the agreement to have all nuclear explosions for military and civilian use banned

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(Chesterman, Johnstone & Malone, 2016). Thus, the UN underlines that the NPT remains the
cornerstone for the non-proliferation of the nuclear regime and an essential foundation for the
achievement of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After the council voted for the CTBTO the
executive secretary, Lassina Zebro said that the agreement served to strengthen the policy against
nuclear testing and harmful use (Avant, D., & Westerwinter, 2016). In the words of Chesterman
et al. (2016), the treaty came at a time when North Korea agreed that time had come for the
international community to affect the treaty and have the cessation of nuclear testing sealed. The
UN also acknowledges that the process of implementation of the treaty is not easy, but the
commitment of the states to have it work will help make strides for future safety and completion
of the disarmament exercise.
Export Control Systems
The export control system has an effective method of advocating for non-proliferation.
The adoption of new policies, regulations, acts of control and facilities carrying primary
commercial and military applications of nuclear weapons have been effective in controlling the
manufacture and spread of the arms (Gahlaut, 2017). The Chinese export control is one of the
prominent non-proliferation engagement. By integrating its multilateral standards, China made
its system compatible with the international standards to reduce the channels that permit end-user
proliferation of critical items (Altmann & Sauer, 2017). For instance, the promulgation of new
regulations to control the export of chemical, nuclear, and military products has enabled China to
ensure that there is no spread of technology and processing of nuclear weapons. The United
States also practices the export controls by ensuring that they pull and push the multilateral
systems. The United States takes initiative in implementing non-proliferation export controls the
regulation of vast production capabilities (Early, Nance & Cottrell, 2017). Certainly, non-

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proliferation export controls are essential for enhancing the process of denuclearization. There
may appear discrepancies in the way countries execute export controls. However, the
achievement of the underlying theme is critical for a safe and peaceful universe.
North Korea Undermining NPT
For many years, North Korea has been a powerful processor of atomic weapons. Indeed,
the nation has the largest consortium to sell nuclear reactors to the Middle East (Pollack, 2017).
Its growing engagement in the trade of nuclear reagents positions her in a leading role and the
country projects that by 2030 it will capture 40% of the world trade of nuclear elements. The rise
in prominence of North Korea in the trade of nuclear weapons occasioned the concern of the
other leaders in the market including the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, and France reckoning of the
serious competition and danger posed by her trader (Way & Weeks, 2014). Probably, the trading
partners for the country are the largest cause of concern because South Korea main market is the
Middle East, which seems to be a volatile region. Therefore, the fact that the nuclear elements
can make the deadliest weapons in the world makes other regions to feel uneasy with the trade
between South Korea and her partners. Indeed, it is evident that the rising concern for the nuclear
gist in the country is a tale of the business pages unlike what the competitors make out of the
occasion.
The prominence of non-proliferation related concerns particularly from the United
Nations and the United States arises from the belief that there is a need to reduce the
environmental impact elicited by the reactions of the elements. However, North Korea assured
that it adopted the pyro-processing technology that is less harmful compared to the traditional
processing methods and has few proliferation risks (Way & Weeks, 2014). However, the
international community is adamant on the defense laid by the nation and keen that the new

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technology will be obstinate to control and could permit diversion of versatile nuclear materials.
North Korea has over time been reluctant and an occasional violator of global rules for nuclear
non-proliferation. Indeed, the failure of the agreed framework to freeze illicit plutonium arms led
North Korea to withdraw from the non-proliferation agreement with the United States in 2002
(Hill, 2013). The pursuit of achieving the goals of nuclear weapon policies require North Korea
to conclude nuclear cooperation with leading actors such as the United States rather than engage
in a primal battle. Moreover, it is essential for the nation to abscond revolt form international
organizations and become a follower and a leader in the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda.

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